•CD

CO

HANDBOUND
AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF
TORONTO PRESS

The Central Problem of
David Hume's Philosophy

An Essay towards a

Phenomenological Interpretation of the First Book
of the Treatise of Human Nature

by
C. V. Salmon

M. A. Oxon

Offprint at:

,,Jahrbuch fur Philosophic und phanomenologische Forschung", vol. X
edited by £. Husserl, Freiburg i. Br.

**/*

Halle a. d. S.

Max Niemeyer Verlag
1929

Alle Rechte,

auch das der Obersetzung in fremde
Copyright by Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle (Saale), 1929
Printed in Germany

Druck von Karras, Krober & Nietschmann, Halle (Saale

To my Father

xa ViOfl<i$ xa ravg xa

Table of Contents.

Pagre
Introduction 1

Part I.
Concerning the Generalities of Hume's Position.

Chapter 1. "The Way of Ideas". Hume's Heritage 4

§ 1. The "Idea". Descartes and Locke 4

§ 2. Subjectivism and Psychology. Hume's Attitude towards himself.

The "philosophic" and the "natural" state of mind 7

Chapter 2. The Nature and Necessity of Introspection. . . 11
§ 3. Hume's notion of Introspection on the field of consciousness.

J. S. Mill on the "psychological" and "introspective" mode ... 11

§ 4. Hume vindicated, and Mill criticized 14

§ 5. Concerning the nature of Introspection. Real Hypostases ... 17
§ 6. Hume confused between the "psychological" and "introspective"

modes 19

§ 7. Final vindication of the Introspective Mode 24

Chapter 3. TheplaceofLogicintheSciences 30

§ 8. Locke's Division of the Sciences. The Rational Hypostasis and

the two operations of Abstraction 30

§ 9. Hume's excess of zeal against the Continental Rationalists. First
distinction of the elements of the Impression. Hume's view of
Abstract Ideas 33

Chapter 4. TheAscentofthelmagination 38

§ 10. First appearance of Hume's notion of the "Imagination". A

parallel between Causality and the Abstract Ideas 38

§ 11. Hume's subordination of the Quantitative to the Qualitative
Ideas implies that he does not consider them to be examples of
analytical relation 40

§ 12. Brief statement of Hume's contradictory attitudes towards Cau
sality 43

§ 13. Hume's ultimate division of the powers of Consciousness into
Reason, Sensation and Imagination, is latent in his treatment of
Causality . . . 46

yj Table of Contents.

Page
Chapter 5. The History of the "Impression" and the "Idea" 49

§ 14. A caution concerning Hume's use of the Impression-Idea anti
thesis 49

§ 15. Hume's Impression-Idea antithesis 51

§ 16. The variety of functions actually attributed to the Impression

and the Idea 54

§ 17. Serving to connect Part I. Sect. 3 in the Treatise, with Part I.
Sect. 4. What resulted from Hume's proposal to derive the Idea
from the Impression 57

Chapter 6. An Estimate of the 'Scepticism' to which Hume is
led by his misconception of the Subject-Object
relation 61

§ 18. General Estimate of Hume's conception of the Subject-Object

relation 61

§ 19. Hume's 'Scepticism', harmless when it is absolute, false when it
is partial. Hume's Comparative Subjectivism, converning A. the
Objective World of Reality 63

§ 20. Hume's Comparative Subjectivism, concerning B. the Subjective
world of Consciousness. The strange conclusion brought about
by the relation of these two 'Scepticisms' 68

§ 21. Hume's Scepticism concluded in a kind of Berkeleyan Idealism . 71

Chapter 7. Hum e's Theory of Belief 77

§ 22. Hume's general conception of Belief. Rational and Perceptual

Belief 77

§ 23. Hume's particular account of the Belief, which is general tq

Consciousness 82

Part II.
Concerning Hum e's Particular Problem.

§ 24. The Programme of Part II 86

A. Hum e's Methodic. Emergence of the Phenomenon . . . 87

§ 25. Neither the Senses nor the Reason present us with the objects of

our Perception. Hume's estimate of Sense-Data ...... 88

§ 26. The "Imagination" in Perception. Hume fails to distinguish

between Sensation and Sense-Data 92

§ 27. The Three-fold division of Perception. Further Development of

Hume's notion of the Fiction as the Object-in-Consciousness . . 96
§ 28. 'Protention' and 'Retention' part of the Apprehension of all

Consciousness 100

§ 29. Hume's paradoxical 'Appearance-Theory'. That which it involved

and that to which it leads .' . . ... . . . . . . . . 102

B. Hume's "System". The Problem of Identity in External

Perception . . . 107

§ 30. Introduction to Hume's Principium In dividual ion is, or special

problem of Identity in Consciousness . „ . . ... v . . . . 108

§ 31. Part I of Hume's System. Principium Individuationis. I. Identity 110

Table of Contents. VII

Page

§ 32. Part II of Hume's System. Principium Individuationis. II. Unity 113
§ 33. Survey of Hume's Arguments to the Establishment of his account

of Identity 119

§ 34. Hume's Seven Definitions of a "Perception". Part J.I of Hume's

System 121

§ 35. Vindication of the Vulgar Man from the opinion that our "per
ceptions" are "interrupted" 124

§ 36. The Re-appearance of Hume's notion of the "Idea" 127

§ 37. Hume's "Philosopher" examined 131

§ 38. Hume's Example of the comparatively 'Genuine' Identity . . . 133

§ 39. Hume's Example of the comparatively 'Spurious' Identity . . . 136
§ 40. Hume's notions of the "disposition of the mind", and of the

"idea", set free from the results of his Empirical Prejudice . . 141
§ 41. Hume deserts the Phenomenal sphere. Identity is converted into

an Abstract Idea. Parts III and IV of Hume's "System" . . . 143

§ 42. A Concluding Estimate of Hume's position 148

The Central Problem of David Hume's
Philosophy.

By

C. V. Salmon (M. A. Oxon).

Introduction.

The Treatise of Human Nature sets out to be a study of the
whole nature of man. But in effect Parts I. to IV., comprising Hume's
First Book, and the entirety of the Treatise which is devoted to
'metaphysical' speculation, resolve themselves into an analysis and
description of the subjective 'act' of External Perception. The
problem which forms the core of Hume's enquiries, to which all that
precedes it stands as a preparation, is stated succinctly in the 2nd
Section of Part IV. First, To explain the principium indi-
viduationis, or principle of identity. Secondly, Give
areason, why the resemblance of our broken and inter
rupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity
to them. Thirdly, Account for that propensity, which
this illusion gives, to unite these broken appearances
by a continu'd existence. Fourthly and lastly, Explain
that force and vivacity of conception, which arises
from the propensity1).

In view of the obvious difficulties attending this interpretation
of the work, I have looked in the early portions of the Treatise for
a problem which might co-ordinate the whole. I have followed the
orthodox steps of other critics, and sought to make Hume's treatment
of Causality upon the one hand, and his treatment of Reason upon
the other, the centre of his thought, only to find that neither of them
can serve with justice to the tenour of the whole. For if it is
difficult to correlate all the Parts of the Treatise to its last Part, it
is not for lack of uniformity of theme. From the first paragraph to

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 489.

300

C. V. Salmon, [2

the last, the Treatise is governed by Hume's conception of the nature
of human consciousness Hume proclaims his interest with no lack
of decision in the Introduction. 4Tis evident, he says, that all
the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human
nature; and that however wide any of them may seem
to run from it, they still return back by one passage or
another1). And he speaks of his philosophy as the science of
Man, and of H u m 9 11 Nature itself as the capital or center
of the sciences, which he intends to seize. And he says .... In
pretending .... to explain the principles of human
nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the
sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new,
and the only one upon which they can stand with any
security2). The attempt to delve, thus, into the ultimate
springs and principles of human nature is pursued throughout
the Treatise; and in concluding the first Book, Hume writes For my
part, my only hope is that I may contribute a little to
the advancement of knowledge, by giving in some par
ticulars a different turn to the speculations of philo
sophers, and pointing out to them more distinctly
those subjects where alone they can expect assurance
and conviction. Human Nature is the only science of
man; and yet has been hitherto the most neglected3).

If reason or causality had provided Hume with his central
problem, he would have conceived the essence of Human Nature to
be rational or causal. But Hume did not consider it as either the
one or the other. He admitted no objective causality, and if he did
not actually deny the human faculty of reason, he confined it to as
narrow a sphere of activity as he could. Hume's science of Man was
conceived as the investigation of the principles of human Conscious
ness, and the principles which he examined most closely in Book I
were those involved in the external perception.

By reviewing the results of this examination I hope to shew up
Hume's genius in a new light. The study of Hume as a forerunner
of Kant, upon the one hand, and as one of the founders of modern
empirical psychology, upon the other, has tended to obscure his
own philosophy. His conception of consciousness, and the method
which he used to examine its structure, have not received any direct

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 306. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 306-7.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 552.

3] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 301

development either from the Kantian philosophy, or from empirical
psychology. The one has been too formal, and the other too objective,
to be in sympathy with Hume's descriptive and subjective work. But
the present century has seen the rise of a school of thought in Ger
many whose attitude towards philosophy and philosophical problems
is akin to Hume's. The Phenomenological *) conception of Conscious
ness as the matter of philosophy, as the foundation of all intelligence
whatever, and the a priori alike to Logic and Psychology, resembles
Hume's conception of Human Nature. Historians will see Hume's
lineal successors, not in Kant or Mill, but in Brentano and Husserl.
For the essential of Hume's philosophy is its subjective attitude, the
notion that the ultimate explanation of truth and all ontologies
awaits the practise of an introspection. This introspection should not
be psychological in the empirical sense, for it has to reveal the
ultimate processes of consciousness itself. But, like the psychological
investigation, it aims at description and not at definition. Hume did
not always succeed in keeping his reflection pure of a reference to
physical and psycho-physical reality. His connection with these in
volved him in many difficulties, and brought him to some extravagant
conclusions. He was tempted to abandon the principle which he had
tried to establish: The origin of all the individual's knowledge is
within himself. But he clung to it, and sacrificed the reality of all the
natural world. I am first affrighted and confounded, Hume
writes at the conclusion of his first Book, with that forelorn
solitude, in which I am plac'd in my philosophy, and
fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not
being able to mingle and unite in society, has been
expell'd all human commerce, and left utterly a b -
andon'd and disconsolate .... I have exposed myself
to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathe
maticians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at
the insults I must suffer?2)

It might seem as if a philosopher had justly earned the scorn of
his associates, who, at the end of his enquiries, could leave the indi
vidual as a battle-ground between his faculties, compelled now by

1) Phenomenological. — The Title adopted by the Phenomenological School
of Philosophy, which is at present under the leadership of Edmund Husserl. The
School includes, or has included, such members as M. Heidegger, A. Reinach (the
late), M. Scheler (the late), R. Ingarden, O. Becher, D. von Hildebrand, H. Konrad-
Martius, and others.

2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 554.

302 C- V- Salmon, [4

reason, and now by common-sense, to opposite convictions. But
Hume may be admired for preferring to leave his work full of ab
surdities than to forsake the principles of his Subjectivism. For these
are irrefutable, and his mistakes are not difficult to rectify. The
Subject is the only 'object' of philosophy. Within himself lies the
philosopher's world, albeit large enough to hold the universe, and
universum of knowledge. The history of philosophy has shown that
the introspection of consciousness requires a strict discipline. Two
prejudices hamper the philosopher, the metaphysical prejudice, and
the empirical. Hume was free of the former. At the expense of
the metaphysican he cracked many a joke. But the empirical fallacy
returned to plague him whenever he seemed quit of it. Paradoxical
as it reads, Hume was led into solipsism by his belief in reality. For,
while he recognized that the subject was responsible for his con
sciousness of every objective sphere, he considered himself obliged
to qualify the subjective with some of the qualities of the one ob
jective sphere of Reality. The reality of the Humeian consciousness
quickly excluded the reality of the whole world else.

This Essay occupies itself first with as much in Parts I — III of
the Treatise as is essential to the matter in Part IV. Before examining
Hume's special problem of the external perception, it attempts to
outline the general theory of philosophy in which Hume conceived
his problem set.

Part I.

Concerning the Generalities of Hume's position.

Chapter I.

"The Way of Ideas." Hume's Heritage.
§ 1. The "Idea". Descartes and Locke.

The title of Hume's first Section, Of the Origin of our
Ideas, involves him in historical relation to his past. Hume was
not the first to conceive of a science of man. The epistemological
notion, that something, at least, of the nature of the objects of know
ledge consists in our knowledge of them, is as old as philosophy
itself. 'Modern' philosophers had embodied the notion in the word
"Idea". "Je prends le nom d'Idee pour tout ce qui est congu im-
mediatement par 1'esprit1)." Locke used the same word for the same

1) Descartes, Letter to Hobbes.

5] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 3Q3

notion. All knowledge, he thought, depends upon the immediacy of
our apprehension of it. That only can be known certainly which is
immediately present to the mind. "It is evident, the mind knows not
things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has
of them." "Since the mind, in all its thoughts arid reasonings, hath
no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does, or
can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant
about them1)."

This notion of the "idea" as the "immediate" object of con
sciousness is, in itself, ambiguous. Locke, being chiefly interested in
what he called "knowledge", makes the reason the chief object of
his study; and in the Essay, the "idea" gradually assumes the meaning
which is generally assigned to it do-day, of being object to the reason,
of being 'thought'. It is this notion of the idea as rational which
lends the Lockeian terminology its significance. That only can be
'known' which is an 'idea'. The 'idea' being 'immediate' is present
under "Intuition". The Lockeian "intuition" is always rational, and
belongs together with "Demonstration" to the province of Logic. No
'knowledge', then, is absolutely 'known', except the 'ideas' of the
reason, for no other objects of consciousness, except the reason's
ideas, are 'immediately present to the mind'.

Such an interpretation of Descartes' notion of the immediacy of
the idea is, however, unnecessarily confined. For why should the
'mind' be the reason, and not rather the whole of apprehensive con
sciousness?

Being dissociated from the Lockeian terminology, the phrase
"the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention
of the ideas it has of them", carries a universal significance. Locke
does himself suggest a wider application of the principle than he
actually makes: and if Descartes had not already suggested that ideas
might be immediate in the sense of being the "means" of all con
sciousness of objects, the notion was implicit at any rate in his Cogito,
ergo Sum. The residuum of the Cartesian Dubito was in fact an
"idee". Descartes had recognized that when a man "doubts" the
whole world, he does not empty his consciousness of all its content.
Were a man to wake at any moment and recognize that what he had
taken for perceptions had been illusions merely, and the objects of
those perceptions non-existent, his perceptions themselves would yet
remain, incontrovertibly, perceptions of those objects believed real;

1) Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. IV, § 3.

304 C. V. Salmon, [6

and those objects as they were perceived would have been a content of
consciousness. The same applies to every field. If the truths which
a man reasoned were apprehended to be figments and not true, the
man's consciousness itself would not have been void, but still 'ob
jective', an intuition of objects believed true. If these objects had
no 'existence' outside consciousness, they had one within it, But for
the sake of philosophy the real world need not cease to exist, or
become recognized for a nonentity. Truths need not become null or
recognized for fiction. An exclusion from the attention merely of the
real world, or of the world of truths, suffices to turn the attention
of the individual on to his consciousness itself. The Cartesian dubito
was certainly not sceptical. It implied no more than the possibility
of a change of attitude, away from the objective, towards the sub
jective. The possibility of disregarding the objects of consciousness in
any perception, and of regarding the objects in consciousness in the
same perception, does not impugn the objectivity of what was per
ceived, for it involves an entire change of attitude. The two sets of
objects, the objects of consciousness and the objects in consciousness,
can never be apprehended at the same time, since the one requires
the objective, and the other the subjective, regard. The objects in
consciousness may be called "ideas", and because they are not alter
native to, but complementary to, our consciousness of objects them
selves, they may be called "immediate", and the means to our con
sciousness of objects. As much as this was latent in Descartes, and
neither Locke, nor Hume, saw the whole of it. Locke put both sets
of objects on the same plane, and adopted a 'representative' theory
to relate them; and Hume, considering them as strictly alternative to
one another, denied the existence of the objective for the sake of
that of the subjective. Locke suggested, definitely enough, that the
object in consciousness was the means by which we became conscious of
objects outside consciousness, and in one passage he departs from his
usual terminology to use the word "idea" in this sense. "There can be
nothing more certain", he writes, "than that the idea we receive from
an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge1)." And
again, "It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only
by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, there
fore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and
the reality of things2)." It is significant that the importance of these

1) The Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. II, § 14

2) The Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. IV, § 3.

7] The Central Problem of BaviJ Hume's Philosophy. 3Q5

two sentences should have rested chiefly on the misleading influence
which they exercised on Locke's successors. Campbell Fraser has
referred to the second of them as "the germ of modern philosophical
scepticism," and has held it responsible for every variety of Re
presentative Theory of Perception, on the one hand, and by way of
reaction against it on the other, for such dogmatic 'realism' as Reid's
assumption "in the name of common sense, that we perceive things
in the senses without ideas.7'

§ 2. Subjectivism and Psychology. Hume's attitude towards himself.
The "philosophic" and the "natural" state of mind.

When we first scrutinize the problem of the theory of knowledge
we most of us become 'comparative subjectivists'. We recognize that
the world is dependent on our perception of it. But most philo
sophers have been content to recognize the fact of this relation
between the world and ourselves, and leaving the relation itself
obscure, to pass as quickly as they may to the elaboration of a priori
principles for some of the spheres contained in the objective world.
The logician is as far as the psychologist, and both as the natural
scientist, from solving the problem of the 'relation' itself. The
abstract ideas with which the logician deals are 'objects' as much as
things in the natural world, and as capable as these of being studied
in and for themselves. But the study of them for themselves requires,
in the one case as in the other, a careful exclusion of the subjective
elements involved in our apprehension of them. The philosopher can
make no more elementary mistake than to suppose that the reason
is a faculty more peculiarly essential to consciousness, than, say,
perception, or the faculty of dreaming, and to conclude that he has
only to study the reason and the laws of thought, to find the clue
and ultimate explanation of all consciousness. The reason may be
considered peculiar to the 'human' being; and, from the evolutionary
point of view, reasoning is a late, if not the latest, development of
consciousness. But this does not mean that reason may be taken by
itself as the essence of human consciousness, or that it includes
within itself the other faculties, because, historically speaking, it
presupposes them. On the contrary! Logic is an 'abstract' science,
and the ideas of the reason must be purified of every non-rational
element before our observation of them can yield valid results.
Natural Science is equally 'abstract'. The scientist must purge his
objects of every non-real element before his observation of them can
Husserl, Jabrbuob f. Philosophic. X. 2

306 C- V- Salmon, [8

yield valid results. Thought on the one hand, and reality on the
other, are particular realms of which the human person is. or can be,
conscious. But since neither reasoning, nor perception, is the sole
faculty of human consciousness, not even a subjective study of these
faculties can claim to be the supreme study of philosophy. It happens
that psychology, for the most part, has not been a subjective study
of the faculties of consciousness. Psychology has concerned itself with
the observation of consciousness as it can be seen to function in the
life of persons. As such it cannot claim to be a study of the relation
between a person and the world of his consciousness. The person,
whose functions psychology observes, is already an object in the world,
a real object or a psychical object, according as the psychology is
empirical or pure, but always an ^object'. In studying the reaction of
persons to happenings in the real world about them, or the sequence
of their so-called 'states of mind' which are discernible to him, the
psychologist is always interested in something objective. The persons
and their psycho-physical, or psychical, actions and reactions are the
objects of his consciousness. The psychologist is himself making use
of a relation of himself to an objective world. The relation is his
consciousness of those persons and their activities. It follows that if
the word 4a priori' be confined to its most absolute sense, to designate
that ultimate relation of a person to any and every of his objective
worlds, and eventually to every possible objective world, then the
results of the conventional psychology cannot be called a priori.
Psychology can only be made a priori in the absolute sense when
it is conceived by a subject as the examination of his own states of
consciousness, and as a further step from these, as the examination
of all possible states of consciousness; and it is only in this highly
specialized sense that Hume can be called a psychologist. For Hume's
purpose was to examine his own consciousness, and, turning his
attention from what was objective to him in everyday life, to con
centrate upon what was actually passing in his own mind, and what
was implicit in his consciousness itself. Hume describes this reflective
state of mind in a comparison which he draws between the philosophic
and the natural state of mind. He thought that the two states of
mind were contradictory to one another. Having failed, himself, to
comprehend the nature of the relation between consciousness and
its objects, he felt himself bound to make a choice between the ob
jects in consciousness and the objects outside it. Philosophically
speaking, he considered himself compelled to admit that no one can
ever perceive anything but his own "perceptions"; but in daily life

9] The Central Problem of David Home's Philosophy. 307

his unsophisticated nature obliged him to believe that he perceived
realities independent of himself. Hume's misinterpretation of these
two states of mind does not rob his discovery of the essential diffe
rences between them of all its value. When Locke made his "ideas"
'representations' of realities, he was nearer to scepticism than Hume,
the avowed sceptic, who made the "ideas" and the "objects" alter
native to one another. To every representative theory stands the
unanswerable objection, that, in fact, we do not perceive two sets of
objects but only one. If we grant, as we can be forced to, that it is
only in virtue of our perception of the tree that we perceive the
tree itself, yet we are also bound to admit, that we do not perceive
both our perception of the tree and the tree itself. When Locke
said that "the mind knows not things immediately but only by
the intervention of the ideas it has of them - - Our knowledge,
therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between
our ideas and the reality of things", — he was arguing, falsely,
from his premise to an absurdity. As if what enabled a man
to perceive, for example, a house, was that there was taking
place in his "understanding" a certain coalescence or agreement of
his "ideas" of the walls and roof! that, in fact, for each part of the
real house there was a correspondent part of an ideal house which
was fitted together in the understanding, as a child might cut out
and piece together a cardboard reproduction of a house! so that a
man became conscious of the real house when the last part of the
ideal house, a window or a chimney-pot perhaps, had been stuck into
its place in his understanding!

Hume did better than this in making the perception of the ideas,
and the perception of the realities, strictly alternative to one another.
For while it is true that we can apprehend them both, we can never
apprehend them both at the same time, or from the same point
of view.

Hume speaks of "metaphysical reflections", and describes the
philosopher sitting in his chair, abstracted from the world of every
day, and conscious not of the world itself, but only of his ideas of it.
And presently, will he, or will he not, Hume's philosopher becomes
again the man of every-day, and adopts the attitude of practical life.
Hume sets reason upon the one hand, and nature upon the other.
Most fortunately it happens, Hume says, that since
reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature
herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this
philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by

2*

308 C- V' Salmon, [10

relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and
lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all
these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon,
I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when
after three or four hours' amusement, I wou'd return
to these speculations, they appear so cold, and
strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart
to enter into them any farther. Here then I find myself
absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and
talk, and act like other people in the common affairs
of life1).

And on the other hand, At the time . . . . that I am tir'd
with amusement and company, and have indulged a
reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river
side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am
naturally inclined to carry my view into all those sub
jects, about which I have met with so many disputes
in the course of my reading and conversation . . . . I am
uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disap
prove of another; call one thing beautiful, and another
deform'd; decide concerning truth and falsehood,
reason and folly, without knowing upon what prin
ciples I proceed. I am concern'd for the condition of
the learned world, which lies under such a deplorable
ignorance in all these particulars. I feel an ambition
to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of
mankind and this is the origin of my philo
sophy2). Hume did well to emphasize the essential difference
between the points of view of ordinary conscious life and of re
flective philosophy. That he thought that the beliefs in which a man
lived in the one point of view were directly contrary to those in
which he lived in the other, was due to a misconstruction of the
data which he found in each. The misconstruction is not difficult to
remedy; and since the fault was, partly at any rate, responsible for
his having kept his philosophical data distinct from his natural data,
we need not be too severe upon it.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. S4&-9. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 550.

11] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 309

Chapter II.
The Nature and Necessity of Introspection.

§ 3. Hume's notion of Introspection on the field of consciousness.
J. S. Mill on the "psychological" and "introspective" modes.

Hume conceived of philosophy in the terms of a man reflecting
upon his own consciousness to the exclusion of the real world and
the life which he is accustomed to lead there. Philosophical truth
can only be revealed, he conceived, under a kind of philosophical
introspection. Hume took up Locke's purpose of describing to others
"what it is their minds do, when they perform the action they call
knowing"1), but carried it out by a different method. He extended
the Lockeian notion of 'knowing' to cover, in theory, every possible
faculty of conscious apprehension, and in practice, the faculty of
perception. He took very little account of the reason. Of the 36 Sec
tions which compose the first Book of the Treatise, only 4 are con
cerned at all directly with the reason. Of these 4, one, (Sect. 7,
Part I) is occupied with denying, as against Locke, that there is any
such thing as an "abstract" idea; one (Sect. 1, Part III) with showing
that almost everything which Locke called "knowledge" he ought
to have called "opinion"; another (Sect. I, Part IV) has for its title
Scepticism with regard to Reason; and the fourth (Sect. 16,
Part III) refers shortly to what Hume delights to call the Reason
of Animals. The sphere of Humeian rational knowledge is con
fined to arithmetic and a small part of algebra. Ideas related in
these two disciplines alone are allowed to remain within the "demon
strative inference". All other so called 'ideas' can offer us probable
knowledge only, and belong, therefore, to the Lockeian "judgment".
"Judgment", Locke said, "is the thinking or taking two or more ideas
to agree or disagree by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose
certain agreement or disagreement with them it doth not perceive,
but hath observed to be frequent and usual."2)

By carrying on what almost amounted to a crusade against the
Continental Rationalists, Hume removed the "idea" from the faculty
of reason, and used it in connection with conscious apprehension in
general. And having thus extended the faculty of knowing, he went
on to change the kind of "description" which Locke had given of
what it is the mind does when it performs the action called knowing.

1) Locke, 2nd Letter to Stillingfleet.

2) The Essay. Bk. IV, Ch. 17, § 7,

310 C. V. Salmon, [12

For Locke's attempt at description had degenerated into an attempt
to discover the temporal origin of our ideas. The mind was a piece
of white paper which, in its growth from infancy, received im
pressions like marks in ink. Believing that there was a fixed order
in the arrival or occurrence of these impressions, Locke conceived it
to be the task of the philosopher to ascertain this order, and construct
a system, or description, of human consciousness, based on this history
of ideas. And, since Locke, such an account of the growth of the
mind has been generally accepted as the proper task of psychology.
In a passage in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy,
J. S. Mill, accepting Cousin's definition of the business of philosophy,
to decide what it is that our mind really "testifies to", what it is
that is really given us at first hand in our "intuitions", divides philo
sophers into two schools. Both schools accept the task, but each
pursues it with a different method of investigation. The one uses the
"introspective method", which Mill condemns, and the other the
"psychological method", which he applauds.

"The elaborate and acute criticism", he writes, "which is perhaps
the most striking portion of M. Cousin's Lectures on the History of
Philosophy, sets out with a remark which sums up the characteristics
of the two great schools of mental philosophy by a summary de
scription of their methods. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong
from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the question to
be first resolved, the origin of our ideas. This was commencing at
the wrong end. The proper course would have been to begin by
determining what the ideas now are. To ascertain what it is that
consciousness actually tells us, postponing till afterwards the attempt
to frame a theory concerning the origin of any of the mental
phenomena. I accept the question as M. Cousin states it, and I
contend that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations
of consciousness, can be successful, or entitled to any regard, unless
preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to follow it, an enquiry
into the origin of our acquired ideas. For we have it not in our
power to ascertain, by any direct process, what Consciousness told
us at the time when its revelations were at their pristine purity. It
only offers itself now, when buried under a mountainous heap of
acquired notions and perceptions. It seems to M. Cousin, that if we
examine with care and minuteness our present states of consciousness,
distinguishing and defining every ingredient which we find to enter
into them — every element that we seem to recognize as real, and
cannot, by merely concentrating our attention upon it, analyse into

13] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

anything simpler — we reach the ultimate and primary truths, which
are the sources of all our knowledge, and which cannot be denied
or doubted, without denying or doubting the evidence of conscious
ness itself, that is, the only evidence which there is for anything. I
maintain this to be a misapprehension of the conditions imposed on
enquirers by the difficulties of psychological investigation. To begin
the enquiry at the point where M. Cousin takes it up is in fact to
beg the question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact, at least
of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the mind — the laws
of association according to one class of thinkers, the Categories of
the Understanding according to another — are capable of creating,
out of those data which are uncontested, purely mental conceptions,
which become so identified in thought with all our states of con
sciousness, that we seem, and cannot but seem, to receive them by
direct intuition; and. for example, the belief in Matter, in the opinion
of some of these thinkers, is or at least may be, thus produced.
Idealists and Sceptics, contend that the belief in Matter is not an
original fact of consciousness, as our sensations are, and is therefore

wanting in the requisite which gives to our subjective

convictions objective authority. Now .... these persons .... cannot
be refuted .... by appealing to Consciousness itself. For we have no
means of interrogating Consciousness in the only circumstances in
which it is possible for it to give a trustworthy answer . . . (namely,
before the mind has been buried under the mountainous heap of

acquired associations) We have no means of now ascertaining by

direct evidence, whether we are conscious of outward and extended
objects when we first opened our eyes to the light. That a belief or
knowledge of such objects is in our consciousness now, whenever
we use our eyes or our muscles, is no reason for concluding
that it was there from the very beginning, until we have settled
the question, whether it could have been brought in since ....
The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or Principles of
Common Sense, are affirmations of consciousness, supposes two things,
that the beliefs exist, and that there are no means by which they
could have been acquired .... Locke was therefore right in believing
that "the origin of our ideas" is the main stress of the problem of
mental science, and the subject which must first be consit
forming the theory of the Mind"1).

1) Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. J. S. Mill. Longmans G
1878, pp. 176—179.

312 C. V. Salmon, [14

§ 4. Hume vindicated, and Mill criticized.

It is noteworthy that Mill believed himself to be taking Hume's
side, and arguing, as Hume might have argued against Cousin. His
reference to the "laws of association" is intended for Hume, and in
"Sceptics contend that the belief in Matter is not an original fact of
consciousness", the allusion is to Hume. But Hume would not have
commended Mill's arguments. Hume did not endorse Locke's attempt
to find in the temporal origin of our ideas the a priori of philosophy.
There are reasons for calling Hume a sceptic, but he never contended
that the belief in matter was not an original fact of consciousness.
On the contrary, over and over again, Hume bears witness to the
force of the belief in matter. It was for Hume precisely our belief
in matter which was an original fact of consciousness, something to
which our mind will testify, in spite of all the arguments which we
can bring against it. — No one can hope to understand the Humeian
Laws of Association, who imagines that they were framed to account
for the temporal origin of our ideas. Hume was convinced, like Cousin,
"that Locke went wrong from the beginning". Hume was convinced,
like Cousin, that the proper course is "to begin by determining what
the ideas now are". Hume's purpose was precisely Cousin's, namely,
"to ascertain what it is that consciousness actually tells us, postponing
till afterwards the attempt to frame a theory concerning the origin
of any of the mental phenomena". For what interested Hume was
not the origin but the 'genesis' of our ideas, not the question, when
did our mind make us conscious of such and such objects? but the
question how does our mind make us conscious of such and such
objects? Putting the question as Cousin put it, Hume was anxious
to decide what it is that our mind "testifies to", when it is taken in
and for itself, or, as Locke put it, "to describe to others what it is
their minds do, when they perform the action they call knowing".
It was with this task that Hume's armchair philosopher was occupied,
as he sat, practising introspection, to the neglect of the whole world.
What Hume really did in his work on the external perception, was
i to shift his attention from the objects generally perceived, on to the
conscious experience of perception itself. This is not to say that he
always realized what was involved in this change of attitude. He was
; often inclined to confuse the 'perception' with the object perceived,
I and to argue, — and it is in this sense that Hume was a sceptic, — that
because space, time and matter, and all that they involved, were not
themselves to be found in the 'perception', although they were un-

15] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 313

doubtedly 'perceived', that space, time, and matter, did not really ft
exist. Hume was right to suppose that, by investigating the perception
he could discover how the perception of space, time and matter is
made, but quite wrong in supposing that he ought to find space, time
and matter there themselves.

Mill is perfectly entitled to consider the business of psychology
as the "enquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas". One task of
empirical psychology is to provide us with a "history" of our ideas,
regarding both the growth of the individual baby to the man, and,
anthropologically, the growth of the human race. But, when Mill
goes on to consider this historical enquiry as a priori, and precedent
to any valid philosophical enquiry, "I contend that no attempt to
determine what are the direct revelations of consciousness can be
succesful, or entitled to any regard, unless preceded by .... an
enquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas," he not only mis
understands the nature of philosophical enquiry, but by impugning
the certainty of intuition, makes it impossible, after, as before, the
practice of psychology. The philosopher will be willing enough to
grant the psychologist that "we have it not in our power to ascertain,
by any direct process, what Consciousness told us at the time when
its revelations were at their pristine purity". For it must seem to
the philosopher, as it seemed to M. Cousin, "that if we examine
with care and minuteness our present states of consciousness,
distinguishing and defining every ingredient which we find to enter
into them .... we reach the ultimate and primary truths, and which
cannot be denied or doubted, without denying or doubting the
evidence of consciousness itself, that is, the only evidence which
there is for anything". The conviction that present consciousness is
self-sufficient, that it can be taken to contain within itself forms and
faculties sufficient to, and responsible for, the objective truths with
which it presents us, is the only possible foundation for philosophy.
We can only be justified in considering mathematical propositions
as true, if we believe that our own faculties of consciousness are
responsible for the propositions appearing to us as they do. Our
intuition must be believed to be beyond the reach of doubt. The
evidence of each present state of mind to its present self must
be taken to be ultimate and absolute. If, like Mill, we found the
truth of, say, mathematical propositions on a historical past, we must
also make them dependent on a historical future. Not only shall we
need to trace the historical origin and growth of our ideas of number
and relations of number, in order to support our mathematical

3x4 C- V- Salmon, [16

arguments with fundamental proof, but having thus established them,
we shall still be obliged to qualify them by making them relative
to the present state of our development. If we succeeded in proving
the historical truth of 2 plus 2 = 4, we should be forced to admit
that some future development of the human mind might bring the
same premises to a different conclusion. In the passage quoted, Mill
confines himself to the faculty of perception, but such a limitation
is quite arbitrary. His "For we have no means of interrogating
Consciousness in the only circumstances in which it is possible for
it to give a trustworthy answer", if it be valid at all, must apply
to all the faculties of consciousness. "The proof that any of the
alleged Universal Beliefs .... are affirmations of consciousness,
supposes two things, that the beliefs exist, and that there are no
means by which they could have been acquired.'"1 Mill was con
strained to enquire into the perception, rather than into any other
faculty, by his interest in, and prejudice for, reality. Did he conceive
of a sort of "golden age" in the history of mankind, when men
'perceived' only what really existed? He draws a distinction between
"data which are uncontested", by which he understands perceptions
of objective and ultimate realities, and "purely mental conceptions",
which the mind invents and superimposes upon these original per
ceptions, so that the real and the fictitious can no longer be dis
entangled, or recognized for what they are. Mill conceives that this
invention and imposition of fictions on to "uncontested data", is
due to a power of "association" native to the human mind. And
when he talks of "association", he thinks of himself as a disciple of
Hume. "The laws of association", he says, "are capable of creating,
out of those data which are uncontested, purely mental conceptions,
which become so identified in thought with all our states of con
sciousness, that we seem, and cannot but seem, to receive them by
direct intuition."

In thus interpreting the Humeian laws of association, Mill totally
misunderstands the best of Hume's work. For with whatever hope
Hume may have started his research, of being able to distinguish
between those data in consciousness, which are in Mill's sense
"original" and "uncontested", and those which are posterior to these,
he discovers quickly that consciousness is not capable of supporting
any such distinction. He finds that if the notion of association is to
be used at all, it must be used with reference to all the processes
of consciousness. He finds that no means remain for distinguishing
in consciousness between "data which are uncontested", and "purely

171 The Cen^al Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 315

mental conceptions". On the contrary, he finds that all the data in
consciousness must be called "fictions", i. e. the production of the
creative mind. In so far as Hume remains true to this point of view,
and places the 'origin' of the whole content of all the worlds which
we perceive, or could perceive, in a purely subjective 'genesis', he !
reaches the true starting point of all philosophy, vindicates his con- i
ception of the dependency of the sciences on "human nature", and
both proposes, and practises, the "introspective method" of philo
sophy which Mill condemns.

§ 5. Concerning the nature of Introspection. Real Hypostases.

The introspective method will examine consciousness itself. It
excludes all the objects of consciousness. The real world and all its
past and future is one class or sphere of objects. Mathematics and
its entities, and logic and its conceptions, are other classes or spheres
of objects. All are excluded. [/The introspective method supposes
that the whole of our perception or consciousness of these and other
objective spheres, is due to, and must be explained by, the processes
of consciousness itself. To take particular examples, it is not the
reality of the real world which makes us perceive it, or the truth
of the logical world which makes us aware of its truth and its truths.
The laws of the genesis of our consciousness of these worlds will be
neither real nor logical. The introspective philosophy proposes to
investigate not the laws or principles of these objective worlds, but
the laws or principles of our consciousness of these worlds; and it
must take the greatest care that no law or principle belonging to
these worlds be taken over from these worlds, to explain, or to be
used towards explaining, the principles of our consciousness of these
worlds. The principles of the objective worlds presuppose the con
sciousness in which we know these worlds. The laws of these worlds
are a part of these worlds as we know them, and must not be
employed in explaining the 'as', or manner, of our knowing them.
Any employment of objective laws, be these real, or logical, or moral,
or aesthetic, in explaining the principles of consciousness involves
hypostasis, and will prevent a proper explanation. Hume was in no
danger of using logical principles to explain the processes which he
found in consciousness. He had very little use for 'rationalization'.
But he did not succeed in clearing his subjective regard of the taint
of reality; so that he gave some excuse to his successors for regardir
him, as Mill regarded him, as an empirical psychologist. But Hume

316 C V- Salmon, [18

was not guilty, like Mill, of the 'historical hypostasis'. Hume saw
no difficulty in the "mountainous heap", and did not impugn the
evidence of the direct intuition. It is true that, in his very first
section, Hume makes use of the historical argument. In considering
the relation of his "Impressions" and "Ideas", he talks of the order
of their first appearance1), and thus allows himself to share,
for a moment, Locke's conception of the historical task of philo
sophy, which, for the most part, he spurns. But in view of the fact
that Hume quickly made the "idea" swallow the "impression" by
turning the "impression" into an "idea", he left no "first appear
ance" to establish an "order of appearance", and may be absolved
from any real devotion to an argument of which he makes no further
use. But over and over again Hume asserts the autonomy of the
direct intuition, and does not hesitate to oppose it even to those
beliefs which are most generally accepted.

But, besides the hypostasis involved in the historical argument,
there is another which Hume shares with Mill, and to which he
clings. Mill wished to set those "data which are uncontested"
upon a basis of reality, and did so in two ways. He held that
the "uncontested data" in the mind represented real existences,
in contrast to the "purely mental conceptions", such as Matter,
which represented only fictitious existences. Hume had done away with
this distinction. Hume found no ground, at any rate in his better
moments, for distinguishing between "uncontested data" and "purely
mental conceptions". In fact he laid it down, eventually, that if our
data are uncontested it is precisely because they are what Mill would
have called "purely mental conceptions". But Mill was inclined to
say not only that our "uncontested data" represented realities, but
also that they owed the fact of their being "uncontested" to their
being realities themselves. The suggestion is unmistakeable. "Idea
lists and Sceptics", he says, "contend that the belief in Matter is not
an original fact of consciousness, as our sensations are, and
is therefore, wanting in the requisite which .... gives to our sub
jective convictions objective authority." Mill wishes to rest a part,
at any rate, of the incontrovertibility of our "uncontested perception
data", on the fact of their being themselves sensations, and as such
"real". Locke, whom Mill applauds, starting, like Mill, with the
historical bias, had made use of the same argument. "Since there
appear not to be any ideas in the mind," Locke wrote, "before the

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 314.

19] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the under-
standing are coeval with sensation; which is such an impression,
made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the
understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by
outward objects that the mind seems first to employ itself in such
operations as we call perception, remembering, consideration, reas
oning, etc."1). This fallacy, that the incontrovertibility of the data
of consciousness rests, in the last resort, both actually and historic
ally, upon 'reality', manifested through the 'real' means of sensation,
has been widespread. In our own day, owing largely to the extra
vagant faith in reality, which the success of the natural and physical
sciences has produced, we have seen the birth of a physiological
psychology which claims to comprehend philosophy. One would
not have expected Hume, who drew so great a gulf between
the objective and the subjective worlds, to be liable to it. But Hume
was often guilty of the real hypostasis, and even after his most
brilliant analysis of a purely subjective experience, he was tempted
to reduce the whole experience, absurdly, to the terms of real
sensation.

In the matter of causation, to take one example, Hume takes
great pains to point out that our perception of cause is dependent
upon certain purely subjective processes of consciousness, and in
the very face of this proceeds, first, to deny that there is any such
thing as real cause, — an inverse use of the real hypostasis — and

then, a direct use of the real hypostasis --to assert that it is

a cause which governs the processes of consciousness. In this we
see a repeated contradiction.

§ 6. Hume confused between the "psychological" and "intro
spective" modes.

Hume's most illogical use of realistic arguments — they always
lead him to absurd conclusions - - is explained by the fact, that
although he did achieve a very considerable practice of philosophi
introspection, he did so rather in his own despite, and without qui
recognizing the nature of his operations. Hume's own descripti
of the experiments he is going to conduct conform to the psycho,
logical" rather than to the "introspective" method, and offer 1
some excuse for taking him for an ally. Having laid down i

X) The Essay, Bk. II, Ch. I, Sec. 23.

318 C- V- Salmon, [20

Introduction the absolute importance and universal scope of "Human
Nature", Hume says, And as the science of man is the only
solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only
solid foundation we can give to this science itself
must be laid on experience and observation .... For
to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind
being equally unknown to us with that of external
bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any
notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from
careful and exact experiments, and the observation
of those particular effects, which result from its
different circumstances and situations. And tho' we
must endeavour to render all our principles as uni
versal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to
the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simp
lest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain we cannot go
beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends
to discover the ultimate original qualities of human
nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous
and chimerical1). So far there is nothing definitely amiss in
Hume's programme, although the conception of "experience" as the
only foundation for philosophy is obviously in need of closer de
finition; and Hume's "tho' we must endeavour to render all our
principles as universal as possible" rather suggests that, for some
reason or other, he supposes that this will be impossible. Now
what prevents a science from reaching universal principles is the
possibility of its being bound to particulars. If a science is obliged
__ to proceed strictly inductively, it can never reach beyond a relative
^ / generality compounded of the sum of observed cases. We can con
ceive of empirical psychology as being limited in this way, but the
idea seems foreign to philosophy. Is Hume going to consider the
"experience", which he calls the foundation of all consciousness, as
being nowise different from that objective psycho-physical experience
and experiencing, which supplies empirical psychology with its sub
ject-matter? . . . . to me it seems evident, he writes, that the
essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with
that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible
to form any notion of its powers and qualities other
wise than from careful and exact experiments, and

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 308.

21] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 3^9

the observation of those particular effects, which
result from its different circumstances and situa
tions1). And finally, after a comparison of his task with that of
the natural scientist, he writes, Moral philosophy has
this peculiar disadvantage, which is not yet found in
natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot
make them purposely, with premeditation, and after
such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every
particular difficulty which may arise. When I am at
a loss to know the effects of one body upon another
in any situation, I need only put them in that situa-
tion, and observe what results from it. But should I
endeavour to clear up after the same manner any
doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the
same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this
reflection and premeditation would so disturb the
operation of any natural principles, as must render
it impossible to form any just conclusion from the
phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experi
ments in this science from a cautious observation of
human life, and take them as they appear in the
common course of the world, by men's behaviour in
company, in affairs and in their pleasures. Where
experiments of this kind are judiciously collected
and compared, we may hope to establish on them a
science which will not be inferior in certainty, and
will be muchsuperiour in utility to any other of human
comprehension2). Is this, then, to be the end of Hume's boasted
"science of human nature", this philosophy which was to contain "a
compleat system of the sciences", that it should "not be inferior in
certainty", and should be "much superiour in utility to any other c
human comprehension"? It would be disappointing, being nothing
more nor less than a formulation of what Mill called "the psycho-
logical, as distinguished from the simply introspective mode , b
"the known and approved method of physical science, adapted
the necessities of psychology". Fortunately Hume did not
the methods which he here lays down. Once fairly started on
investigations he disregarded the limitations which he had I

l)G,&G,I,p-308. 2)G,&G,I,P.309_10.

320 C- V- Salmon, [22

A regard for what Hume called the "peculiar disadvantage of
moral philosophy", and what Mill called "the necessities of psycho
logy", has been so general among students of the "science of man",
that it will be well to consider, somewhat closely, the nature of these
limitations, which Hume seemed ready to allow to his investigations.
The purport of the passage is the following. The philosopher is
prevented from the examination of his own mind by certain diffi
culties native to introspection. These difficulties make it, in effect,
impossible that the 'natural' or 'true' principles of consciousness
or 'experience' should be revealed. "Premeditation," Hume says,
"disturbs the operation of the natural principles", thus rendering the
instance under examination 'artificial', that is, different in its nature
from the ordinary unreflected experiences of conscious life. This
disturbance of the operation of the natural principles obliges the
philosopher to disregard himself and his own consciousness, and
turn his attention on to other people, other subjects, whose ex
periences he can study in their natural state. It is from this point
of view that Hume is doubtful, and rightly doubtful, of rendering
his principles universal. For in the early stages of such psychological
investigation, the investigator is working empirically and a posteriori,
collecting a large number of similar instances of particular ex
periences. But even when this investigation has been advanced far
enough to allow these particularities to be converted into abstract
generalities, the discipline built upon these can claim no more than
relative a-priority. The investigation has all along been in the strict
sense 'objective'. The material of this science may be called 'ex
periences', but these are, after all, the experiences of other people,
that is, experiences objectively observed, and not 'experiences' in
the strict sense, i. e. experiences experienced. The material of ob
jective psychology is "persons" rather than "experiences". These
"persons", psycho-physical or psychical as they may be regarded, are
'objects', part of the world of which the investigator is conscious,
part of the world, then, his consciousness of which the investigator
has created for himself. If he regards these 'persons' physically, they
belong, in his consciousness, to his creative experiences of per
ception. If he regards these 'persons' psychically, they belong, in his
consciousness, to his creative experiences of sympathy (i. e. he
projects on to some body which he perceives, a power of ex
periencing experiences, similar to his own). If he regards them psycho-
physically, they belong, in his consciousness, to a compound of his
creative experiences. In each of these three cases, of which one

23] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 321

belongs rather to the science of biology or physiology than to psycho
logy, the results of investigation are 'objective' in the strict sense,
being the products of a subjective consciousness and experiencing,
which is itself not regarded. These results can be accurate and useful,
and are capable of sustaining general rules and principles which are
no less valid than those of any other natural or physical science.
Its a priori discipline is on the same plane as that of any other
physical or natural science. Hume himself was aware both of the
comparative relativity of the psychological a priori, and of its con-
gruity with the a priori's of the other sciences. But if this im
possibility, he writes, of explaining ultimate principles
should be consider'd a defect in the science of man,
I will venture to affirm that 'tis a defect common to
it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we
can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are
cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or
practised in the shops of the artizans. None of them
can go beyond experience, or establish any principles
which are not founded on that authority1). Indeed this
relativity, which is the best which an empirical psychology can pro
duce, so weighs upon Hume, that he writes: I do not think a
philosopher who would apply himself earnestly to, the
explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would
show himself a great master in that very science of
human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very
knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind
of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair
has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment,
and that we are no sooner acquainted with the im
possibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire
itself vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at
the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down con.
tented2). But, as he says, A true sceptic will
dent of his philosophical doubts, as well as c
philosophical conviction3), and this sitting down contented
in despair does not long detain him. In spite of a recurrence of
such passages, in spite of the compromise which Hume is so of
tempted to make between his doubts and his convicti

l)Gr.AGr.I.p.309. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 308-9.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 552.

Huaserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophie. X.

322 C. V. Salmon, [24

dominate the work, and stand much as he set them out in his Intro
duction. The mind is the citadel of human science which we may
seize. We are to leave the tedious lingering method,
which we have hitherto followed, and instead of
taking now and then a castle or village on the fron
tier, to march up directly to the capital or center of
these sciences, to human nature itself; which being
once masters of, we may everywhere else hope for an
easy victory1). It is this hope which inspires the Treatise, and
this task to which Hume devotes himself. Hume's main theme is
not to be questioned. In spite of all his doubts his conviction remains
with him. Hume is convinced that while all the rest of the sciences,
empirical psychology among them, "cannot go beyond experience or
establish any principles which are not founded on that authority",
.philosophy itself can go "beyond experience". Philosophy can
go 'into' experience, can concentrate upon experience itself, and
that experiencing, which presents us with all the objects of our
knowledge, and conditions them. When Hume despairs, it is be
cause he cannot justify his practise of the introspective mode. But
he recognizes, that if he may not practise it, he will be driven to
accept the limitations of the empirical psychologist, who regards
other persons and not himself.

§ 7. Final vindication of the Introspective Mode.

What was the nature of the "peculiar disadvantage of moral
philosophy", which seemed likely, at one time, to drive Hume into
the ranks of the empirical psychologists? Philosophy, Hume said,
"in collecting its experiments, cannot make them purposely, with
premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself con
cerning every particular difficulty which may arise". For, says Hume,
"tis evident this reflection and premeditation would .... disturb
the operation of any natural principles". As Hume does not state,
explicitly, how this reflection would disturb the experience in question,
in asserting for ourselves the contrary, we shall be content to state,
and invalidate, the most general argument which is brought against
the possibility of pure introspection, and from which, in our opinion,
all minor objections derive their force.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 307.

25] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 333

This argument runs as follows. Let it be granted, that no sub-
jec can become conscious of any object whatever, without himself
hvmg through a certain 'experience'. It is obvious that this Tx
penence is one which takes place below the threshold of con-
sciousness and, that anyone living in the ordinary attitude is quite
unaware of experiencing' any such 'experience'. Let it be supposed
however, that by some such method as the Cartesian dubito the
subject can succeed in revealing this internal experience to himself
It is to be understood, now, that the subject succeeds in experiencing
consciously what before he experienced unconsciously. He finds that
these experiences consist of certain 'intentional'1) 'processes', through
which his 'mind' works to create for itself its accustomed ,
sciousness of objects. If, now, by the constant practice of such
flection, our philosopher became able, in each and every of his

con-
re -
con

scious experiences, to remove his attention from the object of his
consciousness, and turn it inwards on to that consciousness itself, and
discover there the processes through which he had lived, and by
whose means only he had arrived at his consciousness of the object,
it would have to be allowed that he was in the possession of a method
which could furnish him with the ultimate a-priori of all knowledge.
For he could take every faculty of consciousness by turn, the per
ception of reality, the apprehension of truth, recognition of the
right, appreciation of the beautiful, etc. etc. and from a description
of the processes involved in his consciousness of a plurality of parti
cular objects in these several fields, pass, through a manipulation of
their varieties, to the region of strict generality. There he could
exhaust the types not only of all actual, but also of all possible,
experiences of objects. But, says now the objector, all this claim is
based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of introspection, and
on an ignorance of the difficulties native to its practice. For if it
is true, as was granted, that the subject cannot become conscious
of any object without living through a certain experience, below
the threshold of consciousness, then, the subject cannot say, in any
particular instance of reflection, that the 'processes' which he is now
surveying, are those by means of which, a moment since, he was con
scious of such and such an object. This for one of two reasons! Either

1) The word "Intentional", was brought into modern use from the Scholastic
by Brentano. For its present use in Phenomenological Philosophy, see Husserl,
'Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie', pp. 64, 168, et seq: Max Niemeyer,
Halle a. S., 1922.

3*

324 C- V- Salmon, [26

the 'processes' which he is now surveying are not the whole, but only
a part, of those through which he had to live, in order to be con
scious of his object, or they are not those at all which helped him
to a consciousness of that object, but are processes which are helping
him now to his consciousness of themselves. This alternative depends
upon the two kinds of interpretation, which can be put upon the
original premise, that no subject can be conscious of any object
without living through certain processes, which are the means of his
consciousness of that object. The first interpretation is as follows:
If every object of consciousness presupposes a means in conscious
ness, then those processes, which become, under introspection, objects
of consciousness, themselves presuppose a means in consciousness by
which they have become objectified. And since it must be acknow
ledged that the 'processes' revealed are not identical with, but diffe
rent from, the original object of consciousness, it must be acknow
ledged also, that the processes underlying these processes, as the
means of their being objectified, cannot be identical with, but must
be different from, those 'processes', become objects, which have been
shown to underly the consciousness of the original object. In other
words, since it is impossible to 'reflect' without changing the object
of consciousness, each reflection presupposes a new 'means', and the
reflecting subject must be involved in an infinite regress, before he can
ever arrive at what he may say, absolutely, was the 'means' by which
he was conscious of any particular object, i. e. the 'processes' which
he is surveying at any particular moment are not the whole, but
only a part, of those through which he had to live, in order to be
conscious of his original object.

The second interpretation of the original premise argues that
because no subject can become conscious of any object whatever,
without himself living through certain processes as a 'means' to
that consciousness, for that very reason, those processes, which
it is admitted are lived through, can never be revealed, i. e. made
the objects of consciousness. For, if no subject can be conscious of
an object without a means thereto, it is presumed that the same
means will always furnish the subject with a similar object, and that
a different object will always imply a different means. If therefore,
it is in the nature of all the means to any particular object to remain
below the threshold of consciousness, we can never hope to bring
them up into consciousness; for the only circumstance, in which we
can live through the particular means, is in the consciousness of the
particular object of which it is the means. There is, therefore, no

27] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 335

such thing as a strictly reflexive consciousness, but each state of
consciousness implies its hidden means. We can never be aware of
consciousness itself, but only of objects: and when we seem to be
conscious of actual internal experiences, we are in reality either in
venting, or remembering, states of consciousness which we have
experienced, but never those which we are at the moment actually
experiencing.

Re-quoting Hume's objection, it will be seen to be capable of
bearing both of the interpretations offered above. When I am
at a loss, he said, to know the effects of one body upon
another in any situation, I need only put them in that*
situation, and observe what results from it. But should
I endeavour to clear up after the same manner any
doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the
same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this
reflection and premeditation would so disturb the
operation of any natural principles, as must render
it impossible to form any just conclusion from the
phaenomenon1).

It remains to show that both interpretations are based upon a
misconception of the nature of philosophic reflection or intro
spection. In considering the significance of Descartes' discovery of
the possibility of 'doubting', we spoke of the ability of the subject to
disregard the objects of his consciousness at any given moment, in
order to regard the consciousness itself, or the 'objects in conscious
ness' at the same moment. Having interpreted the dubito as an
essential change of attitude, from being interested in the various
objective worlds of our consciousness, to being interested in what
Descartes discovered to be the pregnant world of our consciousness
itself, we need do no more than appeal to a personal experiment,
which every reader can make for himself, to assert, that this 'possi
bility' of a radical change of attitude is an essential part of every
moment of objectifying consciousness. We make no reference 1
to a 'real' possibility, for the practice of introspection takes pla,
from the very start upon a purely subjective plane. By saying that
every subject 'can', in every moment of his conscious life remove
his attention from the object of his consciousness on to his cc
sciousness itself, it is asserted that it is impossible for any .object
to conceive of any state of consciousness, on which he could not,

1) Gr- & Gr.I, p. 307,

326 C- V- Salmon, [28

under certain conditions, 'reflect'. The 'certain conditions' include
both the real occasion, which may not, of course, be proper to the
realization of this 'possibility', and the actual ability, which can be
bred in the subject only by practise. But since, in the realm of a
priori, it is impossible to conceive of any state of consciousness which
could not bear, under the right occasion, and in the person of the
able subject, the reflexive attitude, we assert that the possibility of
becoming reflexive is an essential part of all consciousness. From
this ground it is easy to discover a fundamental mistake, made by
both the arguments given above, against, in the one case, the utility,
and in the other case, the possibility, of reflection. In making use,
as both arguments do, of the premise, that the same object of con
sciousness implies the same means in consciousness, and the same
means the same object, to conclude that an identical experience must
always terminate in the apprehension of an identical object, they
are guilty of the empirical fallacy of real hypostasis. They seek to
cover an ideal identity with the quotation of a purely real numerical
difference, and to obscure the identity of an ideal quantity by
stressing a purely real difference in quality. "Since it must be
acknowledged," the first argument ran, "that the 'processes' revealed
under reflection are not identical with, but different from, the original
object of consciousness, it must be acknowledged also, that the pro
cesses underlying these processes, as the means of their being ob
jectified, cannot be identical with, but must be different from, those
processes, become objects, which have been shown to underly the
consciousness of the original object." "It is presumed," so ran the
second argument, "that the same means will always furnish the subject
with a similar object, and that a different object will always imply
a different means". Now these antitheses between identical objects,
and identical means, and different objects and different means, rely
upon the particularity of what is real. For granting, as the objectors
must, that a unity can be a compound, and one whole consist of
many parts, and that, in any given state of consciousness, the atten
tion of the subject can be shifted from the unity to the compound,
from the whole to the parts, and, among these parts, from one part
to another, there is no ground, except that of the distinctness, and
numerical difference, in time, of the different moments of conscious
ness, for maintaining that the experience in question is not identical.
But the question of real time can only be raised when the subject
is engaged in ordinary perception. In order to reflect upon the
perception itself, and no longer on the object of the perception, the

29] The Centr.1 Prohlem of David Hume's Philosophy. ^

duty of the subject is to exclude the whole world of reality of which
the particu ar object is a part. Real time, therefore, as much a? he
rest of reality, will have no place in what he finds in his consc OU8
ness^ In other words, the identity which he finds there must held .
pendent of real time Speaking then of conscious experience, it s
clear that one and the same experience can be experienc d in'
numerable tunes, since it is the consciousness of the same, and not
the real experience of the same, which is involved. There is nothing
startling in this assertion. It applies to other non-real spheres besides
the sphere of consciousness. No one is likely to argue that the iden
tity of a Beethoven symphony consists in, or is dependent upon, any
one of the particular performances which may have been given of it,
or any one of the particular orchestras or audiences, or on any one of
the particular scores on which it is written, or even on the original
manuscript. The identity of a piece of music is independent of all
these things. One and the same truth may be apprehended innume
rable times by innumerable people in innumerable worlds; and it
can be known by one person on innumerable occasions as the same
truth. The identity of a conscious experience is not dependent upon
any one particular experience of it, or upon my being concentrated
upon any one of its compound parts or moments. And, in the case
of perception, so little is the real object which I perceive involved
in my perception of it, that if the object which I had perceived were
removed, and an exactly similar object put in its place, my second
perception itself, when I perceived the new object, would be iden
tical with my first.

Both the arguments brought against the practise of the intro
spective mode suffer from being too ingenious. In the course of one
identical experience I can not only exclude the object of my con
sciousness from my attention, and regard my consciousness itself, but
having done this, I can, for the sake of testing its identity, turn my
attention away from my consciousness, and back upon the original
object, and thence back again upon my consciousness, and after this
manner as often as I please. With this ability at my command, I can
disregard metaphysics, and by my practise itself, establish the vali
dity of what I do. Granting that the same object of consciousness
implies the same means in consciousness, and the same means the
same object, I have only to recognize the complexity of elements
involved in my consciousness of an object, to realize that I can
regard now this element, and now that, within the unity of the one
experience. And I have only to establish the total unity by an obser-

328 C- V- Salmon, [30

vation of what is involved in its means, and to test it by turning my
attention freely backward and forward, from object of consciousness
to consciousness of object, to recognize at once that I am involved
in no infinite regress. For when I seek to find the means which
underly the means I have observed, I find, reflexively, that they are
identical with themselves.

Introspection, then, is not only possible, but able to furnish me
with the whole of the means whereby I arrive at the consciousness
of any given object.

After an extensive practise of the introspective mode, the philo
sopher will be able to describe the processes by which he arrives
at the consciousness of objects in the variety of all his faculties.
From this personal, or egoistic, realm of a priori, it will be but
a step for him to pass, by the means of abstraction and variation,
from his own consciousness to the absolutely universal generalities
of consciousness in general, and to declare, in the realm of pure
Subjectivity itself, the ultimate truths of all philosophy.

In spite of his profession to deny the possibility of the intro
spective mode, and his intention to devote himself more to the
examination of other people than of himself, when he came to the
problem of external perception, Hume did forsake empirical psycho
logy, and derive, from the employment of introspection, a notable
success.

Chapter III.

The place of Logic in the Sciences.

§ 8. Locke's Division of the Sciences. The Rational Hypostasis,
and the two operations of Abstraction.

When Hume took up Locke's task of "describing to others what
it is their minds do when they perform the action they call knowing",
he made two signal modifications on Locke's attitude. With Locke's
preliminary classification of the departments of knowledge he had
no quarrel. "First", Locke had said, "the nature of things as they
are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation".1)
Here we are to pursue "the knowledge of things, as they are in their
own proper beings, their constitution, properties, and operations:
whereby I mean not only matter and body, but spirits also, which
have their proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as

1) Locke, The Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. XXI.

31] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy, 339

bodies". This is **«,„£ or "natural philosophy", whose end is "bare
speculative truth". Whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such,
falls under this branch, whether it be God Himself, angels, spirits,
bodies, or any of their affections, as number and figure, etc." Next
comes UgaxTtx^ whose domain "is not bare speculation and the know-
ledge of truth: but right and a conduct suitable to it", "that which
man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the
attainment of any end, especially happiness". The third department
is 2qi*£ia>TUCtj, or Aoyixr], which is announced shortly, as "the ways
and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other
(i. e. of <Pvaixrj and nQaxTixr]) is attained and communicated". This is
the province of philosophy. In setting Locke's observation free,
1. wholly from its rationalistic, and 2. partially from its empirical,
bias, Hume was only adopting the recommendations of Locke's own
programme, to which Locke had proved unfaithful. The compre
hensiveness of <Pv6ixtfi which is the characteristic of this division of
the sciences, should have kept Locke's Ao-fixy clear both of rationa
lism and empiricism. <PvOixij was to include both logic and psycho
logy. The limits of these sciences expressed the distinction latent in
Locke's "new way of ideas", between 'ideas' in the conventional sense
of 'objects' to the reason, or imagination, or memory, and 'ideas' in
Locke's original sense of 'means' of consciousness. The Lockeian
"ideas" were conceived as being the means by which each faculty
of consciousness arrived at the consciousness of its objects. The
reason, like every other faculty, owed its apprehension of 'ideas' in
the conventional sense, to 'ideas' in the Lockeian sense. Locke's
philosophy was to concern itself exclusively with the means of con
sciousness, and not with the principles of any objective sphere of
consciousness, such as the principles of logic. When Leibniz1) took
objection to Locke's inclusion of the formal, as well as the material
disciplines, in &v<jixij, he was representing the rational prejudice
against the new conception of philosophy. Leibniz wished to remove
the formal disciplines from the sphere of "natural philosophy", in
order to make them the foundation of philosophy proper. Parallel
to the Real Hypostasis operates the Rational Hypostasis. It is sur
prising that the writings of Locke, Berkeley and Hume should have
done so little to dispel a prejudice, still general, that there is one
objective sphere of human consciousness which contains the answer,
in the shape of truths, to all the problems which can confr

1) See Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, Livre IV, Ch. 2: "De la Division de8 Sciences",

330 C- V- Salmon, [32

human intelligence; and one faculty, namely, the reason, which, being
properly and purely used, can supply a Universum of knowledge, in
the shape of an explanation of all Being, and all modes of Being.

No body of knowledge which is to be ultimate, entire, and a
priori in the absolute sense, can be concerned with objects, not even
when those objects are the ideas of reason. Leaving on one side the
conception of reason itself, which involves many difficulties, it may
truly be said, that all the a priori knowledge which we possess is the
result of abstraction, and that philosophy, like every other science,
can only arrive at its final principles within the body of an abstract
and formal discipline. But abstraction is not to be identified with
reason. Abstraction is not an intuitive faculty, but a certain method
which can be practised in any field of observation. The quality of
the a priori which it procures is not the product of the abstraction
itself, but depends upon the nature of the field in which the ab
straction is used. Radical abstraction involves two separate oper
ations. Under the first operation the field of observation is purified
from the concomitant foreign elements which accompany the ge
neral observation. The natural scientist 'abstracts' his material by
excluding the subjective and inter-subjective elements of perception,
to concentrate upon what is 'real' in the perceived object. The
moralist, on the other hand, abtsracts his material by purifying his
observations of human behaviour from all their 'real' conditions.
The aesthete must purify his data from what is not aesthetic, the
logician his from whatever is not logical. But the philosopher must
purify his data from everything objective, whether this be real, or
moral, or aesthetic, or logical. He must concentrate upon what is
subjective, upon the means of, instead of upon any termination of,
consciousness. Upon this operation of abstraction depends the vali
dity of the observations to be made. The second operation of ab
straction is a process of Variation, by which the observer passes from
the realm of that which he does actually observe to the realm of
that which he might observe, to the realm of the possible and the
a priori. It is with the second of the operations of abstraction that
the reason is often falsely indentified. Theorists have been ready
to describe their activities as 'reasoning', without considering what
it is that they have actually done, when they have 'generalized', and
passed from a statement of what objects have been, to a statement
of what objects might be, from a statement of what they have per
ceived, reasoned, appreciated, to what they might perceive, reason,
appreciate. It is slighting reason to regard it as an illuminating

33] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

process which can be turned on to any field of investigation to order
it. dta and elucidate Us principles. For reason is itself a special
acuity by which we apprehend truths, just as we apprehend reali-
tie. by the special faculty of perception, beauties by the special
faculty of aesthetic appreciation etc. The confusion of reason with
a purely formal and perfectly general process, which we can practice
upon every one of the special objects of consciousness, has led to
a false notion of the superiority of the logical principles and laws
proper to the objective realm of truths, over the laws and principles
of other objective realms. Under this fallacy many forms of 'Idealism'
have taken the field. The Rational Fallacy is balanced by the Em-
pirical Fallacy which has attempted to dominate the principles of
all the objective spheres by the principles of the one objective sphere
of reality, and to subordinate the use of each of our faculties, to the
one faculty of perception. As the Rational Hypostasis is evolved
from a sense of the 'general' quality of reasoning, so the Empirical
Hypostasis is evolved from a sense of the 'original' character of per
ception. But, in their final stages, each of the two fallacies is guilty
of a double hypostasis. Not only do they seek to impose the abstract
principles of one objective realm on to the abstract principles of
another objective realm, but they even seek to convert the principles
of their own objective realm into principles governing the operations
of the subjective faculties themselves. This is to confuse one objective
realm with another in the terms of their a priori, on the one hand,
and, on the other, to confuse the principles regulating the objects of
a faculty with the principles regulating the faculty itself.

In addition to rational and empirical hypostases, attempts have
been made by would-be universalists to extend moral, aesthetic and
religious principles over the whole of objectivity, and to offer an
explanation of all Being in laws taken from a Being of one kind.

§ 9. Hume's excess of zeal against the Continental Rationalists.

First distinction of the elements of the Impression. Hume's view

of Abstract Ideas.

Hume freed Locke's later attitude from the rationalistic bias,
from which it ought, upon Locke's own programme and division of
the sciences, to have remained free. "Bare, speculative truth, -
Locke's definition of g>vCixtj — and whatsoever can afford the mind
of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God Himself
angels, spirits, bodies, or any of their affections, as number and

332 C, V. Salmon, [34

figure etc." There is no room for doubt. Locke placed logic within
the compass of natural philosophy. At this point in the development
of his thought. Locke was drawing a distinction between the defi
nitive formal disciplines which had their place in tyvGixtf, and the
ultimate descriptive task which he alloted to philosophy proper or
2t]fl£UQTlX7]i between the function of 'definition', so often mistaken
for a subjective region of philosophy, and that true subjective 'de
scription' of the processes of consciousness, which can reveal the
ultimate a priori. In this distinction Hume saw the embryo of a
philosophical system. His first anxiety was to dispel the influence
of the Continental Rationalists. 'Tis usual with mathe
maticians, he writes, scornfully, to pretend, that those
ideas, which are their objects, are of so refi n'd and
spiritual a nature, that they fall not under the con
ception of the fancy, but must be comprehended by a
pure and intellectual view, of which the superiour
faculties of the soul are alone capable1). And he ends
by concluding grudgingly that certain ideas of quantity are the only
ideas which permit of furnishing any such exact relations to one
another, as reason claims to discover. One of the doctrines in the
Treatise, which has been accustomed to receive most notice, is Hume's
denial of the abstractness of the so-called 'abstract' ideas; as Hume
put it, that all general ideas are nothing but particular
ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a
more extensive signification, and makes them recal
upon occasion other individuals which are similar to
them2). It must needs be granted that there is much here which
is highly unsatisfactory. His assertion that with the exception of
arithmetic, and a small part of algebra, there is no science which
can supply us with "certain knowledge", is most unhappy, and
by denying the abstractness of ideas, Hume had left himself no
logical right to concede certainty even to these two disciplines.
Moreover it was the empirical fallacy which supplied him with
his dearest argument. He borrows his first statement of it from

"Mons: Malezieu", "'Tis evident, that existence in itself

belongs only to unity"3). He adds his own: - - An idea is a
weaker impression; and as a strong impression must
necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality,
the case must be the same with its copy or represen-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 375. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 325, 3) See Gr. & Gr. I, p. 393.

35] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

333

tative . . . . 'tis a principle generally receiv'd in phi-
losophy, that everything in nature is individual, and
that 'tis utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really
existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and
angles. (Hume has Locke's 'abstract' triangle in mind.) If this, there
fore, be absurd in fact and reality, it must also be ab
surd in idea', since nothing of which we can form a clear
and distinct idea is absurd and impossible Ab
stract ideas are ... in themselves individual, however
they may become general in their representation1).
This argument depends upon the real hypostasis. If it were a fact that
"everything in nature is individual", — and the saying is obscure -
an 'idea' is not a part of "nature", and cannot be made to bear the
characteristics of reality. All that need be said concerning the deri
vation of the "idea" from the "impression", in its connection with
the present argument, is that the latter term lacks definition. The
"impression" needs to be distinguished from the objects of which
it is the impression. It does not follow, that, because the object of
an impression is "particular", the impression of the object is also
"particular". Moreover, if we talk of "real" impressions, which have
"a determinate quantity and quality", and mean by those, no objects of
perception, but the perception itself, we are referring either to a physical
or psycho-physical 'experience', which must be carefully distinguished
from a subjective 'experience' of consciousness. A. observes B. per
ceiving a table. A. may refer to B's perception of the table, when
he observes it, as a reality with a determinate quantity and quality,
for what A. means by B's perception is an objective fact. But no
one can suppose for a moment that it is from an "impression
this sense, i.e. B's perception as it is observed by A., that
'table in general', can be abstracted. B's 'perception',
served by A, is nothing 'like' a table, and cannot be descnbed by A.
in terms of 'table'. The 'perception' from which the abstract
'table in general' can be abstracted, is not a 'real -penence
A's own perception-of, or consciousness-of the table^
sciousness may be a perception of ^f^^«^
itself 'particular' in the same ; sense .For > > ^ , ^

himself. If it 'exists',

™Uo" l^He'^W^ch We recede ^ «. * -*

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 327—28.

334 C- V- Salmon, [36

perceptible by more than one person in its own particularity.
But B's perception can only be experienced by more than one person
by being deprived of all its particularity, i. e. by being gene
ralized, by being taken as the 'perception of a table in general'.
This general 'consciousness', or 'experience', can be described by
any subject in reflexion, but it is plain that it is not to this subjective
experience that we refer, when we talk of an abstract idea of a table,
of a triangle etc. Hume was right to insist that no real object can
explain the idea which is abstracted from it. For if the real object
is particular, it cannot explain something which is general. Hume
has in mind Locke, whose 'abstract' triangle, neither scalene nor iso
sceles, nor with any "precise proportion of sides and angles", is
supposed to be both particular and general.

Purging it of its empirical allusion, we can find in Hume's
Abstract ideas are in themselves individual, however
they may become general in their representation, the
valid suggestion, that we should look for the origin of abstract ideas
in our actual abstraction of them. If we can never 'perceive' anything
abstract, and so cannot assert that anything abstract 'really exists',
we can, perhaps, create abstract ideas for ourselves by a certain
process of the 'imagination'. Hume's "however they may become
general in their representation" makes the reader curious to know
how that could happen, and suggests to him that Hume may have
had some notion as to how it actually does happen. And indeed
Hume had. Having denied the 'existence' of abstract ideas, he offers
a very tolerable description of how they are abstracted. When we
have found a resemblance, Hume writes, among several
objects, that often occur to us, we apply the same
name to all of them, whatever differences we may ob
serve in the degrees of their quantity and quality,
and whatever other differences may appear among
them. After we have acquired a custom of this kind,
the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of
these objects, and makes the imagination conceive
it with all its particular circumstances and propor
tions. But as the same word is suppos'd to have been
frequently applied to other individuals, that are
different in many respects from the idea, which is
immediately present to the mind; the word not being
able to revive the idea of all these individuals, but
only touches the soul, if I may be allow' d so to speak,

37] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 335

and revives that custom, which we have acquir'd by
surveying them. They are not really and in fact pre
sent to the mind, but only in power; nor do we draw
them all out distinctly in the imagination, but keep
ourselves in a readiness to survey any of them, as we
may be prompted by a present design or necessity. The
word raises up an individual idea, along with a cer
tain custom; and that custom produces any other in
dividual one, for which we may have occasion. ... For
this is one of the most extraordinary circumstances
in the present affair, that after the mind has produc'd
an individual idea, upon which we reason, the atten
dant custom, reviv'd by the general or abstract term,
readily suggests any other individual, if by chance
we form any reasoning, that agrees not with it. Thus
shou'd we mention the word triangle, and form the
idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to
it, and shou'd we afterwards assert, that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to each other, the other
individuals of a scalenum and isosceles, which we
overlooked at first, immediately crowd in upon us,
and make us perceive the falsehood of this proposi
tion, tho' it be true with relation to that idea, which
we had form'd . . . . Before those habits have become
entirely perfect, perhaps the mind may not be content
with forming the idea of only one individual, but may
run over several, in order to make itself comprehend
its own meaning, and the compass of that collection,
which it intends to express by the general term. That
we may fix the meaning of the word, figure, we may
revolve in our mind the ideas of circles, squares,
parellellograms, triangles of different sizes and
proportions, and may not rest on one image or idea.
However this may be, 'tis certain that we form the idea
of individuals, whenever we use any general term; that
we seldom or never can exhaust these individuals; an
that those which remain, are only represented
means of that habit, by which we recal them, whenev
any present occasion requires it. This then i
nature of our abstract ideas and general terms; an
'tis after this manner we account for the foregoing

336 C. V. Salmon, [38

paradox, that some ideas are particular in their
nature, but general in their representation. A parti
cular idea becomes general by being anne x'd to a
general term; that is, to a term, which from a custo
mary conjunction has a relation to many other parti
cular ideas, and readily recals them in the imagi
nation1). This is a not uninteresting description of abstraction.
We are said to be able to vary our individual ideas, to repeat their
identity through all manner of subsidiary differences, to recognize the
same kind in a plurality, and to construct collections of kind. Hume
neglects to give the grounds on which we recognize the characteristics
of kind, and to explain why, although we are "seldom or never' able
to "exhaust" the "individuals", we are yet able to know the general
necessities and conditions binding them.

The quotation supplies the first practical instance in the Treatise,
of Hume's theory that the ultimate 'explanation' of our consciousness
of objects lies, not in the objects, but in the processes of consciousness
itself. We can only be conscious of objects the consciousness of
which we have constructed for ourselves. Abstract ideas give Hume
an opportunity of practising that 'subjective description', which he is
going to use to such good effect in the matter of external perception,
and may serve to show something of the light, which can be thrown
by 'description' on to a department of knowledge where 'definition'
has been accustomed to reign.

Chapter IV.
The Ascent of the "Irnaginatio n".

§ 10. First appearance of Hume's notion of the "Imagination".
A parallel between Causality and the Abstract Ideas.

The ingenious critic will recognize, when Hume wrote of its being
"usual with mathematicians to pretend that those ideas which are
their objects, are of so refin'd and spiritual a nature, that they fall
not under the conception of the fancy", that it was in Hume's mind
to say, and in his work to prove, that there were no objects in any
sphere of which a man could be conscious, which did not "fall under
the conception of the fancy". Hume's account of abstraction is
interesting, not only as an instance of the means by which he sought

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 328—30.

39] The Central Problem of David Hume', Philosophy. 337

to escape from the rational ontology, but also because it leads him to
his first substantial formulation of that supreme Humeian faculty
the Imagination".

The "imagination" is to grow into an active, 'genetic' faculty,
responsible for our consciousness of objects in general, and of each
set of objects in the domain to which they belong. We have to
note the functions which Hume assigns to it in the sphere of ideas,
and his rather ambiguous conclusion from these that almost the
whole of consciousness 'originates', in a certain sense, from our
faculty of external perception. "Almost the whole"! because Hume
is content with an inconsequence. In one department of know
ledge he becomes an ontologist. He allows the ideas of "quantitive
relation" to be responsible for their own objectivity. He does this in
the face of such a general description of the abstraction process as
would seem to have made the exception impossible. The inconsequence
is not the somewhat superficial contradiction of which Hume is guilty,
of denying on the one hand that ideas were abstract, and asserting on
the other that arithmetic and algebra could provide the enquiring
mind with certain knowledge. For this inconsequence is so apparent,
and concerns an opposition between fine terms, the absolute, namely,
and the relative, whose antithesis becomes so quickly dialectical, that,
if it cannot be set right, it can, without much harm, be disregarded.
With a more radical inconsequence Hume conceives the possibility of
our 'invention' of all the objects of our consciousness, of accounting
in terms of consciousness for our consciousness of every variety of
object, and every variety of objective sphere, except the ideas of
quantitive relation. These are allowed to include their own explana
tion within their objectivity. The first inconsequence, which consists
in an unjustified, or, at any rate, unexplained, differentiation between
quantitative and qualitative abstractions, may be considered as formal
rather than material. But the second inconsequence involves nothing
less than a limitation of the subjective realm. By his exception in
favour of the quantitative "ideas of relation", Hume seems to wish to
imply that these will not submit to any explanation in terms of the
subjective processes, and that these alone of all objects, and all ideas,
are not 'originated' into consciousness by consciousness itself. The
inconsequence is radical within Hume's philosophical system. But it
is not without a parallel. There is one other fundamental inconse
quence, which is exactly parallel to this one, and holds a similar
position in the second of the two chief spheres of objectivity,
concerns causality. In the sphere of perception Hume again mak<

Husserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophic. X.

338 C- V- Salmon, [40

one exception among the objects of our consciousness. While
recognizing that our perception of each several object in the world,
and of each element of that world, requires an explanation in the
subjective terms of consciousness, Hume makes an exception in favour
of causality. Causality, he tries to say, 'exists' really, in and for itself,
and, itself, composes the real principle of conscious experience. But
in this matter Hume cannot be taken to have succeeded. He is
inconsequent here even within his inconsequence. Escaping from the
real ontology, he offers a tolerable subjective account of causality, and
explains how this causality is no less a "fiction" than the objective
entities it is supposed to rule. There can be no doubt which side of
this latter contradiction is nearest to Hume's heart. The grounds for
taking Hume as an empiricist are as negligible as those for taking him
as a rationalist. Both rest upon one contradiction, which, somehow,
in each case, Hume, the courageous, lacked courage to resolve.
Seriously to regard Hume as an ontologist in either sphere, to stress
the admission to which he can be forced, to exclude the quantitative
ideas, or real causality, from a subjective origin in our consciousness,
from an origin in the "fancy", in the "association", testifies to a
misunderstanding of Hume's work. Hume is to be blamed for not
having extended his subjective account of "philosophical relation" to
cover the quantitative, as well as the qualitative, ideas. He is to
be blamed for having attempted to make causality the working prin
ciple of association, when he had already sought to account for our
perception of causality by its means. The reader must recognize the
exceptional nature of these hypostases, and return to his interpretation
of Hume as the subjectivist.

§ 11. Hume's subordination of the Quantitative to the

Qualitative Ideas implies that he does not consider them to be

examples of analytical relation.

Although Hume allows that the quantitative ideas may be
productive of "certain" knowledge, he subordinates them to the
qualitative ideas, which produce "probable" knowledge only. Know
ledge, for Hume, is chiefly a question of 'complexity'. He comes to
regard all conscious apprehension beyond mere "sensation" as the
recognition of a complex objectivity. This complexity is a compound
of "ideas". The mind constructs complex ideas from simple ideas,
by relating simple ideas to one another. "Knowledge", accordingly,
consists in learning the "relations" of ideas. The prelude to knowledge

41] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 339

is a division of the kinds of relation which ideas can bear to one
another. This division is made by classifying the "qualities' native
to ideas, which render them susceptible to "association". As all
simple ideas -- Hume writes — may be separated by the
imagination, and may be united again in what form it
pleases, nothing would be more unaccountable than
the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by
some universal principles, which render it in some
measure uniform with itself in all times and places.
Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance
alone wou'd join them; and 'tis impossible the same
simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones
(as they commonly do), without some bond of union
among them, some associating quality, by which one
idea naturally introduces another1). This use of the word
"quality" suggests that Hume considers that the justification of all
possible complexity, or relation, of ideas, is to be found in the sphere
of perception. The qualities, Hume writes, from which this
association arises, and by which the mind is after this
manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three,
viz Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, and
Cause and Effect2). These three "qualities of association" are
meant to include all possible relation of ideas, and to contain t
explanation of all complexity. Hume is faithful to this classification.
Writing very much later (in Part III), he says, The principles
of union among ideas, I have reduced to three genera
ones, and have asserted that the idea or impression,
any object naturally introduces the idea of any other
object that is resembling, contiguous to o r connected

pare them4).

2) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 319.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 319. Gr & Qr j p 322>

3) Gr. & Gr. I, P- 393.

340 C- V- Salmon, [42

The quantitative ideas, those complex ideas which owe their
relation to their common "quality7' of quantity, appear as one of
the seven kinds of qualities, which Hume enumerates: actually,
(refer Part I. Sect. 5), as No. 4. All those objects, which
admit of quantity , or number , may be compar'd in that
particular; which is another very fertile source of
relation1).

This inclusion of the 'rational principle' within the three general
associative principles of the imagination, the description of the
essence of the 'rational idea' as a quality, and its derivation from
a source apparently common to every branch of 'knowledge', whether
"certain" or "probable" only, testifies not only to Hume's general
disinclination to regard Logic as the foundation of Philosophy, but
also to a special view concerning the nature of logical truth. It is
Hume's conviction that even those ideas whose relations provide us
with certain knowledge are not examples of 'analytic' relation. This
fact has often been disregarded by historians who have wished to
endorse Kant's criticism of Hume. Ideas may be said to be related
'analytically' to one another, when the related ideas stand to one
another as predicate to subject, the predicate being contained in
the subject, and bound to the subject in such a way, that the con
ception of its not being contained in the subject, involves a violation
of the principle of contradiction. But to this class of "relations of
ideas", it is obvious that the Humeian relations do not belong. Re
semblance, Contrareity, Degree and Quantity (see Part I. Sect. 5),
may be considered as predicates of a subject, but they could by no
means be said to inhere in their subjects in such a way, that their
non-inherence would involve an contradiction. A relation of ideas
can be a priori without being 'analytical', when their relation is such
that it is given in the presentation of the two related ideas: such
that when A. and B. are given, their relation, r, is necessarily given.
It is to this class of a priori relation that the four Humeian relations
belong2).

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 323.

2) This question of 'analytic relation' has been concisely treated by
A. Reinach, 'Kants Auf fassung des Humeischen Problems', Gesammelte Schriften,
Halle a. S., 1921.

43] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 341

§ 12. Brief statement of Hume's contradictory attitudes towards

Causality.

It is obvious that no statement of Hume's attitude towards cau
sality can be complete, unless it follow, instead of preceding, Hume's
final analysis of perception. No attempt can be made here to offer
anything like an adequate account of Hume's treatment of causality,
and this essay will not make it its business, even at its conclusion,
to supply any such account. Hume's interpretation of causality has
so often been considered as the pivot of his work, that no author
need offer an apology for turning his attention to other matters in
the Treatise. In so doing he is likely to escape many dangers of
misinterpretation. For Hume himself did badly by causality, denying
it, and making use of it, alternately. Whoever wishes, can find
authority for regarding Hume as an empirical psychologist, or even
as a species of physiologist. There is scarcely a moment, even in his
purest introspective descriptions of the subjective phases of per
ception, when Hume does not lay himself open to empirical mis
interpretation by some unwarrantable allusion to an efficient cause.
Hume was inconsequent enough to expound a most uncompromising
solipsism on the one hand, and to declare, on the other, that the
individual is an objective "bundle" of causally related "experiences".
Nothing could be more surprising than such a change as this implies
from the extreme of absolute subjectivism to absolute objectivism. The
- — -Tame antipathy separates Hume's description of "association" in terms
of principles depending upon consciousness for their operation, from
his frequent references to association as a "gentle force", a "kind
/ of attraction", etc. This use of the causal principle to designate the
nature of association is a misnomer, as Hume's own descriptions of
it show. The field of this description is consciousness. The operation
of the imagination is governed by laws of consciousness. Into con
sciousness the "gentle force" enters without right. It is introduce
through hypostasis to save the reality of the Person, which I
throught he had impugned. The attempt weakens the .
both of the objective and subjective world.

But Hume is not to be restrained. In addition to many attempts
to impose the law of real causality on to the activities of consciousn
he made one notable attempt to impose the causal law on t
relations of objects in an objective but non-real sphere I
remarkable theory of contradiction Hume proposes to rest the pn

342 C. V. Salmon, [44

ciple of contradiction on a sensible uneasiness1). This theory
has received from T. H. Green as much notices as it deserves.

Besides particular arguments, general passages are not wanting
in the Treatise, where Hume's attitude towards philosophy has been

vitiated by his notion of cause as no real objects are

contrary, he writes in a discursion upon the "production of
thought" - - I have inferred . . . . that to consider the
matter a priori, anything may produce anything, and
that we shall never discover a reason, why any object
may or may not be the cause of any other, however
great, or however little the resemblance may be
betwixt them. This evidently destroys the precedent
reasoning concerning the cause of thought or per
ception (a reasoning that "motion" could not be the "cause" of
"thought"). For though there appear no manner of con
nexion betwixt motion or thought, the case is the
jsame with all other causes and effects. Place one body
of a pound weight upon one end of a lever, and another
body of the same weight on another end; you will never
find in these bodies any principle of motion depen
dent on their distances from the center, more than of
thought and perception. If you pretend therefore, to
prove, a priori that such a position of bodies can never
cause thought, because turn it which way you will,
'tis nothing but a position of bodies, you must by the
same course of reasoning conclude, that it can never
produce motion, since there is no more apparent con
nexion in the one case than in the other .?.. you reason
too hastily, when from the mere consideration of the
ideas, you conclude that 'tis impossible motion can
ever produce thought, or a different position of parts
give riee to a different passion or reflexion. Nay,
'tis not only possible we may have such an experience,
but 'tis certain we have it; since every one may per
ceive, that the different dispositions of his body,
change his thoughts and sentiments2), finding up the
matter, he writes . . . . it follows, that for ought we can
.determine by the mere ideas, anything may be the
cause of anything .... and as the constant conjunction

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 494. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 529—30.

45] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 343

of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and
effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as
the causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of
that, relation1). But even this passage is not unqualified. Be
ginning and ending on the theme, Anything may be the cause of
anything, Hume plays ingeniously enough with the subjective and
objective antithesis, and in the confusion is guilty of the suggestion
of invalidating cause where it is valid, namely in the real world, and
validating it, where it is invalid, namely in the psychical world. If
any one tries to pin him to either of these assertions, he can wriggle
out of it by quoting from the other. He has left himself room to
claim that lie is referring only to a psycHo^physical parallellism, a
cb*ntmgent relation, a "constant conjunction" between the disposition
of our body and the disposition of our thoughts and sentiments. If,
in the face of Hume's assertion that we have no further notion of
the causal "relation" than permits us to see in the "constant con
junction of objects" "the very essence of cause and effect", the
empiricist finds in the statement that "matter and motion may be
regarded as the causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of that
relation", enough to support his empirical interpretation of Hume's
treatment of consciousness, he is beyond the reach of argument.

Hume's employment of the causal principle is too frequent and
too varied to permit of more than partial vindication. Those who
will view the Treatise as a handbook to empirical psychology can
find what they want in Hume's hypostases. For the rest, if Hume be
claimed to have accounted for association in causal terms, we are
also justified in claiming that Hume wished to explain our conscious
ness of causality in the terms of associative consciousness. Nor need
we to lack for quotations: - 'Tis easy to observe, that in
tracing this relation, the inference we draw from
cause to effect, is not deriv'd merely from a survey
of these particular objects, and from such a penetra
tion into their essences as may discover the depen
dence of the one upon the other . . . . such an inference
would amount to knowledge . . . . the necessary con
nexion d e p e n d_s^jo n^t h e inference instead of the i n -
fe r e n"c eTTe^elTd ing 0 a "t h e 'It' e c e s s a r y connexion2).

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 532. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, PP. 388-89.

344 C. V. Salmon, [46

§ 13. Hume's ultimate division of the powers of Consciousness
into Reason, Sensation and Imagination, is latent in his treatment

of Causality.

One general faculty of consciousness emerges from Hume's treat
ment of causality to include all the varieties of experience, excepting
only that limited faculty of 'reasoning', or 'relation of ideas' in the
specific sense, which Hume allowed to be independent. Causality made
its appearance as the third of the "philosophical", or "uncertain",
"relations". In a moment of supreme significance it was given out as
the ability of the mind to go beyond what is immediately present to
the senses. The only connexion or relation of objects,
Hume wrote, which can lead us beyond immediate im
pressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause
and effect1). This "relation of objects" has just been described as
an "inference". 'Tis .... by Experience only, that we can
infer the existence of one object from that of another.
The nature of experience is this. We remember to have
had frequent instances of the existence of one species
of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of
another species of objects have always attended them,
and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and

succession with regard to them Without any

farther ceremony we call the one cause and the other
effect2). The several faculties of consciousness are taken by Hume
to originate in the different kinds of "relation of ideas" which create
the only possible complexities in apprehended objects. (Refer sect 13.)
All kinds of reasoning, he says, and means by "reasoning"
no more here than the apprehension of objects in relation, consist
in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those
relations, either constant or inconstant, which two
or more objects bear to each other. This comparison
we may make, either when both the objects are pre
sent to the senses, or when neither of them is present,
or when only one3). The last sentence needs only to be modified
in one particular to provide a key to the whole Treatise, in the shape
of a division of faculties which Hume carries into all his investiga
tions. This modification is that Hume establishes it eventually, that

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 390. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 388.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 376.

47] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 345

a plurality of objects cannot be present to the senses at the same
time. This modification made, the first state of consciousness ceases
to be a "comparison", and becomes, to give it its final name, a Sen
sation. The other two states of apprehension remain as processes.
The "comparison" when "neither" of the objects is present to the
senses, i. e. when no object is present to the senses, is Reasoning.
The "comparison" when "one" object is present to the senses is
Imagination, or, as Hume calls it here, the causal "inference",
or, in another place, the "natural relation"1). In this we presuppose
Hume's analysis of the external perception. It will be established
there, that whenever a plurality of objects seem to be present
to the senses, i. e. in every case of external perception, the "natural
relation" has already been at work, and imposed a complexity of
imaginative ficta upon a simple sensation. In every perception both
the sensation and the imagination have been at work. In the
Humeian perception there is both an object "present to the sen
ses", and a conclusion beyond the impressions of our
senses . . . . founded only on the connexion of cause
and effect2), which is the work of the imagination. Re-inter
preting Hume's "when both the objects are present to the senses",
to include the 'causal' "comparison", we get the name of that general
faculty, which covers all the kinds of consciousness which the reason
does not touch. When bjgJLk tlhA ob Jects are present to the
8 *nsea along with the relation. Hume writes, we calLt h i s
perception rather than reasoning3) . ... But it happens
that the actual word "perception" is required, and afterwards used, by
Hume in a different, and important, sense. It is to be recommended,
accordingly, that Hume's present use of it, to denote all that sphere
of consciousness which falls not under the 'reason', be forgotten. It
is undesirable in any case, that the various faculties on 'this side'
of abstraction, perception, memory, and the sensuous imagination,
which share the common ground of 'direct' foundation in sense-
experience, should be so little distinguished from one another as to
be grouped, without further differentiation, under one title. Hume
would have avoided many difficulties concerning 'perception' proper,
had he been more particular about the varieties of 'sense-experience .

1) Gr & Gr I, p. 394 . . . tho' causation be a philosophical re
lation, as implying contiguity, succession, & constant con-
junction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a natural Delation .... e

2)Gr.&Gr.I,P.376. 3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 376.

346 G- V- Salmon. [48

Apart from its present name, this homogeneity of the whole body
of experience, (excepting only the limited 'reason', and its division
into that part of it, which is presented to consciousness 'ready-made'
by sensation, and that part of it which is constructed by the imagi
nation, and only afterwards 'presented',) lasts through the Treatise,
and is of paramount importance. It is to be regretted that in the
/use of the term sensation, Hume makes no distinction between the
faculty and its object, between the act of sensation and that which
is felt in the sensation. When he comes to that element which is not
presented ready-made to consciousness, but which the individual
makes for himself, he does make use of the distinction. For in con
trast to the creative process of imagination he sets the "fiction",
which is that which the imagination creates. The meaning assigned
to these words in conventional language must be forgotten. Humeian
Sensation stands both for "what is immediately present to the
senses", and for the apprehension of what is immediately present to
the senses. Humeian Imagination stands for the power of con
sciousness, to work upon "what is immediately present to the senses"',
to create Fictions. Humeian fictions are the objects which the
subject has constructed in consciousness for himself. When Hume
calls the objects which we ordinarily perceive, "fictions", he is con
fusing the reflective with the ordinary objective attitude of mind.
Fictions are objects in perception, and are not identical with the
objects o f perception, which are the realities in the real world. The
introduction of this distinction can put Hume's scepticism to rights.
Fictions are objects in consciousness. In the sphere of perception
they are 'objects as they are perceived'. They are 'objects', then, only
in a specific sense. We do not 'perceive' them at all, but become
conscious of them for the first time, when we withdraw our attention
from the objects of our ordinary consciousness, and use it in the
introspective mode. The Humeian "imagination" is the 'means' of
consciousness. To the 'activity' of this faculty in consciousness, and
to the "fictions" which it constructs, the subject owes his conscious
ness of the objects which he perceives. In a corrected version of the
Humeian doctrine, fictions are the equivalent of 'Phenomena'.
Phenomena are objects as we perceive, remember, invent, abstract,
intuite, prove, them etc. etc. and phenomena are the 'means' of our
consciousness of all objects. Phenomena are the residua of the Car
tesian dubito, through which the 'intention' of consciousness passes
to objects themselves.

49] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 347

Chapter V.
The History of the "Impression" and the "Idea".

§ 14. A caution concerning Hume's use of the Impression-Idea

antithesis.

In the light of the outline of Hume's general theory of the
apprehensive consciousness, given in the preceding section, Hume's
preliminary treatment of "impressions" and "ideas" requires some
explanation.

Hume starts his reader on an apparently fundamental antithesis
between "impressions" and "ideas", where, claiming to emancipate
himself from Locke's unitary conception of consciousness, (I make
use of these terms, impression and idea, in a sense
different from what is usual . . . . Perhaps I rather
restore the word, idea, to its original sense, from
which Mr. Locke had perverted it, in making it stand
for all our perceptions1), he seems to be returning to the
ordinary, and presumably sound, distinction between perception on
the one hand, and all the 'idealizing' faculties on the other. Hume's
opening sentences may seem radical, yet they do not seem to desert
the common distinctions of thought. They seem meant rather to
establish these common distinctions upon root principles.

The reader has to open the book near its end to find the material
from which the foregoing section has been taken. There he finds no
comfortable, conventional division of faculties and objects, no
impressions and ideas, but a conception of consciousness as a whole,
where every variety of faculty seems merged under one supreme
faculty, and every variety of objective is apparently obedient to one
set of laws. He reads, in Part IV. Sect. VI, for example, about the
uniting principles in the ideal world2), and discovers,
presently, that this "ideal world" and its principles, actually includes
what is usually called the 'real world'. In Part IV. Sect. IV, he reads
about the Imagination, being the ultimate judge of all
systems of philosophy3). In Part IV. Sect. VII, he finds it
asserted that the memory, senses, and understanding,
are .... all of them founded on the Imagination4).
Returning thence, again, the reader must feel inclined to mistrust the
conventional beginning of the opening sections, and suppose that

1) Footnote to Gr. & Gr. I, p. 312. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 541.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 510. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 545.

348 C- V- Salmon, [50

Hume's claim to forsake Locke's attitude is verbal rather than actual.
Hume, indeed, is not less, but more, aware than Locke of the
singleness of the genus which comprehends all conscious experiences.
And if, with the impression-idea antithesis, he seems to divide the
ground of human knowledge, it is in order that, by separating the kinds
of our experiences, he may bring them together again, presently, the
more effectually. In tracing the steps by which Hume converts his
separation to consolidation, the express purpose for which it seemed
that the impression-idea antithesis was set up, the derivation, namely,
of our ideas from our impressions, altogether fails. As soon as the
question of a possible derivation of ideas from impressions is raised,
it is subordinated to another problem, that of the origin of the com
plexity of our objective consciousness. And in the course of solving
this second problem, Hume decides that the derivation of ideas
from impressions is impossible. Having asserted, as the first step
towards this, that our ideas and impressions are all resembling, he

sees that he has already gone too far Ifindlhavebeen

carried away too far by the first appearance, and that
I must make use of the distinction of perceptions into
simple and complex, to limit this general decision,
that all our ideas and impressions are resembling1). It
is in this problem of the complexity of our experiences, qualified by
Hume's failure to distinguish between impressions and ideas in
anything more essential than the quality of their subjective vivacity,
that the faculty of the imagination comes to play its first part in the
Humeian doctrine of consciousness. A genuine understanding of the
Treatise depends upon a critical reading of the early sections. For the
true factors involved in Hume's interpretation of consciousness do not
appear, except in disguise, until the later portions of the work. The
three-fold division of consciousness is stated for the first time in
Part. IV. Sect. II. Occupied, there, with the enquiry concerning
the causes which induce us to believe in the existence
of body2), Hume proposes to consider, whether it be the
senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the
opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence3). The
senses, reason, and imagination, are Hume's ultimate and
inclusive division of the powers of consciousness. They must be
learned as an introduction to the Treatise, and kept in mind

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 312—313. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 478.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 479.

51] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 349

throughout its length. For only under these three headings do
Hume's various contributions to epistemology marshall themselves
into conformity. It is to be regretted that Hume never offers anything
like a definition or summary of the scope of these faculties. The fault
is due largely to the fact that Hume started with no clear notion of
their scope. He only came to determine it gradually as he set their
several claims in opposition to one another. But his separation of
the simple and complex objectivities provides a useful means of diffe
rentiation. Simplicity becomes the only existential reality. Simplicity
is sensation itself, the actuality of sensation, and of that which is felt
in sensation. Complexity is split up into two. One of its departments,
that namely of quantity, is handed over to the reason. Objects which
are complex by being the product of quantitative relation are ideas
intuited by the reason. The rest of complexity is assigned to the
imagination. All objects which are complex through any non-quanti
tative relation owe their complexity to the imagination. The
"demonstrative" inference is accountable for all rational complexity,
and the "natural" inference for all non-rational complexity.

The confines of the reason are quickly drawn. The limits of the
imagination and the senses are drawn much more slowly. They are
elaborated bit by bit, with frequent modifications, in the course of
Hume's analysis of external perception. But the faculty of imagination
appears already as a vague power, and not easily discernible, in
Hume's first antithesis of impressions and ideas. The faculty of the
senses is introduced when this antithesis has been finally dissolved.
Only one fragment of what was the impression, sensation namely,
then remains unabsorbed by the idea.

§ 15. Hume's Impression-Idea antithesis.

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve
themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call
Impressions and Ideas1). Hume proceeds quickly to a most
confusing and varying use of each of these. He gives no 'definition' of
either of them, but only such a general 'description' of each, as leaves
their differences comparative, and permits of their being inter
changed and reconciled in case of need. Thedifferencebetwixt
these, he writes, consists in the degrees of force and
liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and
make their way into our thoughts and consciousness').

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 311. 2) Gr. & Gr I, p. 311.

350 C. V. Salmon, [52

Already there is much ambiguity. It is not clear whether Hume is talking
of objects or of experiences. His use of the word "perception", and
his phrase "striking upon the mind", would seem to refer to objects;
but the difference "in the degrees of force and liveliness" which is
given as their distinguishing mark, seems only capable of qualifying
experiences. This latter opinion seems to be confirmed by other
passages. I believe it will not be very necessary, Hume says,
tc employ many words in explaining this distinction.
Every one of himself will readily perceive the diffe
rence betwixt feeling and thinking1). "Feeling" and
"thinking" are certainly experiences, not objects. As far as the im
pressions are concerned, there would seem to be no further possibility
of doubt, for we read this: - Those perceptions, which
enter with most force and violence we may name im
pressions^ and under this name comprehend all our
sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their
first appearance in the soul2). We must be meant to under
stand that those particular "perceptions" called "impressions" are
the "sensations, passions and emotions" themselves. These "sen
sations, passions and emotions" need not necessarily be regarded as
'real', they may be regarded as 'psychical', but it would seem quite
certain that they cannot be anything except experiences. Moreover
when Hume repeats this division of perceptions in Part III. Sect. VII,
he seems to have experiences in mind. All the perceptions of
the mind, he writes, are of two kinds, viz. impressions
and ideas, which differ from each other only in their
different degrees of force and vivacity3). This passage
is afterward modified, in an Appendix to Volume III of the original
edition of 1740. But the modification seems to confirm this opinion,
and to extend it beyond impressions to ideas. When I say, Hume
writes, that two' ideas of the same object can only be
different in their different degrees of force and
vivacity, I believe there are other differences among
ideas, which cannot properly be apprehended under
these terms. Had I said that two ideas of the same ob
ject can only be different by their different feeling,
I should have been nearer the truth4).

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 311. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 311.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 396. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 560.

53] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

351

As against this view, however, we find an explicit denial of the
interpretation of the impression as experience. Hume writes, By
the term of impression I would not be understood to
express the manner in which our lively perceptions
are produced in the soul, — but before the reader has time to
conclude that, after all, Hume must be speaking of the objects of ex
perience, and not of the experiences themselves, Hume adds this diffi
cult sentence, — but merely the perceptions themselves,
for which there is no particular name either in the
English or any other language that I know of1). But had
not Locke provided a precedent for the use of the word "idea"?
Hume would seem to establish it, that impressions are neither ex
periences of objects, nor objects of experiences, for there is
certainly no shortage of names for these in any language. What can
he signify by the "perceptions themselves"? The question cannot be
answered yet. Suffice it that the reader carry it in his mind, to ask
again, and answer presently. This much can be deduced from Hume's
vacillation. He was fully aware of the dual element in the concrete
experience, of the object of the experience, and of the experience
of the object, and willingly or unwillingly he embodied something of
this differentiation in each of his two terms. He never used them,
even on their first appearance, on a common level. Taking them
together it is vain trying to decide what part of conscious experience
Hume meant by them, for he meant a different part by each. But
ostensibly they are to signify the same. They are introduced as of
one kind, differing from one another only in degree. The diffe
rence .... consists in the degrees of force and live
liness with which they strike upon the mind2). But in
effect Hume distinguishes in kind between them from the first. He uses
the term impression to refer to an experience-element, and the idea
to refer to an object-element. He helps himself with the conventional
meaning of the words. When these words are used in the common
sense, it is obvious that "impression" carries with it a reference to
an object - - I am impressed by an object; while "idea" is itself
meant for an object, for Svhat' I think, or dream, or fancy etc.
The reader is as apt as Hume himself to be influenced by this ordi
nary meaning of the words, and to attribute to them each a different
sense. He is puzzled by Hume's introducing them as if they were two
varieties of objectifying experience. The fact is that, knowing

1) Gr. & Gr. I. Footnote to p. 312. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 311.

352 C. V. Salmon, [54

that two elements are necessary to conscious experience, and that
each of them is strictly complementary to the other, Hume makes
them falsely independent and introduces them artificially, as if they
were two discrete varieties of conscious experience, in order that he
may show that each one taken separately must include the other. The
impression and the idea are introduced, both of them, as "percep
tions". But before long the impression and the idea have been shown
to be the two elements in one perception. As the Treatise proceeds,
the impression assumes to itself more and more of the meaning and
function of experience of object, and the idea more and more of
the meaning and property of object of experience. It is thus Hume
finds the means to ascend into the subjective realm, and also to
descend, by a variety of false deductions, into scepticism. And in this
progress also the conventional meaning of the words helps Hume to his
conclusions. "Impression" carries something of the significance of
the word "sensation", and "idea" something of the significance of the
word "fiction".

§ 16. The variety of functions actually attributed to the
Impression and the Idea.

The stages are curious by which impressions and ideas pass,
from being offered as two varieties of objectifying conscious ex
perience, to being offered as complementary elements in one ex
perience. Although, when they are once fairly included within the
unity of perception, the impression absorbs almost all the functions
of experience of object, and the idea almost all those of object of
experience (the 'almost' represents Hume's failure to separate them
clearly, and not any lack of wanting to do so), the allotment of
function to each seems, in the early stages of their differentiation,
to be driving in an opposite direction. The impression seems to be
going to stand for object of experience, and the idea for the ex
perience of object. This, again, is, no doubt, partly due to an every
day use of the word "idea". The word "idea" bears a certain signi-
fiance of 'emptiness'. Compared to a real object, a chair itself, for
instance, an idea of a chair seems rather 'empty', as if the idea could
be assumed to be identical with my perceptive experience if the real
object were removed. Hume is satisfied to let this natural, though
fallacious, notion of the idea, play its part. It is the first sign he
gives of the sceptical road he is going to take. By ideas, he
says, I mean the faint images of these (i. e. impressions),

55) The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 353

in thinking and reasoning1). Again, We find by ex
perience, he writes, that when any impression has been
present with the mind, it again makes its appearance
there as an idea, and this it may do after two different
ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a
considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is some
what intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea;
or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect
idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions
in the first manner, is called the Memory, and the
other the Imagination2). And again, talking of impressions
and ideas, he says, The one seem to be in a manner the re-
flexionoftheother....When!shutmyeyesandthink
of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact represen
tations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any cir
cumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the
other3). No circumstance, the reader is inclined to conclude, except
that in the one case there is assumed to be an object beyond the
experience, and in the other no object. The conclusion is false. The
j remembered object is just as much an object beyond the imagination,
I as the real object is beyond the experience of perception. The latter is
a physical object, the former are ideal objects, but no more capable than
the physical object of being absorbed into the experience itself. If Hume
had recognized the objectivity of ideal objects, he could hardly have
become a sceptic. For by changing one kind of existence for another,
by calling the real world an hallucination, he did not escape the
difficulty of accounting for our belief in the world's independent
existence, but only added to his task the extra difficulty of explaining
the nature of our consciousness of 'reality' in terms of our con
sciousness of the phantastical. Meanwhile, by playing with the divi
sion of elements in conscious experience, and assigning the object-
element for a moment to the impression, and the experience-element
to the idea, he serves to make the transition to the exact opposite a
little easier, as a pendulum swings back more easily in reaction. But,
even at the beginning, indications are not wanting of the way affairs
will march. Much can be anticipated in the following! Everyone
of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt
feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these
are easily distinguished; tho' it is not impossible but

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 311. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 317. 3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 312.

Husserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophic. X. 5

354 C- V Salmon, [56

in particular instances they may very nearly approach
to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness,
or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may
approach to our impressions: as on the other hand, it
sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint
and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our
ideas1). As soon as Hume turns his attention to the impression,
the balance of meaning swings the opposite way. The impression
becomes the experience itself, the idea the object of the experience.
This does not happen all at once, but demands most of the space of
the Treatise for its completion. Analysing the impression, Hume finds
that the object of the experience does not coincide with the
object as it is experienced. Seeking to interpret this on
what he conceives to be the ultimate and irrefutable basis of tem
poral reality, he concludes that the object as it is experienced
is identical with the temporal experience, i. e. sensation. This he
calls the impression. He concludes that the object of the ex
perience is not a temporal reality at all, but a "fiction", which he
calls the idea. In the process of this argument, the Humeian idea
has become what Locke liked to call an "object", and the Humeian
impression, although it ends as an actual sensation, has passed
through a stage of being very like what Locke called an "idea". This
it did while it was an act of the imagination. Passages can be found
where the development of impressions and ideas are at midway. Both
the object-element and the experience-element of the conscious ex
perience are there combined, and possessed in half measure both by
the impression and the idea. In Part III. Sect. VI, where Hume is
expounding the causal principle as an "inference", the concrete ob
ject of the experience seems to be compounded of impression and
idea, to be made of a mixture of both, half-real and half-fictitious.
Witness such a sentence as the following: — Had ideas no more
union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the
understanding, we cou'd never ... repose belief in any
matter of fact2). Part. III. Sects. VII and VIII present a similar
view of the process in transit. In these Hume actually describes
belief as an idea conjoined to an impression. The idea of an
object, — he says — is an essential part of the belief
of it . . . .8). But the stages are seldom clearly marked.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 311—12. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 393.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 394.

571 The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

355

§ 17. Serving to connect Part I. Sect. Ill in the Treatise, with
Part I. Sect. IV. What resulted from Hume's proposal to derive

the Idea from the Impression.

Locke's tabula rasa theory, and Hume's attempt to derive our
"ideas" from our "impressions", are both versions of the old Aristo
telian contention, Principium nostrae cogitationis est a sensu. Although
Hume did not share Locke's interest in the problem of innate ideas,
he sympathised with Locke's conception of the priority of the sense
perception above the other faculties of consciousness. Having divided
the "perceptions" of the human mind into impressions and ideas,
Hume notices a resemblance between them. The first circum
stance that strikes my eye, he writes, is the great resem
blance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every
other particular, except their degree of force and
vivacity. The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion
of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind
are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas.
. . . . Ideas and impressions appear always to cor
respond to each other1). But this universal resemblance is
quickly modified. Upon a more accurate survey I find,
Hume writes, I have been carried away too far by the first
appearance, and that I must make use of the distinc
tion of perceptions into simple and complex, to limit
this general decision, that all our impressions and
ideas are resembling2). The resemblance between complex
impressions and ideas is partial. But in the case of the "simple"
perceptions, he finds that the resemblance is both exact and universal.
After the most accurate examination, he writes, of which
I am capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here
holds without any exception, and that every simple
idea has a simple impression, which resembles it, and
every simple impression a correspondent idea3). That
I may know on which side this dependence lies, Hume
continues, I consider the order of their fir st ap pear ance ;
and find by constant experience, that the simple
impressions always take the precedence of their corre
spondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary
order4) . . . . all our simple ideas in their first appe-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 312. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 313.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 313. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 314.

5*

356 C. V. Salmon [58

a ranee, he concludes, are deriv'd from simple impres
sions, which are correspondent to them, and which
they exactly represent1). It remains for Hume to account for
those of the complex ideas which have no correspondence with
impressions. We find by experience, he writes, that when
any impression has been present with the mind, it
again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this
it may do after two different ways: either when in its
new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its
first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt
an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses
that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty by
which we repeat our impressions in the first manner,
is called the Memory, and the other the Imagination*).
In addition to the difference in degree of vivacity, Hume finds another

difference between the memory and the imagination the

memory preserves the original form, in which its
objects were presented3), but the imagination is at liberty to

transpose and change its ideas4) the imagination,

he writes, is not restrained to the same order and form
with the original impressions, while the memory is in
a manner ty'd down in that respect, without any power
of variation6). 'Tis evident, he writes, that the memory
preserves the original form, in which its objects were
presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in
recollecting anything, it proceeds from some defect
or imperfection in that faculty6). But, concerning the
imagination, the fables we meet with in poems and
romances puts this entirely out of the question. Nature
there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned
but wing'd horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants.
Nor will this liberty of the fancy appear strange, when
we consider, that all our ideas are copy'd from our
impressions, and that there are not any two impres-
sionswhichareperfectlyinseparable. Nottomention,
that this is an evident consequence of the division of
ideas into simple and complex. Where-ever the ima
gination perceives a difference among ideas, it can

1 ) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 314. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 317. 3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 318.

4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 318. 5) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 318. 6) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 318.

59] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 357

easily produce a separation1). But this is the last that is heard
of the special problem of the complex ideas, for, in the next moment,
it is merged in a larger problem, which lasts to the end of the first
Book of the Treatise. Hume says no word concerning his transition.
Between the sentence last quoted and the one that follows it there is
apparently no break. As all simple ideas may be separated
by the imagination, Hume writes at the beginning of Sect. IV.,
and may be united in what form it pleases, nothing
wou'd be more unaccountable than the operations of
that faculty, were it not guided by some universal
principles, which render it in some measure, uniform
with itself in all times and places2). In reality, in the empty
space between the two sections, the problem has been changed. Hume
is still concerned with complexity, but no longer with the com
plexity of ideas. Hume is concerned now with the complexity of
"impressions". His lack of definition is deliberate. Now, for the first
time, his confusion of the impression with the idea is explicable.
In Section III impressions and ideas carry the sense which they were
given at their introduction. ("Those perceptions, which enter with
most force and violence, we may name impressions." "By ideas I
mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.") Each of
them is supposed to stand for a concrete, objectifying experience of a
different kind. But in Section IV, impressions and ideas have already
been bound into homogeneity. They are complementary elements
within the unity of one experience. When Hume says "as all simple
ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united in what
form it pleases", he means by ideas no independent entities, but "per
ceptions", i. e. that part of the perceived object which the imagination
contributes in a perception experience, which is the whole of it that
is not "sensation".

If Hume had wished his present terminology to be identical
with his former, he would have given the title of Section IV, as "Of
connexion or association in impressions". But being arrived at the
conviction that an impression in the original sense contains an
idea, or in later language, that a perception is composed of an
impression and ideas, he calls his section, Of the Connexion or
Association of Ideas3), and means "Of the connexion or asso
ciation of ideas on to an impression in concrete perception". His
problem is still a problem of accounting for complexity, but the com-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 318-19. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 319. 3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 319.

358 C- V- Salmon, [60

plexity not of ideas in the old sense, but of impressions. Impressions,
in the old sense, stood for perceptions. Hume's present problem is
to account for the complexity of our perceptions. It occupies him
to the end of the Book. The problem arose for him because of his
notion that sensation was essentially 'simple'. The imagination with
its power of "association of ideas", is introduced to add complexity
to the original simplicity of sensation, and convert our experience
into perception proper.

Hume's transition from the problem of accounting for the com
plexity of ideas, to that of accounting for the complexity of
impressions, was facilitated by the interdependency he had already
tried to establish between impressions and ideas. But it was
necessitated by the partial answer which he had given to the former
problem. "Where-ever the mind perceives a difference among ideas,
— he had said, in order to account for those complex ideas which
were not copied from impressions, --it can easily produce a sepa
ration." It is to be presumed that the mind can only perceive a
difference in ideas which are complex. It follows that those complex
ideas, which are not copied from impressions, are created out of the
complexity of ideas which are copied from impressions. But those
complex ideas which are copies of impressions have been denned as
differing 'properly' in no respect but degree of vivacity from the
impressions from which they have been copied. Complex ideas which
are copies of impressions are the ideas of memory. "'Tis evident",
Hume said, "that the memory preserves the original form, in which
its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in
recollecting any thing, it preceeds from some defect or imperfection
in that faculty." Since, then, the faculty of memory is liable
to "imperfection", and since, even at its best, its presentations are
less "vivacious" than the impressions which it copies, it were best
that the complex impressions themselves, and not the complex ideas,
were studied, as providing the compound material from which,
by analysis and re-construction, the imagination creates its
unprecedented, new, complex ideas. This is what Hume conceives.
Instead of watching how the imagination dissects memories, to create
from the components of these, new additions, "wing-d horses, fiery
dragons, and monstrous giants", he will watch how the imagination
dissects impressions. But as soon as he begins to consider complex
impressions, he finds that the imagination can only dissect their com
plexity because it has already constructed it. Before Hume can
explain the operations of the imagination in creating "fables", he

61] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

359

must explain its operations in creating "realities". The latter task
absorbs him. Without any mention of the fact, Hume passes from a
proposal to watch the imagination at work in the construction of
ideas, to an actual contemplation of it at work in the construction
of impressions. Or, using his newer terminology, having divided the
concrete perception, into a. 'impressions' of the senses, and b. 'ideas'
of the imagination, he will watch the "connexion", or "association"
of the 'ideas' in their relation to the 'impressions'. Gradually the
'ideas of the imagination' will acquire, and the 'impressions of the
senses' will relinquish, the greater part of the concrete perception.
As it assumes its new role, the imagination changes its cha
racter. It is no longer the poetic fancy. It becomes the genetic
faculty in all consciousness. . . . I must distinguish in the
imagination, Hume writes near the conclusion of his first Book,
betwixt the principles which are permanent, irre
sistible and universal .... and the principles, which
are changeable, weak and irregular .... The former
are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions,
so that upon their removal human nature must im
mediately perish and go to ruin1).

Chapter VI.

An Estimate of the 'Scepticism' to which Hume is led
by his misconception of the Subject-Object relation.

§ 18. General estimate of Hume's conception of the Subject-
Object relation.

Hume's discovery, that the perceived object does not coincide
with the object-as-it-is-perceived, was a version of the Cartesian
dubito, and provided him with his chief means of ascent into the
subjective sphere. But unfortunately he tried to carry the perceived
object with him into this sphere, and when it would not come with
him, he conceived himself obliged to disown it. For the sake of the
object-as-it-is-perceived he denied the perceived object altogether.
For all we know, he argued, there is no object beyond the object-as-
it-is-perceived.

Hume passed from the true premise, that the object of our per
ception is not the object as we perceive it, to the false conclusion,
that the object-as-it-is-perceived is the object of our perception. He

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 510—11.

360 C. V. Salmon, [62

passed from the true premise, that the object of our perception is
not our perception of the object, to the false conclusion, that our
perception of the object is the object of our perception.

Hume did not drive his distinction far enough. He tried to
make two distinctions do the work of four. He wanted to make the
distinction between object-element and experience-element synony
mous with the wider distinction between objective and subjective.
Here he fell, as many have fallen since, into hypostasis. The distinc
tion between object and subject originates on the subjective side, for
it is made in consciousness. But it is an 'ultimate' distinction. It
brings about a division of 'highest genus'1), so that, once created, the
terms of the division must be taken to stand in an absolute antipathy.
Each term, therefore, is capable of supporting within itself a subject-
object distinction of a subsidiary kind. Just as the subjective must
include an objective - - for there can be no such thing as a 'sub
jective' which does not imply some reference to an 'object' - so
the objective must be capable of including or 'expressing' a sub
jective -- for every 'objective' inplies a 'subject' which made it.

To illustrate this in the matter of the perception. The per
ception can be regarded 1. objectively. But within that highest
genus, the perception can be divided again, into (a), an experience,
and (b), an object. A. observing B. perceive X. must distinguish
between (a) B's perception of X., which is B's real psychological
experience, and (b) the X. perceived by B., which is some reality in
the world. But both the 'perception' and the 'object' are 'objective'.

The perception can also be regarded 2. subjectively. But
within this highest genus, the perception can be divided again into
(a), an experience, and (b), an object. A. observing his own per
ception under an introspection, must distinguish between (a) his
perception of the object, Noesis (v6?]6ic). and (b), the object as he
perceives it, Noema (vor]tua) 2).

But Hume did not pursue his distinctions far enough. Crossing
over from one genus to another, from objective to subjective, and
from subjective to objective, without due precaution, he was at equal
loss in both. Considering that the objective could properly contain
no subjective species within its own genus, and the subjective genus
no objective species, he sought, desperately, to solve the matter with

1) The expression is used in the Phenomenological Sense. See Husserl, Ideen.
Bk. I, Part I, Ch. I, § 12: Gattung und Art.

2) Noesis & Noema. The terms are in common use by Phenomenologists. See
Husserl, Jdeen. Bk. I, Part III, Ch. 3, § 87 et scrj.

63] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

361

a paradox, and asserted — it was his final position — that there was
no object in the objective sphere, but only a subject, and in the
subjective sphere, no subject, but only an object. The first half of
the assertion amounted to the total denial of the existence of the
real world, the second half to the "bundle of experiences" account of
the individual.

In the end, in spite of all his efforts, Hume fails to account for
the relation of the subject to his objective worlds. By proposing to
derive the objectivity of the various spheres of the individual's con
sciousness from the one sphere of perception, he places all his for
tunes on his analysis of perception. Here he comes near to his goal.
He finds a 'Phenomenon', but because he does not know its intentional
character, he disowns it, and converts it into an "image" in a re
presentative theory. Then do what he will he cannot bridge the gap
between consciousness and its objective. If the subject can be shown
to create its own consciousness of reality, why should it be supposed
that that reality exists? But if reality does not exist, how can a sub
ject be conscious of it? Hume cannot frame an answer. Yet he had
almost put the means of answering it in his own mouth. When he
incorporated the impression and the idea within the unity of one
perception experience, he was on the way to succeed. For there
within the subjective sphere, he seemed to have enclosed the sub
ject-object relation. He could have made the impression, Noesis, and
the idea, Noema. Instead of this, he made the idea, an "image", and
the impression, a real sensation, and his last chance was gone.

Towards the end of Part IV of Book I, it is noticeable that
Hume ceases to talk exclusively of "perceptions". He reverts, par
ticularly in his Appendices, to his original terminology. He goes back
to his old impression-idea antithesis. He employs the word "per
ception", but he uses it now to mean "impression". He takes refuge
once more in the fable of the temporal origin of our "ideas". All
ideas — he says -- are borrow' d from preceding per
ceptions. It is his confession that he has failed.

§ 19. Hume's 'Scepticism', harmless when it is absolute, false
when it is partial. Hume's Comparative Subjectivism, cocerning

A. the Objective World of Reality.

N. Kemp Smith has devoted two articles in "Mind"1) to vin
dicating Hume from any superficial charge of scepticism. His defence

1) Refer N. K. Smith: The Naturalism of Hume. Mind. 1905.

362 C- V- Salmon, [64

is based upon the deference Hume shows to his "natural beliefs".
There is a great difference — Hume says — betwixt such
opinions as we form after a calm and profound re
flection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct
or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness
and conformity to the mind. If these opinions become
contrary, 'tis not difficult to foresee which of them
will have the advantage. As long as our attention is
bent upon the subject, the philosophical and studied
principle may prevail; but the moment we relax our
thoughts, Nature will display herself, and draw us
back to our former opinion. Nay she has sometimes
such an influence, that she can stop our progress, even
in the midst of our most pro found reflections, and keep
us from running on with all the consequences of any

philosophical opinion I take it for granted,

whatever may be the reader's opinion at this present
moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there
is both an external and internal world *). Whether, or not,
this division of the human powers against themselves is to be called
'sceptical', it is certainly characteristic of Hume. When we trace
up the human understanding to its first principles, he
writes, we find it to lead us into such sentiments, as seem
to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry and
to discourage us from future enquiries2). I have
already shewn, he says elsewhere, that the understanding
when it acts alone, and according to its most general
principles, generally subverts itself, and leaves not
the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition,
either in philosophy or common life3). He speaks with
assurance of a sceptical doubt, which, both with respect to
reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never
be radically cured, but must return upon us every mo
ment, however we may chace it away and sometimes
may seem entirely free of it. 'Tis impossible, he adds,
upon any system to defend either our understanding
or our senses; and we but expose them farther when
we endeavour to justify them in that manner . . . .

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 505. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 546.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 547.

65) The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

363

Carelesness and inattention alone can afford us any
remedy1). How then shall we adjust these principles
together? he writes, Which of them shall we prefer? Or
in case we prefer neither of them, but successively
assent to both, as is usual among philosophers, with
what confidence can we afterwards usurp that
glorious title, when we thus knowingly embrace a
manifest contradiction2)? And later, The intense view
of these manifold contradictions and imperfections
in human reason, has so wrought upon me, and heated
my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and
reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more
probableormorelikelythananother3).

This opposing of the general faculties of man is a strange
practice for a philosopher. But it can be converted into a position
which aids, rather than hinders, Hume in his Subjectivism. It can be
taken, (or could be taken, for Hume hardly takes it so,) as an expres
sion of the differences which separate the Introspective from the
Natural attitude. Hume's compromise, Where reason is

lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought
to be assented to4), until, nature herself . . . . cures me
of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either
by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation and
lively impressions of my senses., which obliterate all
thesechimeras6) — needs but to be purged of the real hypostasis,
to be turned, from representing two antagonistic, to representing
two complementary, states of mind. The conception of causality will
then no longer relate the two, and the worlds, proper to the different
phases no longer vie with one another, but be reconciled within one
complete unity.

Unfortunately, this nai'f and original notion of the professions
of the philosopher in meditation, and the philosopher turned prac
tical in daily life, does not exhaust Hume's 'sceptical' theories. There
is a set of arguments scattered about the Treatise, where Hume falls
into 'comparative subjectivism', and expounds, a vulgar and unworthy
scepticism. These arguments originate in a misinterpretation of the
distinction between the Primary and Secondary qualities in the

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 505. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 546.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 548. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 550.

5) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 548.

364 C. V. Salmon, [66

objective world of reality, and consist A. in a sceptical theory concer
ning the external world, and B. — the worst portion of the Treatise
— in a sceptical theory concerning consciousness.

A. Hume's Scepticism concerning reality. We may observe,
Hume writes, that there are three different kinds of
impressions convey' d by the senses. The first are those
of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The
second, those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat
and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures, that
arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as
by the cutting of our flesh with steel and such like . . . -1).
Of these he says, Sounds, and tastes and smells, tho' com
monly regarded by the mind as contin u'd independent
qualities, appear not to have any existence in exten
sion, and cannot consequently appear to the senses as
situated externally to the body2). It is of this 'illusion' that
the fig is offered, afterwards, as an example. . . . whatever confus'd
notions we may form of an union in place betwixt an
extended body, as a fig, and its particular taste, 'tis
certain that upon reflection we must observe in this
union something altogether unintelligible and con
tradictory. For shou'd we ask ourselves one question,
viz. if the taste which we conceive to be contain' d in
the circumference of the body, is in every part of it or
in one only, we must quickly find ourselves at a loss,
and perceive the impossibility of ever giving a satis
factory answer. We cannot reply, that 'tis only in one
part: for experience convinces us that every part has
the same relish. We can as little reply that it exists in
every part: for then we must suppose it figur'd and
extended; which is absurd and incomprehensible. . . .
we use in our most familiar way of thinking, that scho
lastic principle .... of totum in toto et totum in
qualibet parte: Which is much the same, as if we
shou'd say, that a. thing is in a certain place, and yet
is not there8).

Hume had no right to use the distinction between the primary
and secondary qualities to deny an existence to the latter, which he

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 482. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 481.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 521—2.

67] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 355

was prepared to allow to the former; for Berkeley had established
their 'equality' in the matter of existence. If an opinion was scep
tical concerning the existence of the secondary, it must be sceptical
also concerning the existence of the primary. There was nothing
new in the form of Hume's argument. It is unsatisfactory. His use
of the word "appearance" is ambiguous. "Sounds, and tastes, and
smells, he says, appear not to have any existence in extension, and
cannot consequently appear to the senses as situated externally to
the body". The argument is circular. These qualities appear not, they
cannot consequently appear; for appearance can only be appearance
to the senses. What Hume applies to "sounds, tastes and smells" he
applies also to "colours, sounds, heat and cold". Speaking of the
"three different kinds of impressions" above given, Hume writes,
Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of
those to have a distinct, continu'd existence. The
vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing.
Both philosophers and the vulgar, again, esteem the

third to bemerelyperceptions *). The fact is, that Hume

is aware of the invalidity of his arguments. Before he has done, he
extends his judgment to include the primary with the secondary
qualities in his denial . . . .'Tis evident, he says, that....
colours, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the
senses, exist after the same manner with motion and
solidity .... 'Tis also evident, that colours, sounds
etc. are originally on the same footing with the pain
that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from
a fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded
neither on perception, nor reason, but on the imagi
nation2). (The word "imagination" is used here in a conventional
sense). If colours, sounds, tastes and smells, be merely
perceptions, is Hume's conclusion, nothing we can conceive
is possest of a real, continu'd, and independent exis
tence, no t even motion, extension and solidity, which
are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on8). If Hume
realized that the primary and secondary qualities must be treated
upon the same level of existence, he must have had some reason
for allowing himself to treat them differently, before he
them alike.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 482. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 482.

3) Gr. & Gr I, p. 513.

366 C. V. Salmon, [68

For the present contradiction Hume had two reasons. 1. Under
the influence of the real hypostasis, he wished to use the primary
qualities for a base on which the association could operate. This
theory, which appears here and there in the earlier parts of the
Treatise, reaches its final form in a version of the modern doctrine
that the sense-data provide the imagination with a "real" foundation
on which to construct its fictitious objects. 2. Hume wished to use
the reality of the primary qualities to provide an explanation of
space, of which he never managed to give any satisfactory account
in the terms of the subjective imagination. Hume's treatment of space
is in general very weak. Space appears in one part of the Treatise as
a reality, in another as an abstract idea. But as neither the one nor
the other is it compatible with Hume's final position. Space itself
cannot be an abstract idea. Space is a reality. But as a reality it
cannot explain our perception of it. Our perception of space, like
every other element in the objective world of reality, requires
explanation in the terms of subjective genesis. The Humeian imagi
nation was quite capable in itself, of creating a perception of space,
but Hume did not give it the opportunity.

When once Hume had extended his denial of reality to the pri
mary as well as the secondary qualities, he could have converted his
sceptical attitude into an attitude merely of Cartesian doubt. The
real world would be perceived, even by the philosopher, in ordinary,
practical life. It would only be excluded, for the sake of the sub
jective 'world', by the philosopher, at introspection, in his armchair.

§ 20. Hume's Comparative Subjectivism, concerning B. the Sub
jective world of Consciousness. The strange conclusion brought
about by the relation of these two 'Scepticisms'.

When Hume's 'scepticism' had grown to include the whole of
the objective world of reality, it might have been translated into a
pheiiomenological idealism. This was prevented by Hume's 'sceptical'
attitude towards the subjective sphere. From holding such notions as,
at one time, that the primary qualities, at another, that space, ex
plained our perception of them through the means of their own
reality, Hume passed to give a similar account of some of the faculties
of consciousness itself. This was the worst of Hume's inconsistencies.
His method of approach to scepticism in the subjective sphere was
similar to that which he had used in the objective sphere.

He begins by arguing from the comparative subjectivity of per-

69] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

367

ception itself. When we press one eye with a finger, he
writes, we immediately perceive all the objects to be-
come double, and one half of them to be remov'd from
their common and natural position .... we clearly
perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on
our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and
animal spirits. This opinion is confirm'd by the
seeming encrease and diminuition of objects, accor
ding to their distance; by the apparent alterations in
their figure; by the changes in their colour and other
qualities from our sickness and distempers; and by an
infinite number of other experiments of the same
kind; from all which we learn, that our sensible per
ceptions are not possest of any distinct or indepen
dent existence1). The argument derives its force from the real
hypostasis. If our "perceptions" have not any distinct or independent
existence, the real existence with which we qualify what we call their
'objects' must belong to the "perceptions" themselves. The notion
delights Hume. In conformity with it he propounds his singular
'doctrine of meaning', that all our 'perceptions' must appear what they
are, and be what they appear. There is no impression nor idea
ofanykind,he writes, of which we have any consciousness
or memory, that is not conceiv'd as existent 2). This being
granted, Hume asks us to grant, that, . . . since all actions and
sensations of the mind are known to us by conscious
ness, they must necessarily appear in every particular
what they are, and be what they appear. Everything,
Hume concludes, that enters the mind, being in reality a
perception, 'tis impossible anything shou'd to feeling
appear different. This were to suppose, that even
where we are most intimately conscious, we might be
mistaken3). And Hume says the same thing explicitly about the
senses. Thus to resume, he writes, what I have said con
cerning the senses .... they cannot operate beyond
the extent in which they really operate4).

This theory of consciousness is so out of line with Hume's signifi
cant work, illuminated by his conception of the imagination with
its genetic function, of "ideas" which are objects in consciousness,

1) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 498. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 370.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 480. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 482,

368 C- V- Salmon, [70

that we may dismiss it without ceremony. Suffice it, that if Hume
had believed sustainedly what he wrote in this matter, concerning
the identification of real, that it to say, spatio-temporal, being,
with the ideal being of 'meaning' and consciousness, it would
have been unnecessary for him to compose the major portion of his
Treatise.

When Hume's comparative subjectivity is regarded as a whole,
when his sceptical opinions concerning the objective world of reality,
on the one hand, and the subjective world of consciousness, on the
other, are brought into relation, they introduce a not uninteresting
example of a sort of Berkeleyan Idealism, to which they compelled
Hume. They come to be related in this way. The differentiation
between the primary and secondary qualities suggests a parallel
distinction between reality and appearance. Hume is content to
suggest that there are varying degrees of objectivity in the world
which we perceive. The explanation of the qualities of bodies, for
instance, should not be looked for upon quite the same plane as
their configuration, or their motion upon the same plane as their
quantity. Hume implies that certain laws, which are generally con
sidered as physical, derive their necessity from nothing physical,
but from the perceiving mind. Hume may have found this suggestion
in Locke's doctrine of "the conformity of ideas to the reality of
things". Its first definite appearance in the Treatise, is in connection
with "Substances". From the beginning, Hume treats substances, as
if they were 'ideal' in nature. He conceives of them as relations of
ideas to which no corresponding relations of real objects, or parts of
objects, can be found. Hume thinks of substances as "complexities".
He talks scornfully of the "idea" of substance. I wou'd fain
ask those philosophers, who found so much of their
reasonings on the distinction of substance and acci
dent, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether
the idea of substance be deriv'd from the impressions
of sensation, or of reflection? If it be conve y'd t o u s
by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what
manner? If it be perceiv'd by the eyes, it must be a
colour; ifby the ears, a sound; ifby the palate, a taste;
and so of the other senses. But I believe none will
assert, that substance is either a colour, or a sound,
or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be
deriv'd from an impression of reflection, if it really
exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve them-

711 The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 359

selves into our passions and emotions; none of which

can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore
no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collec
tion of particular qualities, nor have we any other
meaning, when we either talk or reason concerning it.
The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is
nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are
united by the imagination1). The suggestion is unmistake-
able. Not only cannot such objective characteristics as configuration,
or quality, be supposed to exist on the same level as the 'object'
figured and qualified, but the whole which expresses any object
cannot be supposed to exist on the same level as the simplicity, or
simplicities, to which it refers. Hume argues that the relation of the
parts to the wholes is no more than a relation of ideas. Analyse any
complex objective entity, separate, that is, your complex idea of
that entity into the simple ideas which are its components, and if
the realities represented by these simple ideas are really 'parts',
we shall have an impression of their relation, i. e. of substance, and
not only an idea of it.

There are no physical laws but only laws of "ideas". Instead
of a physical world of objects related to one another by their
characteristics, Hume offers us a psychical world of 'ideas' connected
with one another by their qualities. The laws of this world of ideas
are all expressed under the supreme law of a new 'causality'. To
understand the nature of this 'causality', we must examine, not the
characteristics of objects, but the qualities of ideas. Here, . . . .
says Hume, we have three things to explain, viz. First,
the original impression. Secondly, the transition to
the idea of the connected cause or effect. Thirdly,
the nature and qualities of that idea2).

§ 21. Hume's Scepticism concluded in a kind of Berkeleyan

Idealism.

Our "perceptions" exist; they are the only existences. When
we qualify what we take to be external and independent objects
with the characteristics and qualities we suppose are usual to them,
either we are inventing qualities and characteristics, which cannot be

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 324. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 385.

Huaserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophic. X. 6

370 C. V. Salmon, [72

shown to have any real existence in objects, or we are attributing
them to our "perceptions", to which they properly belong. The
characteristics and qualities at our disposal are contained within the
one characteristic of existence. Our "perceptions" exist. This theory
of the existence of our "perceptions" brings with it many difficulties,
from which Hume extricates himself with considerable agility.

Whatever the nature of our "perceptions" may be, how they
may really be the stuffing, or filling, of Hume's indivisible moments
of time, how the one of them may be able to 'cease' before the next
one 'come into existence', all this can hardly be supposed to affect
our attribution of existence to them. For, after all, the matter in
volves consciousness. To us these "perceptions" are moments of
consciousness. Our "perceptions" possess content. Our "perceptions"
are houses, and trees, and 'objects'. Outside consciousness this
world, we will grant Hume to have shown it, does not exist. But
inside consciousness the world is presented to us as, There! We
may name these 'objects' of the 'world' 'perception-objects', and,
thinking of 'perception-houses', 'perception-trees' etc., effect a com
promise between the real and the subjective which Hume needs.
Hume provides us with authority for the notion. Writing, not in the
Treatise, but some years later in the "Enquiry", he says, .... philo
sophy .... teaches us, that nothing can ever be present
to the mind but an image or perception .... no man,
who reflects, ever doubted that the existences which
we consider, when we say, this house, and that tree,
are nothing but perceptions in the mind1). We must be
nice in our notion of "perceptions". As far as their real existence is
concerned these perception-houses and perception-trees are the
nature of certain indivisible moments of time. They are finite and
discrete. We may call them perception- houses, and p e r c e p •
t ion- trees, But it is not to these that we, the conscious subjects
of perception, attribute existence. We attribute existence to per
ception-houses and perception - 1 r e e s , i.e. 'moments' of our con
sciousness. And the existence which we attribute to them is not a
complete and discrete existence, such as belongs to them as per
ception- houses and perception- trees, but a continous and
continuing existence. We have to remember that, even here, there
is no question of an 'independent' existence. I have already ob
served, Hume says, that there is an intimate connexion

1) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. XII.

73] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

betwixt those two principles of a continued and of a
distinct or independent existence, and that we no
sooner establish the one, than the other follows, as
a necessary (and, as Hume implies, absolutely fictitious) con
sequence1).

As matters stand, there are the makings of a contradiction
between the 'real' and the 'conscious' moments of our "perceptions".
This is the crux of Hume's sceptical situation. He supposes that he
has accounted for all the characteristics of the 'objects' of the real
world except that of existence. If he cannot now account for their
characteristic of existence, his work will have been vain. While
granting that discrete existence belongs properly to perception-
houses and perception- trees, we must yet be able to believe
that our perception - h o u s e s and perception- trees are capable of
sustaining the continuous existence which we attribute to them.

In order to reconcile this threatening discrepancy, Hume pro
pounds an ingenious kind of Berkeleyian Idealism. Stating the problem,
Nothing is more certain . . . . he writes, than that any
contradiction either to the sentiments or to the
passions gives a sensible uneasiness, whether it pro
ceeds from without or within; from the opposition of
external objects, or from the combat of internal prin
ciples. On the contrary, whatever strikes in with the
natural propensities .... is sure to give a sensible
pleasure. Now there being here an opposition betwixt
the notion of the identity of resembling perceptions,
and the interruption of their appearance, the mind
must be uneasy in that situation, and will naturally
seek relief from that uneasiness . . . We must, there
fore, .... suppose that our perceptions are no longer
interrupted, but preserve a continu'd as well as an
invariable existence, and are by that means entirely
the same. But here the interruptions in the appearance
(these "interruptions in the appearance" are the 'signs' of the real
numerical difference of the "perceptions", and of their indivisible
simplicity and isolation from one another, as they exist, really, in the
uni-dimensional world of the separate moments of time), of these
perceptions are so long and frequent, that 'tis im
possible to overlook them, and as the appearance of

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 498.

372 C. V. Salmon, [74

a perception in the mind and its existence seem at
first sight entirely the same, it may be doubted,
whether we can ever assent to so palpable a contra
diction, and suppose a perception to exist without
being present to the mind. (He proceeds, now, to the solution
of the problem.) In order to clear up this matter, and
learn how the interruption in the appearance of a
perception implies not necessarily an interruption
in its existence, 'twill be proper to touch upon some
principles .... We may begin with observing, that
the difficulty in the present case is not concerning
the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a
conclusion concerning the contin u'd existence of its
perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which
the conclusion is formed, and principles from which
it is deriv'd. (Note the essential intimacy between the real and the
conscious moment of the "perception".) 'Tis certain, that almost
all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for
the greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions
to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very
being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the
real body or material existence. 'Tis also certain that
this very perception or object is suppos'd to have
a continu'd uninterrupted being, and neither to be
annihilated by our absence, nor to be brought into
existence by our presence. When we are absent from
it, we say it still exists, but that we do not feel, we do
not see it1). Close upon this follows Hume's famous antithesis
of the "philosopher" and the "vulgar man". It is essential that the
grounds of this antithesis be recognized. The whole argument is
'sceptical', i. e. it takes place inside a comparative subjectivism. It
takes for granted that the reader has allowed that there is no such
thing as an absolutely independent 'object', an 'object' absolutely
independent of the 'perception'. The 'object', which is supposed "to
have a continu'd, uninterrupted being, and neither to be annihilated
by our absence nor to be brought into existence by our presence", is
a perception-object, a perception-house, perception-tree. It will have
to be allowed, that Hume does some injustice to the character of the
vulgar man by crediting him with so much subtlety. But the alter-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 494—5.

75] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 373

native of supposing the vulgar man to refer to absolutely independent
objects renders the whole argument void. The vulgar man supposes
that "Those very sensations which enter by the eye or
ear1)" are the perception-objects. The philosopher supposes that
"those very sensations" are not the perception-objects themselves, but
only 'images' or 'representations' of these. As this has not been
generally recognized by Hume's critics, it may be well, before passing
to his attempted solution, to interpolate a passage where Hume has
given another description of the same problem. When we have
been accustom' d to observe a constancy in certain
impressions, he writes, and have found that the per
ception of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon
us after an absence .... with like parts, and in a like
order .... we are not apt to regard these interrupted
perceptions as different (which they really are), but,
on the contrary, consider them as individually the
same, upon account of their resemblance. But as this
interruption of their existence is contrary to their
perfect identity, and makes us regard the first impres
sion as annihilated, and the second as newly created,
we find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv'd
in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves
from this difficulty, we disguise, as much as possible,
the interruption, or rather remove it entirely, by
supposing that these interrupted perceptions are
connected by a real existence, of which we are
insensible2). This passage leaves no doubt that the reference of
continu'd existence is confined to perception-objects, and does not
reach beyond these to any objects supposed existing by themselves.
Speaking, then, of a "perception", Hume wrote, "When we are absent
from it, we say it still exists, but that we do not feel, we do not see
it." Speaking still of a "perception", he resumes: -- When we are
present, we say we feel, or see it. Here then may arise
two questions; First, How can we satisfy ourselves in
supposing a perception to be absent from the mind
without being annihilated. Secondly, After what
manner we conceive an object to become presentto
the mind, without some new creation of a perception
or image; and what we mean by this seeing and feeling,

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 491. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p.

374 C- V- Salmon, [76

and perceiving. — As to the first question, we may
observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing but a
heap or collection of different perceptions, united
together by certain relations, and suppos'd, t h o'
falsely, to be endow' d with a perfect simplicity and
identity. Now as every perception is distinguishable
from another, and may be consider' d as separately
existent, it evidently follows, that there is no ab
surdity in separating any particular perception from
the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations,
with that connected mass of perceptions, which con
stitute a thinking being. The same reasoning affords
us an answer to the second question. If the name of
perception renders not this separation from a mind
absurd and contradictory, the name of object,
standing for the very same thing, can never render
their conjunction imposible. External objects are
seen and felt, and become present to the mind; that
is, they acquire such a relation to a connected heap of
perceptions, as to influence them very considerably
in augmenting their number by present reflections
arid passions, and in storing the memory with ideas.
The same continu'd and uninterrupted Being may,
therefore, be sometimes present to the mind, and
sometimes absent from it, without any real or essen
tial change in the Being itself. An interrupted appe
arance to the senses implies not necessarily an inter
ruption in the existence. The supposition of the
continu'd existence of sensible objects or perceptions
involves no contradiction. We may easily indulge our
inclination to that supposition. When the exact
resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to
them an identity, we may remove the seeming inter
ruption by feigning a continu'd being, which may fill
those intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire
identity to our perceptions1).

The above theory of "idealism" expresses the extreme of Hume's
scepticism.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 495—6.

77] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

375

Chapter VII.
Hume's Theory of Belief.

§ 22. Hume's general conception of Belief. Rational and
Perceptual Belief.

What can it be, Hume was obliged to ask himself, which makes
us believe that which we do believe, in the face of the fact, that it
cannot be that which we do believe, which makes us believe it? That
which we do believe, is, mainly, truths and realities of the physical
world. But truths deceive us, for there are no abstract ideas and
realities deceive us, for there are no physical realities. It may be
said in favour of Hume's sceptical opinions that they drove him into
giving a subjective account of belief. His attitude was original.
This operation of the mind, he writes, which forms the
belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have
been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; tho'
no one has so much as suspected, that there was any
difficulty in explaining it1). Hume sets himself to explain it.
The account falls into two compartments: belief touching reasoning,
and belief touching perception. If Hume were taken at his word, he
would be supposed to have very little to offer concerning the
rational belief, for he says, The answer is easy with regard
to propositions, that are pro v'd by intuition or de
monstration. In that case, the person, who assents, not
only conceives the ideas according to the proposition,
but is necessarily determi n'd to conceive them in that
particular manner, either immediately or by the inter
position of other ideas. Whatever is absurd is un
intelligible . . . .2). But Hume strikes the truth concerning all belief
of whatever kind, when he says, we "are necessarily determin'd" to
conceive our ideas in a particular manner. The word "assent", also,
is exactly right. The explanation of all belief is that we first con
struct our consciousness of objects in a definite mode, and then
"assent" to the objects as they appear in that mode. This is the sense
of a "necessary determination" to belief. The word "assent" should
signify 'assent to expectation'; for belief is not so much a moment of
consciousness, as a constant attitude of mind. In the course of any
reasoning, any perception, any dreaming, any imagination, we con
stantly 'expect' and are 'satisfied'. We expect the objects, which we

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 397. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 395.

376 C- V- Salmon, [78

apprehend, to continue in the same mode of their being, and either
to develop themselves in accordance with themselves, or to give place
to other objects in the same mode of being. Except in the cases of
'hallucination' or 'illusion' we are 'satisfied'. These exceptions
illustrate the rule. For when, in the course of some conscious
experience of perception, or reasoning, or appreciation etc., we find
ourselves mistaken, our expectation which was disappointed does not
cease, but continues on new lines. Expectation awaits the new con
viction, and proceeds. Every moment of consciousness is accompanied
with a 'protention' and satisfaction. The satisfaction produces a
'retention' *) of the memory, which induces a further 'protention'.
Belief is an attitude engendered by and sustained with a continuous
satisfaction of expectation. It can be explained only in the terms of
the genesis of the objects in consciousness. The belief corresponds
to the mode of consciousness in which the object is constructed, and
is the completion of the processes of its construction.

Ignoring Hume's "The answer is easy", concerning the reasonable
belief, he is found to have given a very fair account of it in his
description of Abstraction. (Refer back to Section 10 of this Essay.)
There he said: When .... ev'ry individual of any

species of objects is found by experience to be con
stantly united with an individual of another species,
the appearance of any new individual of either
species naturally conveys the thought to its usual
attendant. Thus because such a particular idea is
commonly annex' d to such a particular word, nothing
is requir'd but the hearing of that word to produce the
correspondent idea .... In this case it is not abso
lutely necessary, that upon hearing such a particular
sound, we sho u'd reflect upon any past experience,
and consider what idea has been usually connected
with the sound. The imagination of itself supplies
the place of this reflection, and is so accustomed to
pass from the word to the idea, that it interposes not
a moment' s delay betwixt the hearing of the one, and
the conception of the other2). Again he wrote, After we
have acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing of

1) 'Protention' and 'Retention': the words are used in the Phenomcnological
significance. See Husserl, Ideen, Bk. I, Part III, Ch. 2, § 77.

2) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 393—4.

79] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 377

that name revives the idea of one of these objects, and
makes the imagination conceive itwithallitspeculiar
circumstances and proportions. But as the same word
is suppos'd to have been frequently applied to other
individuals, that are different in many respects from
that idea, which is immediately present to the mind;
theword,notbeingable to revivethe idea ofall these
individuals, but only touches the soul if I may be
allow'd so to speak, and revives that custom, which we
have acquir'd by surveying them. They are not really
and in fact present to the mind, but only in power; nor
do we draw them all out distinctly in the imagination,
but keep ourselves in a readiness to survey any of
them, as we may be prompted by a present design or
necessity. The word raises up an individual idea,
along with a certain custom, and that custom pro
duces any other individual one, for which we may have
had occasion . . . . For this is one of the most extra
ordinary circumstances in the present affair, that
after the mind has produc'd an individual idea, upon
which we reason, the attendant custom, revived by
the general or abstract term, readily suggests any
other individual, if by chance we form any reasoning
that agrees not with it1).

This passage furnishes a tolerable account of our belief in the
sphere of rational ideas. Its significance lies in the attempt, which
Hume makes there, to explain the manner of our belief according
to our construction in consciousness of the ideas and relations of
ideas which we believe. Our belief depends upon our reasoning,
our reasoning depends upon the relations of ideas; the relations of
ideas depend upon the ideas themselves, but the ideas themselves
depend, for us, upon our own construction of them in consciousness.
The ideas are objective, but we have objectified them, i. e. abstracted
them, and intuited them as abstracted. Locke vaguely pointed the
way which Hume vigorously followed. If Locke asserted that re
asoning was the bringing together and comparing of ideas, "Rational
knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement
of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas"2),

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 328—9.

2) Locke, The Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. XVII, § 17.

378 C- V- Salmon, [80

Hume pointed out that this "agreement or disagreement" of ideas
depended ultimately upon the minds' own construction of those ideas
in consciousness.

After a relatively short examination of belief in reason, Hume
passes to a detailed examination of belief in perception. The
question, there, assumes a characteristic shape: — The subject
of our present enquiry — Hume writes -- is concerning
the causes, which induce us to believe in the existence
of body1) . . . and it is presupposed that the "existence of body"
cannot be the cause of our belief in it. The word "cause" does not
imply a reference to physical causality. We shall be occupied with this
"enquiry" during Part 11 of this Essay. It is Hume's special problem.

It is to be regretted that Hume did not compare the reasonable
with the perceptual belief. When he wrote, "The answer is easy . . . ."
with regard to the former, he did himself injustice, for he did take
some trouble to explain the easy answer. But he did not recognize
the extent of the problem. Hume was dealing with a world of "ideas".
He wished to regard this world of ideas as divided into two com
partments, on the one hand, the ideas of reason, on the other, the
ideas of imagination. The former he regarded as out of relation to
existence. In the rational sphere a man must believe anything that
he can conceive. But the ideas of imagination were only related to
a belief, which they did not themselves necessitate. A man need
not believe, Hume thought, what he 'imagined'. What we 'imagine',
Hume argued, we 'imagine' to be existent, 'and usually believe to be
existent'. But this belief in existence is not inseparable from our
'imagination', as the belief in truth is inseparable from our conception.
On the contrary, not only can we doubt our 'imaginative' or existen
tial beliefs, but we are o b 1 i g e d to doubt them if we meditate on them.
Hume's faculty of imagination included perception, and was, in
Hume's more sceptical moments, identified with perception. To 'per
ceive' was to 'imagine'. Hume had to grant that, when we 'perceived',
we believed what we perceived; but a little meditation, he argued,
would convince us that we were not 'perceiving' at all, but only
'imagining'; and, while we recognized that we had only been 'imagi
ning', we should no longer be constrained to believe. The Humeian
perceptual beliefs are like 'agents', who presume on the carelessness
of their masters, the rational minds, and induce them to believe in
what they themselves know to be false. When their masters cease

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 478.

81] Tne Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 379

from their careless ways, and inspect these facts, they discover that
their confidence has been abused. But when they accuse their agents
of malpractice, these excuse themselves by urging that they could
hardly be expected to have supposed that their masters were believing
such and such facts to be so, when they had always known them to
be otherwise.

If Hume had accepted the fact of the perceptual belief, as he
had accepted the fact of the rational belief, and proceeded to com
pare the two. he would have found between the 'necessary' belief in
reality, (perception), and the necessary belief in truth, (reasoning),
a series of compound faculties and beliefs involving something of
existence and something of truth. Such are the faculties of aesthetic
appreciation, moral sensibility, the free fancy, the memory etc. Hume
saw that there was some relation between the perceptual and the con
ceptual belief. ' T i s an established maxim in metaphysics,
he wrote, that what the mind clearly conceives, includes
the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can
form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence
conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We
can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and
therefore regard it as impossible1). But the matter is not
exhausted. The different faculties need careful differentiation. For
all belief is not a belief in existence --witness the rational beliefs.
And all existential belief is not a belief in present existence - wit
ness, memory or belief in past existence; witness, imagination or
belief in possible existence; witness, free fancy or belief in imaginable
existence, etc. But Hume went wrong, chiefly, in supposing that
belief could ever be 'unnecessary', or controvertible by the evidence
taken from some different faculty. The value of evidence depends
upon its being absolute in its own particular sphere. The perceptual
belief cannot be invalidated by the reason, any more than the rational
belief can be invalidated by the perception. Each is autonomous in
its own realm. It is certain that I am no more free not to believe,
when I perceive such and such objects in the external world, ^than
I am not to believe, when I apprehend the truth of 2 plus 2 = 4.
Only in the Cartesian and non-sceptical sense, I am free to 'do
them both.

]) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 339.

380 C. V. Salmon, [82

§ 23. Hume's particular account of the Belief which is general
to Consciousness.

Hume, the sceptic, became metaphysical. Reason interfered with
perception; but no faculty could be found to interfere with reason.
In the face of the evidence of perception, reason denied that there
were objects in any real world which possessed an independent and
distinct existence. But yet the reason did not kill perception's belief.
Still perception and reason remained in contrary activity, each faith
ful to his own conviction.

If Hume had done no more than provide an explanation of the
rational belief, in terms of the construction of the objects of the
reason, and an explanation of the perceptual belief, in terms of the
construction of the objects of the perception, he would not have
been able to explain how these two sets of beliefs, having no common
ground, should conflict with one another; or how, if in some way
they did come into conflict, either should ever have obtained even
a temporary mastery. For not only can the mind not believe two
opposite things at once, but having once seen the opposition, it
cannot, unless it has some faculty of belief which has its roots
outside both bodies of opinion, believe first the one and then the
other, as Hume wishes it to do. The man must be able to say, defi
nitely, "I believe . . . .". So Hume offers a general theory of belief
which is independent of the two particular kinds of belief, the
reasonable and the perceptual.

Every kind of belief must subject its objects to one mode. Hume's
supreme belief must apprehend its material as of one kind of being.
The mode which Hume considers can relate all the faculties of con
sciousness to one another, and compose both the subjective and the
objective to a nondescript, is the mode of existence.

In his exposition of the supreme belief, Hume lays it down,
A. that belief is not a belief in content, and B. that belief is a
certain manner of experiencing objects.

A. Belief is not a belief in content. Hume's negative assertion is
the condition of his asserting anything positive about belief. For, since
belief is in every case a belief in existence, nothing but an existence
can be the foundation of belief. But we cannot know the independent
existence of anything objective, so there can be no foundation for
a belief in content. Neither content, nor belief in content, can exist.
Belief is not a belief in content. To establish this, Hume offers three
propositions: — 1. The idea of an object is an essential

83] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. $Q\

part of the belief of it but not the whole1), in which is
implied, that we can have an idea without believing it, but that we
cannot believe anything without having an idea of it. Turning this
maxim through the medium of causality on to matter of fact, it is
re-stated, where belief has become belief in existence. 2. The idea
of existence is nothing different from the idea of any
object2), in which is implied that there is no idea of existence
(i. e. of pure or abstract existence, which would have required ab
straction from a particular content), and also, that the idea of any
object is not changed, as far as its content is concerned, by the belief
that the object exists. But now in order to be able to pass to B., or
the positive description of belief, Hume lays down his third pro
position. 3. When I think of God, when I think of him as
existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my
idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes3), from
which not only may be implied, as Hume desires, that belief can only
be a subjective manner of experience, but also must be implied, (1),
which Hume explicitly denies, that we can conceive of an object
without conceiving it, explicitly at any rate, as existent, and (2), the
first half of which he allows, that we can conceive of an object as
existent without believing that it exists, and accordingly, that con
ception is separable from conception-as-existent, and conception-as-
existent is separable from belief-as-existent.

Hume chooses to ignore these implications, and proceeds to his
positive assertion.

B. Belief is a subjective manner of experience. All the
perceptions of the mind, he writes, are of two kinds,
viz. impressions and ideas, which differ from each
other only in their different degrees of force and
vivacity . . . . When you wou'd any way vary the idea
of a particular object, you can only encrease or
diminish its force and vivacity. If you make any other
change in it, it represents a different object or im
pression .... So that as belief does nothing but vary
the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can
only bestow on our ideas an additional force and
vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief, may be
most accurately defin'd, A lively idea related to or
associated with a present impression4).

1) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 394. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 394.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 395. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 396.

382 C V- Salmon, [84

Of this theory, that belief is an idea, Hume makes an entirely
sceptical use. He employs it to destroy the specific differences
between perception and phantasy. The object of the impression is
identified with the impression itself. "Object or impression" Hume
says, and the impression is prepared for identification with the idea.
He gets rid of the awkward externality of perceived existence. If all
belief is an idea, then belief in external existence is an idea; but if
the belief in external existence is an idea, then external existence
itself is an idea also. The Humeian belief in external existence is
an idea (the belief) of an idea (the external existence). The belief
may be said to exist, but the external existence can only be said to
exist in the belief. Perception can only be distinguished from
phantasy, by a comparative "vivacity". It follows that there can be
no difference between the objects of perception and the objects of
phantasy. All the differences between these two are exhausted in a
purely subjective difference of degree in vivacity. There being no
such thing as external existence, the objects of perception exist in
the same way as the objects of phantasy. Both exist in the existence
of their experiences. The "present impression" is the only real
existence. The object of the impression is a "lively idea which is
related to the present impression", or, more strictly, the idea, of
which that lively idea, the belief, is an idea. When Hume passes from
asserting "that the idea of an object is an essential part of the belief
of it", to assert, 'Tis certain we must have an idea of every
matter of fact which we believe1), he means, that every
matter of fact is an idea which we believe.

All belief whether it be rational or perceptual, is supposed by
Hume to be a certain subjective manner of experience, which is, itself,
a certain kind of "existence".

When, in Part III. Sect. VIII, "Of the Causes of Belief", Hume
describes this manner of experience as a 'disposition' to pass along a
chain of ideas -- When any impression becomes present
to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as
are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a
share of its force and vivacity2) -- as a 'dynamic' belief,
capable, like Locke's "Demonstration", of covering the intermediary
ideas, what he says is applicable more widely than might be supposed.
The disposition of belief, enlivening "related ideas" under the
influence of a perceived Resemblance, a perceived Contiguity, and of

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 402. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 399.

85] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

383

an actual Causality, must be supposed to be operative not only in the
examples of "probable reasoning", which Hume gives, the super-
stitions of the Catholic Church, the fervour of a Holy Man, etc., but
also in the perceptive experiences of every day. Hume's I suppose
there is an object presented, from which I draw a
certain conclusion, and form to myself ideas, which I
am said to believe or assent to1), is pertinent to perception.
Not only when we are engaged in historical argument, or being put in
mind of a friend by the sight of his portrait, but also when we are
perceiving the house, which is before our eyes, must we be supposed
to be 'acting' a transition of belief. We pass in perception from "that
which is actually present to the senses" to the concrete object. The
change of the objects is so easy, that the mind is scarce
sensible of it, but applies itself to the conception of
the related idea with all the force and vivacity it
acquir'd from the present impressions2). The house which
we perceive existing, distinctly and independently of us, is an 'inven
tion' of our own, which we both perceive and believe in virtue of our
disposition. We have passed from an original sensation along a chain
of related ideas. The belief qualified the impression, and now qualifies
the idea. 'Tis certain we must have an idea of every
matter of fact which we believe. (This must be made relevant
to perception) . 'Tiscertainthatthisidea(ofthe concrete object
of our perception), arises only from a relation to a present
impression (the original sensation, or real impression). 'Tis
certain that the belief superadds nothing to the idea,
but only changes our manner of conceiving it, and
renders it more strong and lively3). 'Tis the present
impression which is to be consider' d as the true and
real cause of the idea and of the belief which
attends it4).

Hume's account of the genesis of perceived objects in conscious
ness is falsified by his sceptical denial of the existence of objects
outside consciousness. His theory of belief is an attempt to reconcile
his scepticism with his subjectivism, and as such, it forms the crown
of his Berkeleyian Idealism. It is also an attempt to account for exis
tence itself. Apart from his theory of belief Hume has nothing posi
tive to say about existence. Existence cannot be anything 'objective',

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 402. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 399.

3) Gr. & Gr. I. P. 402. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 402.

384 C- V- Salmon, [86

because there are no objects which it can qualify. But Hume has
nothing to say about existence in the abstract, about existence as an
abstract idea. The idea of existence. . . .he says once, is the
very same with the idea of what we conceive to be
existent1). This is even less satisfactory than Hume's account of
Space, as an idea, or Time. For he had something to say concerning
the abstraction of these. He derived our idea of space from an
impression of colour' d points disposed in a certain
manner2), and of time from the succession of our percep
tions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and
impressions of reflection as well as of sensation3), of
which succession it was implied that we could have an impression.
Perhaps at the root of all Hume's misconceptions concerning exis
tence was his separation of external existence from real existence.
Discounting his sceptical conclusions, Hume may be said to have con
ceived, that external existence could be given an origin in the sub
jective genesis of objects in consciousness, but that existence itself
was inexplicable in the terms of consciousness, as consciousness
resolved itself ultimately into existence.

But in spite of his misuse of it, Hume was right in his notion that
"belief was a manner of experience" common to all the fields of
consciousness. Belief is the 'satisfaction', or, as Hume said, the
"easiness" accompanying the fulfillment of the expectation, which
precedes every 'moment' of consciousness. It is a synthesis of the
'processes' operative in consciousness. The 'processes' vary with the
fields in which the objects are constructed, but a synthesis accompanies
them all, and constitutes our 'belief in them. Belief is the conse
quence of our consciousness, in conformity with itself, as it presents
us with all the variety of objects, both real and ideal.

Part II.

Concerning Hume's Particular Problem.

§ 24. The Programme of Part II.

Having made a survey of Hume's general philosophy, and com
passed its salient points about, we pass now to a consideration of his

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 370. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 341.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 341.

87] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 335

particular problem - the External Perception -, which as the van-
tage ground or key, we shall survey on a more detailed plan.

The subject .... of our present enquiry — Hume
writes in Part IV. Sect. 2, of the Treatise — is concerning the
causes, which induce us to believe in the existence of
body1). And close upon this, follows his working statement of the
matter in hand. We ought to examine apart these two
questions .... Why we attribute a continued existence
to objects, even when they are not present to the
senses; and why we suppose them to have an existence
distinct from the mind and perception. Under this
last head I comprehend their situation as well as
relations, their external position as well as the inde
pendence of their existence, and operation2).

Hume's treatment of external perception falls into two com
partments. Hume offers 1. a statement and elaboration of Method;
and 2. the construction of the Four Part System, quoted in our Intro
duction.

A. Hume9 s Methodic. Emergence of the Phenomenon.

Hume's Methodic serves to prepare the stage by bringing first
into question, and then into prominence, the Phenomenon, or object-
in-consciousness, the debate and settlement of whose Identity in the
first two Parts of the "System" marks the climax of Hume's sub
jective work we shall consider -- Hume writes in the

language which we have learned to expect — whether it be the
senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the
opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence. These
are the only questions that are intelligible on the pre
sent subject. For as to the notion of external exis
tence, when taken for something specifically
different from our perceptions, we have already
(Part II. Sect. VI) shewn its absurdity3). In examining Hume's
position that neither the senses nor the reason present us with the
objects of our perception, but that these are the 'product' of the
imagination, our chief interest must lie in the gradual development
of Hume's conception of the object-in-consciousness.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 478. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 477.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 479.

Husserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophic. X. 7

386 C- V- Salmon, [88

§ 25. Neither the Senses nor the Reason present us with the
objects of our Perception. Hume's estimate of Sense-data.

It is not to the senses that we owe our attribution of a continued
and distinct existence to objects. Hume's examination of the senses
is based on the supposition that they are a passive faculty. Kant,
accepting the same premise, afterwards used the word "receptive",
and contrasted the sensuous "Rezeptivitat", wherein he supposed
that the sense-data were passively received, with the "Spontaneitat"
of the apprehending consciousness. It is probable that Hume
adopted the opinion from Locke since whose day it had been
very commonly received. It has misled many enquirers into
supposing that 'sense-data' supply a 'real' basis to perception. The
actual stimulus which the physical body receives is mistaken for a
"feeling', or 'sensation'; and this 'sensation' is supposed to submit to
categories from the apprehending mind. But the truth is, that while
there are 'sense-data' which can properly be regarded as the founda
tion of perception, and as the 'original' material upon which the con
crete perception is built up, these fall within, and not without, the
conscious act of perception. 'Sense-data' are in no sense real. They
are neither a part of the object of perception, nor of the objective
perception. Sense-data are a part of consciousness itself. They are to
be found only within the subjective sphere. Their presence in con
sciousness presupposes an act of perception, and can, therefore, only
be revealed to an introspection. Sense-data can be described as what
is 'felt', on the condition that 'feeling' be allowed to consist of
consciousness.

Hume starts his examination of the senses with a tautology.
To begin with the Senses, he writes, 'tis evident these
faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of
the continu'd existence of their objects, after they no
longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction
in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to
operate, even after they have ceas'd all manner of
operation1). It is, of course, self-evident, that the senses do not
present us with objects when these objects are not present to the
senses. But the only question relevant to the enquiry, as to how much
our senses contribute to our perception of "continu'd existence", is
one which Hume does not consider. Do the senses present us with

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 479.

89] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 337

continuing objects, while these objects are present to the senses?
This question could not be answered except through the means of an
actual and exact examination of what in the subjective consciousness
is 'sensuous'. This exact regard we do not find in Hume. The denial of
their presentation of "continuous existence" is followed by a denial
of their presentation of "distinct or independent or external exis
tence". These faculties .... Hume writes — if they have
any influence in the present case, must produce the

opinion of a distinct, not of a continu'd existence1) ;

But this also they cannot do. For . . . .all sensations are felt
by the mind, such as they really are, and . . . . when we
doubt, whether they present themselves as distinct
objects, or as mere impressions, the difficulty is not
concerning their nature, but concerning their rela
tions and situation. Now if the senses presented our
impressions as external to, and independent of, our
selves, Hume argues, both the objects and ourselves must
be obvious to our senses, otherwise they cou'd not be
compared by these faculties. The difficulty then, is
how far we are ourselves the objects of our senses2).
That our senses offer not their impressions as the
images of something distinct or independent, and
external is evident, Hume continues, because they convey
to us nothing but a single perception, and never give
us the least intimation of anything beyond. A single
perception can never produce the idea of a double
existence, but by some inference either of the reason
or imagination. When the mind looks farther than
what immediately appears to it, its conclusions can
never be put to the account of the senses; and it cer
tainly looks farther, when, from a single perception,
it infers a double existence, and supposes the rela
tions of resemblance and causation betwixt them3). It
is, of course, true that 'external situation in space' cannot be found
among sense-data. We can enlarge Hume's view of the limitations of
the sense-data by collecting a few quotations from different sources.
. . . . my senses -- Hume writes -- convey to me only the
impressions of colour' d points, dispos'd in a certain

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 479. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 479-80.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 479—80.

7*

388 C' v- Salmon, [90

manner. If the eye is sensible of anything farther, I
desire it may be pointed out to me1). And he writes again,
with Berkeley in his mind, 'Tis commonly allow' d by philo
sophers, that all bodies, which discover themselves
to the eye, appear as if painted on a plain surface, and
that their different degrees of remoteness from our
selves are discovered more by reason than by the
senses2). And again — an argument which we noticed in connec
tion with Hume's comparative subjectivism — Sounds and tastes
and smells, though commonly regarded by the mind
as contin u'd , independent qualities, appear not to
have any existence in extension, and consequently do
not appear to the senses as situated externally to the
body3). All this could be corrected in expression, and interpreted
to signify the facts of the case. When the various sense-data are
separated into the fields which correspond to the 'originating' senses,
the bare 'sight-field' is seen to present a two-dimensional field, the
"pre-spatial" field, a certain configuration of 'points', in which there
is no room for any real object, or for any object in motion, or any
real identity of object. The field of touch is found to present a
typically modified 'localisation', while the field of hearing, and the
field of smell, present nothing even 'pre-spatial'.

But Hume is not sincerely devoted to an examination of the
actualities of sense-data. In bringing forward somewhat random
statements concerning the limitations of sense-data, he is concerned
with his old difficulty of accounting for the transcendence of the
spatial world. If there is any such thing as space, Hume argues,
then the perceiving subject must be admitted to share it with the
objects which he perceives. The perceiving subject has a body in
space. Desiring to become intimate with any object, the subject can
only utilize the means of space. He can approach the object, he can
touch it with his hands, he can examine it beneath a microscope.
But however near he come, he can never wholly comprehend it. He
will always perceive it as There! in space, as having a back side and
a front. He must always look at it from this face or from that, from
above or from below, from near or far, in light or shade, in this
perspective or in that, by itself or in relation to other objects. This
omni-presence of space can be translated, Hume thinks, into a perfect
non-existence. For, on the one hand, we are bound to admit that

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 341. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 361. 3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 381.

91] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

339

this same 'space' affects everything which we can know, both subject
and object, and, on the other, we confess that we do not find it in
our sense-data. Space then may be called a total "fiction". This
doctrine unites with Hume's notion of Appearance. The effect of
'space' is to prevent our ever coming into touch with any object.
We are limited entirely to appearances. Hume drives his 'scepticism'
home. Everything, subjective and objective, is 'spatial'. But 'space'
is not found among sense-data. Space, then, is a "fiction". It follows
that the subject-object relation is not 'transcendent'1). There is no
absolute difference between them.

We find ourselves, suddenly, face to face with "perceptions".
. . . . since all actions and sensations of the mind are
knownlo usbyconsciousness — Hume writes — theymust
necessarily appear in every particular what they are,
and be what they appear. Everything that enters the
mind, being in reality a perception, 'tis impossible
anything should to feeling appear different2). Our
"sensations" are the only "realities". We remember Hume's former
theory. Here, through the expedient of merely identifying sense-data
with real sensations, Hume has no objectivity left beyond our per
ception. What we perceive we perceive as spatial and external to
ourselves. But Hume has shown that nothing external to ourselves
is among sense-data. It follows that we do not perceive objects
through our senses. Objects are merely perceptions. Perceptions are
fictions. Fictions are the work of the constructive imagination. How
does the imagination construct the objects of our perception? We
have already detracted as much from the value of Hume's subjective
work as it must lose, when the sceptical steps are considered, by
which he climbed into the subjective sphere. We are not bound here
to straighten the tangle of hypostases which Hume employs to liberate
the senses from responsibility in the matter of perception. Our
interest lies not in the false alternative by which Hume made "per
ceptions" exclude realities in the external world, but in the fact
that, by false means or fair, Hume arrived at a conception of "per
ceptions". We wish to regard the Humeian "perceptions" as objects-
in-consciousness, to whose genesis we are indebted for our perception
of realities. We wish to regard the Humeian "perceptions" as pheno-

1) 'Transcendent', the word is used throughout in the phenomenological
significance.

2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 480.

390 C. V. Salmon, [92

mena which are revealed to introspection. And we wish to regard
the Humeian "imagination" as a name for the whole 'activity' of the
pure consciousness, whose processes 'within' the Ego construct the
ego's perception or apprehension of all kinds of objectivity.

To a consideration of the "imagination" we can quickly pass.
For in the text, the reason, whose turn follows that of the senses,
is dismissed at once from all efficiency or co-operation in perception.
Hume pretends to no more definite conception of reason in this
connection than the weighing of our opinions by any
philosophical principles1). And respecting its uselessness in
perception, he submits (1) that the vulgar believe in the distinct and
continued existence of objects without making use of any 'reasoning',
and (2) that if 'reasoning' is used at all, by "philosophers" for in
stance, it quickly produces a contrary and sceptical belief .... upon
the whole, Hume says, our reason neither does, nor is
it possible it ever sho u'd , upon any supposition, give
us an assurance of the contin u'd and distinct existence
of body. That opinion, he concludes, must be entirely
owing to the Imagination, which must now be the sub
ject of our enquiry2).

But with the examination of the senses, the externality of the
perceived world is left behind . . . . we may observe, he writes,
that when we talk of real existences, we have com
monly more in our eye their independency than ex
ternal situation in place, and think an object has a
sufficient reality when its Being is uninterrupted,
and independent of the incessant revolutions, which
we are conscious of in ourselves3). This is the last which
is ever heard of that part of the transcendence of the real world
which is spatial. To this even the acutest portion of Hume's analysis
of the imagination will contribute nothing.

§ 26. The "Imagination" in Perception. Hume fails to distinguish
between Sensation and Sense-Data.

The problem, which has now become a question of accounting for
the "distinct and continu'd existence" of our "perceptions", is re-
introduced in connection with the imagination in rather curious terms.
- Since all impressions are internal and perishing

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 483. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 483.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 481—2.

93] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 391

existences, and appear as such, the notion of their
distinct and continued existence must arise from a
concurrence of some of their qualities with the quali
ties of the imagination, and since this does not extend
to all of them, it must arise from certain qualities
peculiar to some impressions1). We are going to see the
imagination rise into activity in the Humeian consciousness, and
produce an object of its own. To its own 'object' the imagination
will attribute the difficult qualities of existence. As Hume proceeds
it becomes evident that the imagination's 'object' is intended for,
and must be converted into, the phenomenon. But we need to limit
Hume's conceptions.

The first requisite of our perception of continuously existent ob
jects is the perception of them as distinct. But how can any perceived
object be distinct from our perception of it? Hume's suggestion, that
the solution of the problem lies in a "concurrence" of some of the
"qualities" of "impressions" with the "qualities" of the "imagination",
depends upon an invalid distinction between reality and fiction.
The "impressions" are to be taken as realities, that is, as sensations,
which Hume thought could be considered in and for themselves, as
having no reference to an objective world. Hume supposes that our
sense-impressions are always sensations, which appear as what they are,
and are what they appear, moments of feeling, pleasurable or painful,
severe or slight, "internal and perishing existences". Whenever we
'perceive' anything, he considers, either in the external or internal
perceptions, we suffer these moments of sensation. But between these
two kinds of perceptions there is none the less a difference. Hume
takes it, that while the internal perceptions appear in consciousness
entirely as feelings, and so as internal and perishing, the external
perceptions appear in consciousness with the addition of a fiction,
which makes them external objects with a continuing, distinct and
identical existence. The organ of this fiction is the imagination. The
objects, therefore, of the so-called external perception, are not
feelings, not even objects of feeling, but imaginative ficta, which we
only perceive because we have invented. But at this point, difficult;
arise. It being pre-supposed that there can be no perception at all
without a modicum or core of reality which is the sensation, how
does it come about that sensations can differentiate themselves mtc
two distinct classes of experience, the one class remaining, a

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 383—4.

392 . C. V. Salmon, [94

supposes, unadorned sensation, and the other so stimulating the cre
ative imagination as to obscure itself under a fictitious objective?
Hume puts the matter down to a "concurrence of certain of the
qualities of the impressions with certain of the qualities of the imagi
nation", and 'twill . . . . be easy, he says, for us to discover
the qualities by a comparison of the impressions, to
which we attribute a distinct and continued existence,
with those which we regard as internal and perishing1).
It must be suspected, that the task is not so easy as Hume supposes.
Actually he begs the question even as he formulates it. He offers to
discover the "qualities" which induce us to attribute a distinct and
continued existence to certain impressions, by comparing them with
those other impressions to which we do not attribute a distinct and
continued existence.

But this is not the problem; for on Hume's own grounds we know
that it is never to the impressions, i. e. the sensations, that we attri
bute the distinct and continued existence, but to the fictitious objects
which we have been induced to imagine. These fictitious objects are
not given us in the "impression", and if they were, we should not
be able to 'imagine' them. Hume's problem should have been to
discover what "qualities" of certain "impressions" sets the imagination
operating to create objects for itself, which it believes to be distinct
and continously existent. This he never considers. Hume never
distinguishes effectually enough between the impression-element and
the imaginative element which are compounded in the concrete ex
perience of perception. Either he forgets that the objects of the
external perception are fictitious, and speaks of them as if they were
"impressions", or he forgets, that there is any impression-element
concerned, and speaks as if the external perception were altogether
fiction or imagination.

It is possible, in an analysis of the external perception, to sepa
rate the sense-data from the additions of the constructive imagi
nation; but it is quite impossible to carry out this separation under
the headings of real and ideal; for the 'object' whose distinct and
continuous existence is in question involves no empirical sensation,
but is purely the work of the "imagination", and as such, is itself a
pure object-in-consciousness. Its sense-data are already within the
consciousness. The opposite nature of the real and ideal prevents

1) Or. & Gr. I, p. 484.

95] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

393

the terms or elements subsumed under them from being brought
together into the unity of one experience. Sense-data do not cor-
respond a wit more closely, under the title of reality, either to the
perceived object in the real world, or to the real psycho-physical
perceptive experience, than the additions do. So long as reality and
ideality are the forms to be enforced upon the external perception,
the analysis can go no further than to distinguish naively between
the experience as a reality, and the experience as that which is ex
perienced. This leaves the compound nature of the latter still com
pounded. Nothing can be more certain than that the subjective
experience with its object-in-consciousness, or imaginative ficta,
does not fall within reality. Hume did recognize at times that
the division between real experience and subjective experience
could not help him to understand the nature of perception. He
saw that his whole business lay with the latter, and that the
"qualities" of the one were irrelevant to those of the other. W e m a y
observe, he said, that 'tis neither upon account of the
in voluntariness of certain impressions, as is com
monly suppos'd, nor of their superior force and vio
lence, that we attribute to them a reality, and con-
tinu'd existence, which we refuse to others, that are
voluntary or feeble. For 'tis evident our pains and
pleasures, our passions and affections, which we
never suppose to have any existence beyond our per
ception, operate with greater violence, and are
equally involuntary, as the impressions of figure and
extension, colour and sound, which we suppose to be
permanent beings. The heat of a fire, when moderate,
is supposed to exist in the fire, but the pain, which
it causes upon a near approach, is not taken to have
any being except in the perception1).

The expression is imperfect, though the meaning is clear. The
"impressions" are to be taken as the real experiences, but it is not
to them that Hume refers, when he says, "we attribute to them a
reality and continu'd existence", but to the objects in, or as Hume
would say, out of, the impressions. The qualities of our experiences,
taken as real, can have nothing to do with the reality or ideality
of the objects in those experiences. The experience, as a fact, must
be real in every case, whether the object in the experience be an

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 484.

394 C- V- Salmon, [96

existent reality, or an idea; and, as Hume says, there is no quality
of the factual experience which cannot qualify both a factual
experience where the object of the experience is ideal, and a factual
experience where the object of the experience is real. But, beyond
this distinction again, the object of the experience, whether real or
ideal, must be distinguished from the object in the experience, the
object-in-consciousness, the phenomenon, which is in every case, and
of necessity, ideal.

§ 27. The Three-fold division of Perception. Further Development
of Hume's notion of the Fiction as the Object-in-Consciousness.

The fact is that the two-fold division of perception with which
we have seemed hitherto, explicitly at least, to content ourselves, is
quite inadequate to our present needs. Concrete perception consists
of three main factors. In the perception of a tree, for example, there
is first, my experience regarded as a factual reality, which begins and
ends and is incapable of identical repetition; there is, secondly, the
real tree itself, which I say I perceive; and there is, thirdly, the tree
as I perceive it, a subjective 'object', having no existence in real
space and time, but possessing an identity wihin the immanent sphere.

The philosopher's interest should lie exclusively with the third
element. This element must be divided again into (a) Noesis, the
experience of the object, arid (b) Noema, the object of the experience.
But these are divisions within the subjective sphere.

The two factual realities, the real experience and the real tree,
are related to one another as being both in the world, and we may
conclude, if it be profitable, that they are eventually causally
connected to one another.

The ideal consciousness, on the other hand, or the tree as I
perceive it, is related to the two realities 'contingently' only, for it
is essentially a complete and self-sufficient whole, although it bears
within itself the 'evidence', so to speak, of both the others, being
always within itself, and ideally, the consciousness of an object.

Hume, at different times, conceived of each of these three
elements of the whole conscious experience, but he never could con
ceive of them all at once, or find room for them all within the unity
of one whole. He made them, largely, alternative to one another,
either the one or the other, sometimes two together, but never three.

It was mainly by denying the real tree itself, that he arrived
at the conception of the object-in-consciousness, or fiction, the tree

97] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

395

as I perceive it. In -- Since all impressions are internal
and perishing existences, and appear as such, the
notion of their distinct and continued existence must
arise from a concurrence of some of their qualities
with the qualities of the imagination, and since this
does not extend to all of them, it must arise from cer
tain qualities peculiar to some impressions1); and
'twill be easy, forus to discover the qualitiesbya com
parison of the impressions, to which we attribute a
distinct and continu'd existence, with those which we
regard as internal and perishing2), we have an example of
his sinking the real object of the perception into the real perceptive
experience. Hume here identifies the psycho-physical experience itself
with the object which is in that experience, the object, as we say, in
consciousness. As far as the internal perception is concerned, the
supposition that the 'object' is entirely exhausted in the experience
is an old fallacy, and not one peculiar to Hume. It is generally
supposed, for instance, that a tooth-ache cannot be distinguished from
the sensation by which we feel it. But this is false. Leaving out of
consideration the difficult question as to how far the objects of
internal perception are 'localised', in this case as to how far the pain
may be supposed to be 'localised' in the tooth, it remains indisputable,
that my experience is an experience of a tooth-ache, or, more
generally, an experience of a pain. This 'pain' ought to be con
sidered separately, as it is itself separate from the experience.
In the experience of a pain, the three factors are still to be found;
first the factual experience itself, which is not much better described
as a sensation, than would be an external perception; secondly the
other reality, the pain itself; and thirdly the object-in-experience, or
fiction, namely the pain as I feel it, or am aware of it.

The difference between the objects of the internal and the
external perception is commonly misconceived as lying in the depen
dence of the reality of the former, and the independence of the
reality of the latter, on the psycho-physical experience in which
they are perceived, But actually their difference lies in the diffe
rent nature of the two perceived realities. The nature of the one is
such, that it is directly perceptible to any number of persons, and
of the other that it is directly perceptible only to one. Now Hume
escaped the common fallacy at the price of falling into another.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, PP. 483-4. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 484.

396 C- V- Salmon, [98

Hume considered the reality of the objects both of the external and
the internal perception to be dependent on the psycho-physical
experience in which they were perceived. But he distinguished two
elements in the object perceived in the external perception. This
object was dependent on the perception, but in a double sense. It
was dependent for its reality on the real part of our perceptive
experience, namely on our sensation. But it was dependent for its
'character', i. e. for our perception of it, on the characteristic or
'conscious' part of our perceptive experience, i. e. on our con
sciousness or 'imagination' of it. It is this regard of the 'charac
teristic' nature of our perceptions, which makes Hume's analysis so
illuminating. After a little examination, Hume writes, w e
shall find that all those objects, to which we attribute
a continu'd existence, have a peculiar constancy,
which distinguishes them from the impressions,
whose existence depends upon our perception1). The
'objects' of the external perception differ from the 'objects' of the in
ternal perception in possessing a "peculiar constancy"; but this "peculiar
constancy" is not the constancy of independent realities in an external
world, as appears most definitely in the next sentence. These
mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present
under my eye, have always appeared to me in the same
order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my
eyes or turning my head, I soon after find them return
upon me without the least alteration. My bed and
table, my books and papers, present themselves in the
same uniform manner, and change not upon account
of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them.
This is the case with all the impressions, whose
objects are suppos'd to have an external existence;
and is the case with no other impressions, whether
gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary2).

Accepting Hume's sceptical premise concerning our inability to
perceive a real, independent and external world, we are bound to
recognize that he means by these imaginative 'ficta', these 'objects',
these "houses and mountains and trees", objects-in-consciousness, or
phenomena. For if Hume identified these 'objects' with the psycho-
physical experiences in which they were perceived, he would be in
volved in the contradiction of asserting, that we are conscious only of

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 484. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 484.

99] The Central Problem of David Hume'g Philosophy. 397

we are
cer-

internal and perishing existences, and, in the same breath, that
conscious of houses and mountains and trees, which need not,
tainly, be real, but which cannot be internal and perishing existences.

We find some confirmation of this view of 'objects' as in con
sciousness, and distinct from the psycho-physical experiences which
we enjoy in perceiving them, from Hume's remarks concerning
the "coherence" as well as the "constancy" of objects. This con
stancy however, Hume writes, is not so perfect as not to
admit of very considerable exceptions. Bodies often
change their position and qualities, and after a little
absence or interruption, may become hardly know-
able, but here 'tis observable, that even in these
changes they preserve a coherence, and have a regular
dependence on each other; which is a foundation of
a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the
opinion of their contiii u'd existence . . . . This co
herence, therefore, is one of the characteristics of
external objects, as well as their constancy1).

These "external objects", which are coherent, are not the physical
realities, "mountains and houses and trees" in the natural world, for
these, Hume is convinced, we can never perceive, even if they do
exist, which we can never know. But neither are these "external
objects" confused by Hume, here, with our real perceptive experi
ences, for in a second comparison of the external with the internal
perception, he draws a distinction between the regularity of the
real experiences, and of the sensations which he takes to be identical
with these, and of the coherence, or regularity, of the "external
objects". We may observe, that tho' those internal im
pressions which we regard as fleeting and perishing,
have also a certain coherence or regularity in their
appearances, yet 'tis of a somewhat different nature,
from that which we discover in body. Our passions are
found by experience to have a mutual connection with
and dependence on each other: but on no occasion is
it necessary to suppose, that they have existed and
operated, when they were not perceiv'd, in order to
preserve the same dependence and connection, of
which we have had experience. The case is no t the same
with relation to external objects. Those require a

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 484—5.

398 C- V- Salmon, [100

c p n t i n u'd existence, or otherwise lose, in a great
measure, the regularity of their operation1).

The external perception differs, Hume takes it, from the internal
perception, by reason of the activity of the imagination. The internal
perception is pure sensation. The external perception is sensation
plus imagination. The imagination creates "fictions"', and these fictions
are the "external objects". The fictions, which Hume, driven by his
sceptical prejudices, falsely supposed were 'perceived' in the stead of
the real objects in the natural world, are none other than the objects-
in-consciousness, which are discovered by introspection, and are the
means, through the intentional character of consciousness, of our
perception of the realities. These 'invented' "fictions", or phenomena,
are constant and coherent.

§ 28. 'Protention' and 'Retention', part of the Apprehension
of all Consciousness.

Hume accepts the 'fact' of the coherence and constancy of
'objects' in the external perception as a basis on which to explain
the genesis of their identity. But before proceeding to this question
of their identity, he is led into attempting a description of the origin
of their coherence, which is interesting because it is founded on
a certain 'expectancy' which Hume sees to be characteristic of con
sciousness. We noticed this 'expectancy' in connection with belief.
Hume makes use of the notion here to show how the imagination
'pre-constructs' what it subsequently apprehends. The description is
the famous one of a man seated in his chair by the fire, receiving a
letter brought from a foreign country, by means of a series of ferries
and posts, carried upstairs by a porter, announced by the noise of the
opening door etc. The receiver of the letter is described not only as
presenting to his fancy all this elaborate paraphernalia of transport,
but also of supposing both its present, and its continuous, existence.

There is scarce a moment of my life, Hume writes,
wherein there is not a similar instance presented to
me, and I have not occasion to suppose the contin u'd
existence of objects, in order to connect their present
and past appearances, and give them such an union,
with each other, as I have found by experience to
be suitable to their particular natures and circum-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 485.

101] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 399

stances. Here then I am naturally led to regard the
world, as something real and dura hie, and as pre
serving its existence, even when it is no longer pre
sent to my perception1).

In writing, thus, of the "continuous existence*' of 'objects', Hume
touches what is an essential part of the 'transcendence' of the real
world which we perceive. Hume accounts for the mode of continuous
existence in which the world appears to us, in the terms of an 'ex
pectancy' in consciousness. And indeed this expectancy, by which
we are enabled to overstep bounds of strict presence, and anticipate,
and outline, an extension of the strictly present perception, is a
faculty without which perception, in general, would be impossible.
For in perceptive consciousness we are aware of scenes, which are
by no means limited to, or enclosed within, the 'instant' of the present
consciousness. This is the beginning of all temporal transcendence
of object, that the object is from the very first moment of its
conception, or perception, something essentially apart from the
consciousness itself and that which is directly within the scope of
the immediate consciousness. That which is 'present' in conscious
ness, that which is immediately There! under the intuition, includes
a certain reference to a totality which extends beyond its instant.
The connection of that which is immediate to consciousness with its
own totality, extends, so to speak, both ways, through a certain
'retention', as well as a certain 'protention', of the conscious
mind.

Retention and protention are in operation whereever there is con
sciousness at all. The conception of an abstract isosceles triangle, for
example, is just as dependent upon a retention and protenlion of the
constructive faculty, as the perception of any external reality; and
the perception of any immobile external object is just as dependent
on it, as the perception of some moving object, like a train. But
retention and protention involve no element of real time. They
themselves are rather the means, by which the constructive faculty
of consciousness creates entire objectivities for itself, so that each
single object appears before it, as a part of, and in relation to, the
whole of the particular objective sphere to which it belongs.

The isosceles triangle, which the geometer sets before his mind's
eye, must be present to him as a part of the whole interrelation of
figures possible in geometric space, and itself involves, and is in-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 486.

400 C. V. Salmon, [102

volved in, the laws and relations of them all. The particular tree,
which is perceived, involves, and is involved in, the entirety of the
real world, real space, time and causality. Something, of course, of
the relations of any real object, the tree to other trees in the garden,
may be perceived with the tree. Something of the antecedent events
of portage and distance, in Hume's example of the letter received,
may have been actually 'present' to the mind of the receipient when
he took and read the letter. But these are not the important factors
in the matter. There is a question, here, as Hume recognized, of a
fundamental 'continuity', which serves as an element on which
all objects, of whatever kind, must move. It is a continuity 'prior'
to any real contigencies, a continuity, which makes in the real world,
for instance, causal relation possible, which makes relation, in general,
possible in all spheres, mathematical, ethical, aesthetic, social, eco
nomic etc. Nothing less is in question than the fundamental pro-
tentive and retentive intention of consciousness, as the underlying
structure of intelligence. This it is which gives us the order and
nature of objects in their various fields. This it is which makes the
'fact' of transcendence, and, indeed, creates the very division
between subject and object without which there could be no con
sciousness of any sort. Hume did well to describe our consciousness
of the real world in terms of an underlying continuity for which the
imagination was responsible.

§ 29. Hume's paradoxical 'Appearance-Theory'. That which it
involves, and that to which it leads.

It must not be supposed that the conception of phenomena, into
which we seek to convert Hume's "fictions", was ever held by Hume
in the clearness and distinctness it deserves, or that it was held by
him even confusedly with any consistency. But there are certain
descriptive passages in the Treatise lit by the flash of a genius too
penetrating to allow one to deny Hume the conception altogether.
Hume may be said to have realized spasmodically the nature of ob-
jects-in-consciousness, and at such times to have treated his "fictions"
as if they were these. The reader will recognize that Hume's obli
gation to acknowledge the quality of "continuous existence" in his
"objects", a quality to which their coherence and constancy have led,
will put his conception of these "objects" to the proof. If Hume's
"objects" are phenomena, he need have no difficulty in ascribing to
them a "continuous existence" of an ideal kind, such a continuity as

103] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 4Q1

can permit them to possess their own identity, and allow the same
"object" to be present in consciousness innumerable times. If, on
the other hand, Hume's conception of phenomena, which his notice
of the constancy and coherency of his "fictions" has induced, is weak
enough to fade, as soon as his treatment of these qualities is done,
and be transmuted back into the psycho-physical experiences which
'contain' them, and from which they have only with the greatest
difficulty emerged, then it must be expected that Hume will be re
luctant to allow them to be "continuously existent". Up to the present,
Hume's doctrine that the mind is necessarily limited to its own "per
ceptions" has interested us chiefly by reason of its excluding the
natural world of reality, either sceptically, or merely after the
fashion of Descartes' dubito, from the attention of the philosopher.
But, while still keeping in mind this, its first, consequence, it is ob
vious that the doctrine must interest us chiefly at the present because
it forces a crisis upon Hume, and compels him to pronounce once
and for all upon the nature of his "perceptions". While the discussion
was still confined to the coherence and constancy of the "percep
tions", it was not absolutely necessary to distinguish the "objects"
of the perception from the perceptive experiences. For it was at
least conceivable that the perceptive experiences themselves could
be coherent and constant. But nothing can be more certain than
that the perceptive experiences themselves, taking them as Hume
always takes them, as being psycho-physical, cannot be "continuously
existent". Hume must determine on one or other alternative. On
the one hand, he is bound to acknowledge that we do perceive, or
at least believe that we do perceive, something - "objects" or
"perceptions" — which is continuously existent. On the other hand,
he still believes firmly in the discrete nature of reality, and so is
bound, either to identify his "fictions" with their psycho-physical
experiences, and deny all possibility of our perceiving anything con
tinuously existent, or, transforming his scepticism concerning the
external world into the reflexive attitude relevant to the subjective
plane of the argument, to adopt frankly the conception of his
"fictions" as objects-in-consciousness, and admit that it is these
phenomena to which the continuity of existence belongs. If Hume
chose the latter alternative, it is obvious that the "continuous
existence" will become a mere "identity", which will be proper 1
the "fictions". For, since phenomena do not 'exist' in real time D
more will be implied in asserting their "continu'd existence , t
that they are "identical".

Husserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophie. X.

402 C- V- Salmon, [104

Weighted with the full load of his empirical prejudices, and with
his habit of real hypostasis, Hume makes a final attempt in the form
of a highly paradoxical Appearance-theory, to solve the problem of
consciousness without an appeal to the pure subjective realm. Then,
recognizing the contradictions in which he has involved himself, he
passes fairly to the problem of identity, and, there, in one significant
moment, confesses to the admission of a phenomenon in consciousness
in the shape of an "idea", which he allows to be identical.

Hume's Appearance-theory amounts to the assertion, that,
although 'something' must be admitted to appear to the perception
as continuously existent, this 'something' turns out itself to be no
more than an 'appearance', and consequently no 'reality'. Hume
employs again his former notion of "relation", which the imagination
contrives. If continuous existence 'is' anything, it is a "relation". But

this "relation" is not an instance of the "causal inference" t h o '

this conclusion from the coherence of appearances
— Hume writes — may seem to be of the same nature
with our reasoning concerning causes and effects; as
being deriv'd from custom, and regulated by past ex
perience, we shall find upon examination that they
are at the bottom considerably different from each
other, and that this inference arises from the under
standing, (the "understanding" is to be identified here with the
imagination) and from custom in an indirect and oblique
manner. For 'twill readily be allowed, that since
nothing is ever really present to the mind besides its
own perceptions, 'tis not only impossible, that any
habit shou'd ever be acquired otherwise than by the
regular succession of these perceptions, but also that
any habit sho u'd ever exceed that degree of regularity.
Any degree therefore, of regularity in our percep
tions, can never be a foundation for us to infer a
greater degree of regularity in some objects, which
are not perceived; since this supposes a contradiction
viz. a habit acquired by what was never present to
the mind1).

The imagination's "conclusion" concerning continuous existence
may seem at first sight to be explained as being founded upon the
"coherence of appearances". But upon inspection the plausibility

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 486—7.

105] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

403

of Hume's account vanishes. The difference, which he honestly
admits between the nature of the present "conclusion" and the causal
inference, seems too absolute to allow of the present conclusion
being explained at all. Causality was a "relation" made by the mind
between certain members of an unvaried sequence which it had per
ceived. But the present "relation" is described by Hume as being
made between terms which the mind never has perceived. Hume's
"any degree of regularity in our perceptions, can never be a founda
tion for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects,
which are not perceived", embodies two opposite assertions: 1. that
— by some process as yet unexplained — the imagination creates
the relation of continuous existence, and 2. that, in spite of the
creation of this relation, we do not and cannot perceive anything
which is continuously existent. Such an exposition of the result of
"relation" would rob Hume's earlier accounts of it of all their value.
For the significance of all possible explanation of our consciousness
of objects by a description of the genesis of those objects in con
sciousness, rests on the supposition -- which is, of course, true -
that the objects in consciousness are a means to our consciousness
of the transcendent objects. The mind constructs immanent objects,
and, being intentional, produces thus for itself a consciousness
of transcendent objects. While admitting that Hume never had any
distinct notion of the relation of the immanent in consciousness to
the transcendent beyond it, yet so long as he was prepared to admit
that what the mind had constructed for itself it did perceive, we held
it possible to make use of his subjective descriptions of the construc
tion of objects in consciousness by the imagination. This we believed
we could do by insisting on the difference involved between the
natural and the philosophical or reflective attitude, and by intro
ducing the intentional character of consciousness to relate the sub
jective to the objective. But were Hume to develop with any con
sequence the line of thought which he makes use of here, in a
distinction between that which is "perceived" and that which is
"imagined", we should have to confess that Hume's subjective con
ceptions were devoid of value.

Hume supposes that he cannot admit to any full consciousness of
continuous existence, without admitting the independent reality of the
external world; and we know that Hume was convinced that such an
mission would destroy the validity of the doctrine on which he had boil
the Treatise, that the mind is limited to its perceptions. He seeks
in a distinction between "perception" and "imagination . He r

404 C. V. Salmon, [1Q6

to his identification of "real perception" with "sense-impression", using
the former term now to imply that what is "perceived" is not "ima
gined", and that what is "imagined" is "imagined" merely, and not
"perceived". Under this scheme, and for its sake, he is content
a. once more to confuse within the one word "perception" both the
psycho-physical experience and the object perceived, and b. to make
an improper use of the notion of "appearance". When we have
been accustomed to observe a constancy in certain
impressions, he writes, and have found that the percep
tion of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon
us after an absence or annihilation with like parts and
in a like order, as at its first appearance, we are not
apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as diffe
rent, (which they really are), but, on the contrary,
consider, them as individually the same, upon account
of their resemblance. But as this interruption of
their existence is contrary to their perfect identity,
and makes us regard the first impression as annihi
lated, and the second as newly created, we find our
selves somewhat at a loss, and are involved in a kind
of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this
difficulty, we disguise, as much as possible, the inter
ruption, or rather remove it entirely, by supposing,
that these interrupted perceptions are connected by
a real existence of which we are insensible1).

Hume is willing to argue, a. that the discreteness of the psycho-
physical experiences excludes the possibility of our being conscious
of anything continuous, and b. that we are limited in perception to
the "appearances" of objects, which are themselves beyond the reach
of our perception. These objects, which Hume is now supposing to be
beyond our reach, are not, in this instance, the supposed realities of
the external world. For Hume is arguing within the subjective sphere,
and referring only to what may be found within the body of the
"impressions". ". . . . 'twill readily be allowed - - Hume had just
written - - that .... nothing is ever really present to the mind,
besides its own perceptions." And now, he says, explicitly, we suppose
"that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real
existence of which we are insensible." Hume's present distinction
between "appearance" and "objects" is supposed to be valid within

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 488.

107] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 4Q5

the subjective body of the "perceptions". It is only to 'objects' which
are avowedly "fictions", that we are persuaded to attribute a "con-
tinu'd existence". The "fictions" of the "imagination" are constant
and coherent. We presume them to be continuously existent. Hume's
argument is the following: It is the nature of that which we perceive,
to be perceived, and therefore to cease to 'be' anything at all, when
it is not perceived. This table, therefore, which I, opening my eyes,
perceive, is a perception, a perception-table, which ceases to exist as
soon as I shut my eyes. When I open my eyes a second time, and
again perceive a table, the table which I perceive is a table exactly
resembling the table which I perceived a moment since, but not the
same table, being in its nature a perception-table, and, as such,
numerically different from the former perception-table. I never,
therefore, really "perceive" the continuous existence of the percep
tion-table, but owing to a native disposition in the mind, — as the
mind is once in the train of observing an uniformity
among objects, it naturally continues, till it renders
the uniformity as compleat as possible1), -- I am led to
"imagine" it. But this distinction between what I "perceive" and what
I "imagine" but do not "perceive", with its counterpart distinction
between that which is all "appearance", i. e. that which I "perceive",
and that which is "object" which never "appears", i. e. the con
tinuously existent perception, which I "imagine" only and do not
"perceive", is both invalid in itself, and an inconsequence within
Hume's system. In the Treatise it is a curiosity which quickly sinks
from sight. When Hume proceeds to the question of the identity of
the "perceptions", he shows himself dissatisfied with his account of
their "continuous existence". The fact is that all that we really
"suppose", if we do suppose it and not perceive it, when we say that
our "perceptions" are "joined by a continuous existence", is that they
are entities possessed of an identity, which, when they recur, we
recognize, and say, That is the Same!

B. Hume's "System". The Problem of Identity

in External Perception.

First, to explain the principium individuationis,
or principle of identity. Secondly, give a reason why
the resemblance of our broken and interrupt

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 488.

406 C. V. Salmon, [108

ceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them.
Thirdly, account for that propensity, which this
illusion gives, to unite these broken appearances by
a continu'd existence. Fourthly and lastly, explain
that force and vivacity of conception, which arises
from the propensity1).

§ 30. Introduction To Hume's Principium Individuationis, or
special problem of Identity in Consciousness.

Our review of Hume's work has made it evident, that the ultimate
merit of the Humeian theory, must rest upon his treatment of
identity. We have seen the steps by which Hume came to conceive
of the problem of external perception in subjective terms, and we
have made some estimate of the amount of truth and error involved
in that conception. Although Hume's sceptical prejudices served to
remove the discussion from the objective plane of the natural world,
they have not as yet induced him to make any clear statement about
the nature of the subjective field, where he is occupied. He has been
content to employ the word "perception", and to leave its division
into experience and object implicit and unanalysed. We have watched
Hume's diverse uses of the subject-object relation in general. Its
terms made their first appearance in Hume's ambiguous treatment
of "impressions" and "ideas". Being once introduced they played
a great variety of parts. At one time Hume would have them both
comprehended within a quasi-real objectivity, at another within a
quasi-ideal subjectivity. And forgetful, presently, of both attempts,
he tries to make the subject-object relation synonymous with the
conscious ego, and the natural world. Under this interpretation, he
subsumes the differences between reality and appearance, and
between sense-perception and imagination. But through all these
attempts, and beyond them, the immanent subjectivity and the
transcendent objectivity remain unreconciled and unexplained,
positive still in spite of all negation, and supported by Hume's
authoritative beliefs. The vulgar man, who believes both in his own
existence and that of an independent real world, triumphs over the
merely speculative philosopher. The sceptical and single meditative
attitude gives place before the practical, which can embrace them
both.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 489.

109] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 4Q7

But Hume has still to make a last attempt in the subjective
sphere to find a tolerant philosophy which will have room within it
for the immanent origin of a really transcendent world. Whatever
motives he may have had, Hume finds himself examining perception
from the subjective side. The natural world has dropped out of
sight with all its qualities, with the externality which Hume, so
curiously, leaves out of his regard. The real world cannot explain
our consciousness of it, our perception must explain it. But if we are
to be occupied thus exclusively with consciousness, we must divide
our perception into two elements, we must have both a perception of
a world in consciousness, and a world in consciousness which is built
up to be perceived. We must have a subject-object relation within
the subjective sphere. We must have noesis and noema. We must
have intentional consciousness that we may have a transcendent
world. For all Hume's negative treatment of "perceptions", that they
are not "external", that they are not "distinct", that they are not
"continuously existent", that they are not even "perceived", but,
only "imagined", he must still offer something positive, he must offer
an 'object' in perception. If there is nothing more positive in con
sciousness, there is at least an object, i. e. there is an identity.
There must be a 4pole' in consciousness, besides the conscious
'mind' or 'ego-pole', which can receive the "fictions" which the
imagination invents there are four things requi
site, he writes by way of preface to his subjective account
of perception. First, to explain the principium indivi-
duationis, or principle of identity. Secondly, give a
reason why the resemblance of our broken and inter
rupted perceptions induces us to attribute an iden
tity to them. Thirdly, account for that propensity,
which this illusion gives, to unite these broken appe
arances by a continu'd existence. Fourthly and lastly,
explain that force and vivacity of conception, whi<
arises from the propensity1).

Of these four 'principles' the most significant is the principium
individuationis, in which the second, as well as the first, of Hume's
four requisites is involved. These two taken together form the climax
of Hume's subjectivism. If Hume will allow, that there is in con-
sciousness an identical object, he will have left in his system ,
irrefutable foundation on which a sane and conclusive philosophy can

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p, 489,

408 C. V. Salmon, [HO

be built up. He will have left a subject-object relation in con
sciousness, a noesis and noema, which can create a transcendence out
of immanence through the abilities of intentional consciousness. But
the third and fourth of the requisites of the Humeian system read
sceptical even in their presentation. Must Hume "account for that
propensity, which this illusion gives, and explain that force and
vivacity of conception, which arises from the propensity"? Then
"identity" is an "illusion", and no 'fact', and there is no object in
consciousness, and no subject-object relation within the subjective
sphere, and Hume has failed, and is become, once more, philoso
phically at least, a sceptic.

But while on his own confession Hume does fail, and makes of
identity in consciousness a mere "illusion", he does yet, in his very
account of that "illusion", describe an object in consciousness, and an
identity, which cries out against the name illusion, and is essential
even to Hume's scepticism.

In an examination of requisites 1. and 2. of Hume's system,
we shall show that Hume's position involves a positive philosophy.
Hume calls identity an "illusion", and tries to explain it away as an
abstract idea. But the "resemblance" from which Hume claims that
the idea "identity" is abstracted, is itself perceived resemblance,
and this perception of resemblance involves an identity, in the shape
of an identical object. Hume distinguishes between "identity", which
he calls an "illusion", and "unity" which he admits to be a 'fact'.
He makes "unity" the basis of "resemblance". But the difference
between "unity" and "identity" is one in name only; "unity" of
object presupposes "identity" in object. When Hume refuses to
recognize the 'fact' of the identity of the object in consciousness, the
object-as-it-is-perceived, with which, even in his account of identity
as illusion, he cannot dispense, he gives one the impression of wishing
to use the notion of identity, rather as a stumbling block to positive
thought, and an inducement to scepticism, than as a problem worthy
of solution.

§ 31. Part I: Of Hume's System. Principium Individuationis.

I. Identity.

Hume starts his enquiry concerning the nature of our perception
of identity with a definition of identity itself.

As to the principle of individuation ; we may ob
serve, Hume writes, that the view of any one object is not

Ill] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

409

sufficient to convey the idea of identity. For in that
proposition, 'an object is the same with itself, if the
idea express' d by the word, 'object', were no way dis-
tinguishedfromthatmeantby4itself';wereallyshou'd
mean nothing, nor wou'd the proposition contain a
predicate and a subject, which however are imply' d in
this affirmation. One single object conveys the idea
of unity, not that of identity. On the other hand, a
multiplicity of objects can never convey this idea,
however resembling they may be suppos'd. The mind
always pronounces the one not to be the other, and
considers them as forming two, three or any deter
minate number of objects, whose existences are
entirely distinct and independent.

Since then both number and unity are incompatible
with the relation of identity, it must lie in something
that is neither of them. But . . . . at first sight this
seems utterly impossible. Betwixt unity and number
there can be no medium; no more than betwixt
existence and non-existence. After one object is
suppos'd to exist, we must either suppose another
also to exist, in which case we have the idea of number:
Or we must suppose it not to exist; in which case the
first object remains at unity. To remove this diffi
culty, let us have recourse to the idea of time or
duration .... time, in a strict sense, implies succes
sion, and .... when we apply its idea to any unchange
able object, 'tis only by a fiction of the imagination,
by which the unchangeable object is suppos'd to parti
cipate of the changes of the co-existent objects, and
in particular of that of our perceptions. The fiction
of the imagination almost universally takes place;
and 'tis by means of it, that a single object, plac'd
before us, and survey'd for any time without our dis
covering in it any interruption or alteration (Hume will
presently explain in detail, how the imagination works in the manu
facture of this fiction), is able to give us a notion of

identity Here then is an idea, which i

medium betwixt unity and number • • •

and this idea we call that of identity

the principle of individuation is nothing but the

410 C. V. Salmon, [U2

in variableness and uninterruptedness of any object
thro' a suppos'd variation of time . . . .*).

Taken by itself the definition is neat enough. "Identity" is the
invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object through a supposed
variation of time. Offered as an abstraction, it contains nothing
objectionable. But when it is considered in connection with its
derivation, the hypothetical element involved in the "supposition of
a variation of time", which in abstraction could be taken as concep
tual only, assumes a character of illusoriness, which invalidates the
whole. Identity, the abstraction, becomes a fiction which can never
properly be assigned to the real objects of the perception. Having
admitted a distinction between "unity" and "identity", why should
Hume find any difficulty in the notion of a single object or unity
persisting through a duration of time? Hume is hampered by his
earlier doctrine of particularity. It forces him to regard any 'single'
object as something 'complete', taken both in, and by, itself. And
with this absolute view of the particular, he considers himself bound
to offer an explanation of identity in the terms of the relative sub
jectivity, which we have so often deplored. He wishes to make
'identity' itself dependent on our perception of it. The true sub-
jectivist must recognize that he is not concerned with any object,
but is limited always to as much of that object as can be supposed
to be involved in our consciousness of it. Hume's business did not
lie with identity itself, but only with our consciousness of identity,
i. e. with identity in consciousness. By refusing to confine his atten
tion to the subjective, Hume involved himself as usual in hypostasis,
and brought empirical elements into the subjective sphere in which
he worked. Starting from the false and irrelevant premise, that
there is no such thing as a "real" persistence of any unit through
a variation of time, Hume made identity itself dependent on our
perception. He made identity a fiction in the sceptical sense, an
illusion which, from the point of view of philosophy, we ought
to dissuade ourselves from believing. Hume tries to explain our
seeming perception of identity by a relatively subjective standard of
comparison. And, under analysis, this relatively subjective standard
turns out to be a comparison of a double set of objects. It is by
comparing objects with our experiences of objects, according to
Hume, that we win our notion of their identity, namely their fictitious
persistence. By a fiction of the imagination, the really unchangeable

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 489—90.

113] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 41 J

object is supposed to participate in the changes of our perceptions.
We find ourselves caught once more in the Humeian theory of
simplicity and complexity, with its differentiation between that which
is, and that which is perceived. That which is, is simple, and,
by its nature, cannot participate in change. That which is per-
ceived is complex, and may be supposed to change to the extent in
which it may be compared to that which does not change. That which
is, and does not change, is the sequence of the units which are our
real experiences, which Hume supposes may somehow be retained
singly, and yet in relation to one another, by some such faculty as
memory. The idea of identity is said to spring from a comparison
of perceived objects with perceiving experiences. But as Hume's
explanation stands it is manifestly insufficient. It needs, in the first
place, the explanation which Hume is reserving, as to how this com
parison between objects and experiences actually takes place. But in
the second place it needs an explanation, which Hume never gives,
as to how the supposed single and unique object becomes separated
from the supposed single and unique experience, so as to be able to
be compared with it. A moment's consideration should convince any
one, that the whole question of identity has already been involved
by the time that this separation has taken place. The problem of
identity is already contained in Hume's conception of unity. Hume
should not have made any assertions concerning the single and unitary
nature of the objects supposed to participate in the changes required
by the sequence of our experiences, until he had investigated the
nature of the original separation between experience and object. Had
he made this investigation, he would have found that the unity, i. e.
the object as distinct from the experience, was already identical with
itself; and that this identity of the object with itself, was no mere
tautological proposition, that is to say a logical duplicity to express
a real uniqueness, but that it was a pregnant and synthetic identity,
which the unit contained, as part of its title to be separable from the
unity of the experience.

§ 32. Part II of Hume's System. Principium Individuationis.

II. Unity.

"In that proposition, 'an object is the same with itself, if the
idea expressed by the word 'object', were no ways distinguished from
that meant by 'itself'," says Hume, "we really should mean nothing,
nor would the proposition contain a predicate and a subject, which

412 C. V. Salmon, [114

are however imply'd in this affirmation." Hume has his finger on a
truth which he misinterprets. When we say, with reference to the
real object, This table is identical, it cannot be doubted that we mean
to assert, as Hume suggests, that this table is the same as that table,
which existed, and which we perceived to exist, in a past moment,
and that this table is the same table as that table, which will exist,
and which we could perceive to exist, in a future moment. But
this real table, which is thus really identical, is not the table or the
identity with which Hume ought to be concerned. The expression,
This table! is ambiguous. When we say, This table!, and express
the subject of a judgment, we are already making an assertion of an
identity which we do not actually express in the judgment, but which
we could express without tautology. The truth is that This table!,
which is the subject of the predicate real identity, 'overlaps' or
'coincides' in meaning with another This Table! which is also iden
tical, and the object of the philosophical enquiry. The second This
table! is not and could not be the subject of the predicate real
identity, because it is not a real table. Real identity involves, as
Hume suggests, persistence in time. The one real table was yesterday,
and is today, and will be tomorrow. The real table has four legs:
i. e. it had four legs, is having four legs, and will be having four legs.
But this is not to say, as Hume wanted to say, that this table, which
we assert to be the same with itself, i. e. to be identical, is different
from itself, that is, that the This table! is one table, belonging
to, and included in the moment of time A, and that the Itself is
another table, belonging to and included in the moment of time B,
for such a proposition would have avoided tautolgy only at the price
of being self-contradictory. When we say that an object is the same
with itself, we mean that it is the same with, and not different from,
itself: we mean that it is identical. In others words, while it is true to
assert that the time element enters into real identity, it is false to make
of this time a sequence of discrete moments, in which a real object
could not persist, but only a plurality of unique objects corresponding
to, and included in, these moments. Real time is such that real objects
can persist in it, that is to say, be identical with themselves. Per
sistence is the characteristic of reality. When we say that objects exist,
we mean that they persist. The real table, which has four legs, actu
ally includes within itself a certain flux or continuum of time. The
present existence of the table is a state of being, not an isolated
'moment', but a condition of past, present and future. Both the past
and the future are contained in the real present. So much is this

115] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 413

continuous time nature essential to the existence of the real parti-
cular, that we ourselves are seen to come into a certain psycho-
physical and contingent contact with it, as perceiving subjects. Not
only the object itself, but also the perception of the object, requires
time, that is, 'takes place' in, or 'exists' in, time. And here we come
again to a thought of Hume's. Hume recognized that it is due to our
consciousness of the sequence of our experiences, that we are con
scious of real time. He saw that our perception of time, like
every other perception, was dependent upon the subjective, and
that we only perceived it because we had already made it for
ourselves. But from this notion he made his usual deduction,
that if we had made time, and were as subjects responsible for
it, time must be admitted to be a fiction. At any rate, time must
be taken to belong exclusively to subjects, and cannot be supposed
to belong to objects. But this argument of Hume's was fallacious.
Again he misunderstood the nature of the dependency of time upon
the subjective, which he took as his premise. Just as in the case of
space he did not recognize that there was a subjective, or immanent,
as well as objective, or transcendent, 'space', so, here, he does not
recognize that there is a subjective as well as an objective 'time', these
two 'times' being, like the two spaces, of a quite different nature, the
one immanent and ideal, and the other transcendent and real. He
sees that our perception of real time is 'dependent' in a certain sense
upon the 'subjective', that, as he put it, we perceive real objects
in time because of a certain "comparison" which we make between
real objects and our experiences, but he misunderstands the nature
of this "comparison". It is riot by means of comparing real objects
with our real perceptive-experiences of them, that we are capable of
perceiving real time, but by means of certain ideal 'syntheses', which
take place, not like our real experiences in real time, but in the ideal,
immanent time of the pure subjective sphere. We can only perceive
the real identity, the persistence of objects in real time, because we
have constructed for ourselves an identical object in the ideal time.
Hume, being limited to his conception of 'comparative subjectivity',
conceived that 'subjective' time was real time. Indeed he thought
that the only 'time' was this 'subjective', and uni-dimensional, sequence
of real experiences, and that our only consciousness of 'subjective'
time was our consciousness of this sequence . . But why did he not
recognize, that this sequence of our real experiences, being indeed
a part of real time, belongs to the objective and not to the subjective
world, and that, therefore, our consciousness of the sequence of

414 C. V. Salmon,

these real experiences, is liable to all his own objections against our
perceiving real, identical, objects in time? For in order to exist in
real time at all, these real experiences, like other real objects, must
be supposed to be identical. If Hume was to deny the existence
of external objects in time, he should also have denied, and just as
forcefully, the sequence, and our consciousness of the sequence, of
our real experiences. For the whole of real time, like the whole of
real space, is essentially transcendent to the subject. It is true, that
there is a certain difference between the two cases, for while the
existence of external objects in time requires their persistence, the
sequence of internal experiences does not demand a similar per
sistence of the individual experiences. But this fact in no way alters
the equal reality of the time involved in both; and this may be seen
in the fact that the notions of persistence and sequence are strictly
complementary to one another. Nothing can persist unless a sequence
of something else is involved; and there can be no sequence unless
something else persists. Time lends its name alternately to these two
halves of its own complementary whole. In the first case when the
object persists, time is the sequence, the object persisting through a
sequence of moments of time; in the second case, when events, such
as experiences or any other real events, follow one another, time
is the persistence, or persisting element in which the sequence
takes place.

Real time is a continuum, so that any moment of it contains
both past, present and future. This is involved in the notion of real
identity. But the whole of identity is not exhausted in the real
identity which we perceive; there is a certain ideal identity in the
perception, an immanent identity, which is involved in our perception
both of the sequence of our experiences, and of the identity of a
persisting object in the external world.

This identity is also an identity in time, but in subjective, and
not in objective, time. Now the main differences involved in the
distinct natures of objective or transcendent, and subjective or imma
nent time, may be summed up by saying that while, as we have seen,
objective time is a continuum composed of continuing 'moments',
each of which must be allowed to contain both a past and a future
in their present, subjective time, is not a continuum but an entirety,
in which each 'moment' is an entirety, and, as such, absolutely inde
pendent of any other moment. Subjective time is not a flux or
stream, but is seen under each reflexion as a whole.

When the subject reflects upon the object as it is in conscious-

117] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 415

ness, he is reflecting upon an entirety, a whole, a unity, as Hume
would have called it, or an identity which is perfect. From what has
been said about the complementary nature of real time, and the
distinguishing unitary nature of ideal time, it will be understood
that, there being in this latter neither sequence nor persistence, but
only the absolute present, all divisions involved in reality, and in
particular the real division between the object perceived and the
perception of the object, and the quality of 'change' involved in this
division, will be absent from the subjective sphere. The very rule
which the reflecting subject must follow, namely, that in reflection,
he accept nothing which is not found in that strict moment
or 'present' of consciousness, which he is examining, is enough to
suggest the nature of the identity, which will be disclosed to him. It
will be an identity of object of experience, and an identity of ex
perience of object. Within the unity of the object in experience
remain the differences between the object of experience, noema, and
the experience of object, noesis, but these do not involve 'real' time
or 'real' separation.

For there can be no identity of any kind, either real or ideal —
and this is where Hume's conception of "unity" was at fault — which
does not involve synthesis, or the relation of parts to a whole. Were
there no synthesis within the unity of the ideal identity of the object
in consciousness, there could be no knowledge of the identity of the
object itself. The identical real object endures and is independent of
our consciousness of it. But although the identity of the object in
consciousness is such, that it can be 'repeated' in innumerable
experiences, that is to say, the noema in a plurality of noesis's, yet it
cannot be said of the identity of the object in consciousness, as it
can be of the identity of the real object, that it is separable from our
consciousness of it, for the noesis-noema relation is, in ideal actuality,
an inseparable unity. And here we find the clue concerning the nature
of the relation, or dependence, not of the real identity of the real
object upon the ideal identity of the object in consciousness, and not
of the real identity of the real object upon the real identity of the
real experience, but of our perception of the identity of the real
object, and of our perception of the real identity of the real
experience, upon the ideal identity of the object in consciousness, i. e.
the identity of the object as we are conscious of it. It is only because
the object as we are conscious of it is identical, that we perceive the
identity of the real objects in the world. In this there is the appe-
of a paradox; for, it may be asked, if the identity of the object

arance

416 C. V. Salmon, [118

in the subjective sphere is inseparable from our consciousness of its
identity, why are we not conscious in ordinary perception of the identity
of the ideal object, instead of the identity of the real object? In other
words, if the identity of the ideal object is dependent upon our being
conscious of it, how can it be identical when we are not conscious of
it, and how can it, therefore, be the means of our perceiving the real
identity of real objects in the world? But it is evident, that such
questions as the above, are based on the misunderstanding of the
relation of our consciousness of real objects to our consciousness of
phenomena.

These do not conflict with one another, or dispute for the
attention of consciousness. That they are both involved in any con
crete experience becomes obvious in a moment, when it is considered
that the real objects of the real world, and among these our bodies
and all our organs, hands, eyes, ears etc., are not sufficient to produce
a consciousness of themselves in any subject, are not, in fact,
sufficient to produce any single 'subject'. Neither the physiologist
nor the physicist can discover any 'property' of real objects, by which
these could produce consciousness. If we are to be conscious of these
objects, it is obvious that there is need for consciousness as well as
for objects, of the 'existence' of consciousness, if that word is to be
used, as well as the 'existence' of objects. Consciousness, then, as well
as real objects, has a nature of its own; and consciousness, as well as
reality, is capable of an ontology.

Setting out, then, from the side of the subject — we being sub
jects — there is nothing contradictory in the assertion, that not the
objects, but the consciousness, is responsible for our consciousness of
objects. And to confine ourselves exclusively to perception, there is
nothing contradictory in saying, that not the real objects and their
qualities, but the ideal 'objects', i. e. the objects as they are in con
sciousness, and their 'qualities', are responsible for our perception of
real objects. For it is presupposed in this saying, that, when we
perceive, we are not conscious of consciousness, or of any objects in
consciousness, i. e. of the objects as they are in consciousness, but,
on the contrary, of the real objects which, therefore, we say that we
perceive. In perception we perceive real objects: and when we are
conscious of consciousness, that is of objects in consciousness, we are
no longer perceiving, but are living in that subjective reflexion, which
is necessary to the intuition of phenomena.

If, therefore, we perceive the qualities of real objects, there can
be nothing contradictory in saying, that we only perceive those objects

119] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 417

and those qualities, not because the real qualities of those objects
are what they are, or because the real objects are so qualified, but
because the ideal objects in consciousness 'are' what they 'are', and
'have' such and such 'qualities'.

And, to return to the present issue, it is not contradictory to say
that we only perceive the identity of real objects because the objects
in consciousness are, according to their natures, identical. And now,
turning to the explanation, which Hume is reserving, as to how the
idea of identity, according to the account he has given of it, is
'invented', since it is not 'perceived', by the subject, we shall find, as
we have insisted, that even he should in consistency have admitted,
that the subject is only enabled to invent identity, owing to the 'fact',
that the object as we are conscious of it 'is' identical, or, in other
words, that there is an identical 'moment' in consciousness itself.

§ 33. Survey of Hume's Arguments to the Establishment of his
account of Identity.

In the Second Part of his Four-part System, Hume's business is
to show that 'identity', whose definition he has given in the First Part,
comes to be attributed to objects in perception. This explanation
amounts to a concession that the object in consciousness is identical.
But the concession is made reluctantly, and is never expressed in the
form of a definite admission. On the contrary, no sooner has Hume
made the concession, than, in the Third and Fourth Parts of his
System, he proceeds to retract it. Identity is acknowledged as an
identical "image" only to be quickly dethroned and relegated once
more to the dismal obscurity of an unexplained abstract idea, while
Hume proceeds unhindered to his famous 'sceptical' conclusions. But
Hume's recognition of the identity of the object in consciousness,
shortlived though it is, makes this portion of the Treatise supremely
important. Here Hume comes nearest to a true conception of con
sciousness itself, and of subjectivist philosophy. For in spite of the
devious and often unjustifiable ways by which he travels, in spite of
his making use of a representative theory of perception, which he has
himself shown to be invalid, Hume does arrive here, for one moment,
at the conception of an identical object in consciousness. He misread,
the nature of this object. He calls it, falsely, an "image
Hume has unveiled a phenomenon; and, cleared of its spurious label,
this phenomenon can provide a foundation for positive, and
sceptical, subjective idealism or Phenomenology.

Hu»»erl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophic. X.

418 & V. Salmon, [120

Hume has to explain how the subject attributes identity, in the
sense of persistence, to what he perceives. From his own position,
Hume has to account for the fact, that although our "perceptions"
are not identical, we do, in the ordinary course of experience perceive
them and believe them to be such. But, lover of paradox that he
is, no amount of ingenuity can help Hume in this case. Even his
clever theory of belief, which has served him so often before in
dealing with a variety of 'objects' and their 'qualities', now avails him
nothing. We cannot possibly perceive an identity unless we perceive
something identical: and we cannot perceive something identical
unless that something 'is' identical. As much as this, which is, of
course, everything, Hume finds himself obliged to allow. Having
allowed it, Hume does his best to cover his retreat by con
fusing two levels of 'objectivity' or 'subjectivity' — it does not
matter which they are called, for by this time each is involved in the
other within the introspection. But the distinction between "image"
and "object", which Hume seeks to draw, will not bear inspection.
There is no room within the pure subjective sphere for any such
discreteness. And even as these two appear in Hume's own
account, we can find no grounds of difference to separate them.
The identical "image" is an identical 'object' in consciousness. This,
as soon as he abandons his idle representative theory, Hume is
bound to admit.

The stages of Hume's argument are three.

1. He asserts that our "perceptions" themselves are not identical,
and seeks to bring in the testimony of the vulgar man to support the
assertion. But the vulgar man himself can be shown to hold no such
opinion. Hume misjudges him. He is not capable of the subtlety
which Hume imputes to him. Hume is himself at fault. Hume only
succeeds in establishing the non-identity of our "perceptions" by
confusing together, a. the real objects of the physical world; b. our
real psycho-physical experiences, and c. the ideal objects in con
sciousness, i. e. phenomena.

2. Hume makes use of a distinction between resemblance and
identity. He compares two examples of experiences supposed to be
different, the first supposed to be an example of a perception of 'real'
identity, wherein Hume examines what he calls the disposition
of the mind in viewing any object which preserves a
perfect identity, and the second, a perception of 'false' identity,
wherein Hume examines what he calls an instance of some other

121] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 419

(i.e. non-identical) object, that is confounded with it, by
causing a similar disposition1).

But Hume's distinction in these two examples between 'real' and
'false' identity is not valid. The identity of the object in each case
is in fact the same. It is not 'real' in any physical sense, for it is an
identity of objects in the subjective sphere. But it is not 'false', for
it is a perceived identity. Moreover the examples themselves do not
differ as Hume supposes, and will not support the differences between
resemblance and identity.

3. Hume propounds his notions of the "disposition" of the mind,
and of the "idea" in the mind. When these are dissociated, the one
from its empirical connection with the psycho-physical experience,
the other from its connection with the notion of "image" employed
in representative theories of perception, they can sustain the synthetic
differences of the intentional noesis-noema character of consciousness,
and offer a foundation for a true Phenomenology.

§ 34. Hume's Seven Definitions of a "Perception". Part II of
Hume's System.

I now proceed, says Hume, to explain the second
part of my system, and shew why the constancy of our
perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect
numerical identity, tho' there be very long intervals
betwixt their appearance, and they have only one of
the essential qualities of identity, viz. invariab-
leness2). That I may avoid all ambiguity and confusion

onthishead — he continues — I shallobserve, thatl here
account for the opinions and belief of the vulgar with

regard to the existence of body; and therefore must
entirely conform myself to their manner of thinking
and of expressing themselves. Now we have already
observ'd, that however philosophers may distinguish
betwixt the objects and perceptions of the senses
which they suppose co-existent and resembling; yet
this is a distinction which is not comprehended by t
generality of mankind, who as they perceive only one
being, can never assent to the opinion of a doub
existence and representation. Those very sensatio
which enter by the eye or ear, are with them the true

l)Gr.&G,I,P.492. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 490

9*

420 C. V. Salmon, [122

objects, nor can they readily conceive that this pen or
paper which is immediately perceiv'd, represents
another, which is different from, but resembling it.
In order, therefore, to accomodate myself to their
notions, I shall at first suppose; that there is only a
single existence, which I shall call indifferently
object or perception, according as it shall seem best
to suit my purpose, understanding by both of them
what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or
stone, or any other impression, convey* d to him by
his senses1).

We shall concern ourselves in the next section with the character
of the vulgar man whom Hume introduces; our present business lies
with what Hume has to say concerning the nature of the "percep
tions" whose identity is in question. To this, three additional quota
tions are relevant.

Hume says, The persons, who entertain this opinion
concerning the identity of our resembling percep
tions, are in general all the unthinking and unphi-
losophical part of mankind, (that is, all of us, at one
time or another) and consequently such as suppose
their perceptions to be their only objects, and never
think of a double existence internal and external,
representing and represented. The very image, which
is present to the senses, is with us the real body, and
'tis to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect
identity2). Hume says again, 'Tis certain, that almost all
mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the
greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions
to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very
being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the
real body or material existence. 'Tis also certain that
this very perception or object is suppo s'd to have a
continued uninterrupted being, and neither to be
annihilated by our absense, nor to be brought into
existence by our presence3). And again Hume says, 'Tis
indeed evident that as the vulgar suppose their per
ceptions to be their only objects, and at the same

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 490—91. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 493.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 495.

123] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

421

time believe the continu'd existence of matter, we
must account for the origin of the belief upon that
supposition1). Now although these quotations leave no doubt
that it is to nothing but "perceptions" that we all of us, at one time
or another, ascribe that real identity which is characteristic of the
continu'd existence of the objects of the external world, they do, at
the same time, leave us in the greatest doubt, as to what these
"perceptions" actually are. For we find it asserted in them, that
perceptions are a. "those very sensations, which enter by the eye or
ear", b. "what any common man means by a hat, or stone, or shoe,
or any other impression convey'd to him by his senses", c. "the only
objects" which we perceive, d. "the very image which is present to
the senses", e. "the real body", f. "interrupted images", and g. "the
very beings which are intimately present to the mind". Moreover
there is discrepancy in this variety. Only one of these definitions
appears as quite unqualified. The assertion c., that our perceptions
are the only objects which we perceive, appears in each of the four
passages. One other appears twice. In two of the passages Hume
lays it down, e. that our perceptions are considered as real bodies.
The rest make but a single appearance.

When these assertions are grouped together, according to their
significance, they fall into two groups, which, at the price of avoiding
contradiction within themselves, seem to contradict one another. The
first group is composed of the following:

Group I.

Our perceptions are
c. our only objects,

b. what any common man means by a hat, a stone, or shoe,
e. the real body,

and according to the interpretation which is given to it,

g. the very beings which are intimately present to the mind.
The second group makes up the deficit:

Group II.

c. our only objects,

a. those very sensations, which enter by the eye or c

d. the very image which is present to the senses,
and according to the interpretation which is given to it,

g. the very beings which are intimately present t

1) Gr. &Gr.I,p-497.

422 C- V- Salmon, [124

It appears that the definitions in Group I are spatial, but
in Group II, n o n • s p a t i a 1. This differentiation should not in
duce the reader to forsake the subjective sphere, in which the
whole discussion takes place, as the subjective nature of Hume's
conception of space is already known. Definition g., "the very beings
which are intimately present to the mind", would seem to belong
more naturally to Group II, owing to the non-spatial significance
which it is usual to attach to the word 'mind'. But with a certain
straining of the meaning, it could no doubt be made to fit Group I,
if that were necessary. Hume himself was, doubtless, aware of the
two tendencies, in his definition, and it may be presumed that he
had this distinction in mind, when he said, "I shall at first suppose,
that there is a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object
or perception, according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose".
Adapting the Humeian terminology to our classification, we should
qualify Group I with the name of "objects", and Group II with
that of "perceptions". In Group I, perceptions as objects, there is
nothing remarkable to observe. But in Group II, perceptions as
perceptions, the notion of 'representation', contained in the word
"image" in definition d., is to be remarked, first because it seems
difficult to reconcile with the valid definition c., that our perceptions
are our only objects, and secondly, because it is a notion which Hume
works to its full extent a little later.

§ 35. Vindication of the Vulgar Man from the opinion that our
"perceptions" are "interrupted".

We have seen that although Hume's purpose was* to contrast
the vulgar with the philosophic point of view, in order to ascertain
from their conflict, what might be the essential nature of our "per
ceptions" themselves, he was not able to avoid a certain discrepancy,
or difference of opinion, even within the vulgar body of opinion.
The truth is that Hume is not desirous of avoiding it. For
he wants the vulgar man to endorse his opinion that our "per
ceptions" are not themselves identical. By confusing "perceptions"
defined as objects with "perceptions" defined as experiences, he is
able to saddle the former with what he supposes to be the discrete
character of the latter. But if the vulgar man is to be credited
with the opinion c., that our "perceptions" are our only objects, he
must assert and believe contrary to Hume, that our "perceptions"
are identical. No doubt we do injustice to his character, when we

125] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 423

credit the vulgar man with so subtle an opinion. But we have Hume's
authority on our behalf. For nothing is more certain than that, if the
vulgar man were to be thought as simple as his name, he could not
have been of any service to Hume. For the simple man could not
have been supposed able to debate in the subjective sphere, where
Hume's argument takes place. But Hume wishes to have the authority
of the vulgar man, in asserting that our "perceptions" are "inter
rupted" Wehavealreadyobserved, — Hume writes, -

that however philosophers may distinguish betwixt

the objects and perceptions of the senses yet this

is a distinction, which is not comprehended by the
generality of mankind1). And 'Tis indeed evident, -
he writes later — that as the vulgar suppose their per
ceptions to be their only objects, and at the same
time believe the continu'd existence of matter, we
must account for the origin of the belief upon that
supposition2).

To enter, therefore, -- he now proceeds -- upon the
question concerning the source of the error and de
ception with regard to identity, when we attribute it
to our resembling perceptions, notwithstanding their
interruption; I must here recall an observa ntion,
which I have already prov'd and explained3).

This observation concerns the notion of resemblance. Hume's
reference is to Part II. Sect. 5, where the "relation" of resemblance
was discussed. Our next section will be devoted to the present use
which Hume makes of it. Before passing to it, we have to vindicate
the vulgar' man. For when Hume talks of "the error and deception
with regard to identity, when we attribute it to our resembling per
ceptions, notwithstanding their interruption", he is making a pre
supposition concerning the nature of our "perceptions", which the
vulgar man would not admit. Concerning the nature of "perceptions"
in general, it is obvious that the vulgar man would be prejudiced
in favour of the definitions of them, appearing in Group I, rather
than those in Group II. He could, no doubt, be brought to accept
these latter definitions, when the nature of the inevitable conjunction
between the senses and their objects had been described to him.
But he would certainly insist upon regarding this conjunction as

an

1)G,.&G,.I,P.491. 2)Gr.&Gr.I,P.497.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 491-

424 C. V. Salmon, [126

actual inseparability, and the difference as something verbal and arti
ficial. For the one opinion to which the vulgar man must cling is
that his perceptions are his only objects. The vulgar man would, of
course, be able to distinguish quite clearly between his "perceptions"
and his perceptive experiences. He would not hesitate to say, "I saw a
rainbow yesterday", where such a distinction is actually asserted. But
it is not this distinction which is here involved. The question is confined
here to the possibility of recognizing two elements in the objective
character of the perceptive experience. Now, as against Hume, it
seems to us, that the vulgar man world assert staunchly that he refers
exclusively to one object when he has a perception; that is to say,
the he refers all the 'qualities' perceived in the perception, 'qualities'
such as extension, reality, distance, identity etc., to one single object,
the 'perception', namely, and does not hold, as a 'philosopher' might,
that his 'perception' is merely something like an 'image', which re
presents some object outside the 'perception', some object, that is,
not perceived, to which certain of the qualities involved — we cannot
talk here of 'perceived' qualities — must be attributed.

If the vulgar man believed, as Hume says, that his 'perceptions'
were hats, stones, shoes and such like, he would not admit for an in
stant, that his perceptions were "interrupted". He would acknowledge
readily enough that he does not always perceive his 'perceptions', that
he sees his shoes this evening, and that he will see them again to
morrow morning, but that during the night he will not see them.
But this "interruption" he would attribute unhesitatingly to his real
perceptive experiences. He would say, My boots, my "perceptions",
exist equally during the night, as during the day, it is only that I do
not see them. If they did not exist during the night, I should not be
able to see them again tomorrow morning. It is indeed probable
that the vulgar man would take objection to the word "perception".
While willing perhaps, for Hume's sake, to forsake his ordinary and
naif standpoint, and to enter the subjective sphere, and make no
mention of any absolute reality conceived without reference to some
subjectivity, he would none the less dislike the suggestion in the
word "perception" that the existence of the perceived object is in
distinguishable from the act of its being perceived. If I agree to call
my shoe a "perception" — •- he might urge against Hume — you must
allow that this "perception" has a reality of its own. While admitting
that the objects which I perceive are 'dependent', in a certain fashion,
on the consciousness by means of which I perceive them, I can and
must recognize that these "perceptions" have a nature -of their own.

127] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 425

Different "perceptions" have different natures. I can distinguish
between a pair of shoes which I perceive, and a pair of shoes which
I only dream that I perceive, etc. The vulgar man would refuse to
acknowledge that his "perceptions" were interrupted. If he were a
man of unusual perspicuity, and had succeeded in understanding the
pure nature of the subjective sphere, he would object to Hume's use
of the word "interrupted" in connection with "perceptions". Our
"perceptions" have an ideal existence only, he would say, they are
not 'real' in the same sense as our perceptive experiences themselves,
and cannot therefore be supposed to be "interrupted" in the same
real, discrete, and temporal sense as our perceptive experiences. The
question which we are discussing, he might continue, does not concern
any real identity, and cannot depend upon any real interruption.
We are not met to decide what is the nature of the identity or
non-identity of any real object itself in any real external world. Our
business is to determine how it is that we come to 'perceive' the
identity of the real object in the external world; or, if you like it
better, how we come to 'imagine' the identity of the real object in
the external world, etc. It is interesting to note that Hume falsifies
the opinions of the vulgar man, exactly when, and to the measure
that, he confuses these two questions with one another. It is when
Hume thinks that the nature of reality excludes the possibility of a
real thing being identical, and therefore also excludes the possibility
of our perceiving an identical real object, that he falls into the
fallacy of making the vulgar man attribute the characteristics of
reality to his "perceptions". It cannot be asserted too frequently, that
the characteristics of reality have no bearing upon our 'perceptions'.
If it were true that the nature of reality is such that no real thing
can be identical, this would not, by itself, be sufficient to prevent
our perceiving the identity of real things.

From his own 'sceptical' point of view, Hume contradicted him
self in this matter, for he could not truly assert both that the nature
of reality excluded the possibility of its being identical, and that
reality was for ever beyond the reach of perception. For if he had
not perceived that reality was not identical, on what grounds
he assert it?

§ 36. The Re-appearance of Hume's notion of the "Idea".

Passing to consider the principle which Hume has already
established, but which he considers himself bound to bring mt<
further prominence, we find the following: Nothing is. mere apt

426 C. V- Salmon, [128

to make us mistake one idea for another, than any
relation betwixt them, which associates them together
in the imagination, and makes it pass with facility
from one to the other. Of all relations, that of re
semblance is in this respect the most efficacious; and
that because it not only causes an association of ideas,
but also of dispositions, and makes us conceive the
one idea by an act or operation of the mind, similar
to that by which we conceive the other. This circum
stance I have obser v'd to be of great moment; and we
may establish it as a general rule, that whatever ideas
place the mind in the same disposition or in similar
ones, are very apt ^to be confounded. The mind
readily passes from one to the other, and perceives
not the change without a strict attention, of which,
generally speaking, 'tis wholly incapable1).

We are arrived at the first stage of Hume's argument, where he
will draw a distinction between a 'genuine' and 'spurious' identity,
based upon a confusion between identity and resemblance. The first
observation of importance, which any reader should draw from reading
the passage just quoted, is the re-appearance of Hume's old word
"idea". "Nothing is more apt to make us mistake one idea for
another", Hume said, "than any relation betwixt them, which asso
ciates them together in the imagination, and makes it pass with faci
lity from one to the other," and again, "Of all relations, that of
resemblance is in this case the most efficacious; and that because it
not only causes an association of ideas, but also of dispositions, and
makes us conceive the one idea by an act or operation of the mind,
similar to that by which we conceive the other."

What does Hume mean here by calling the perception an "idea"?
The notion recalls the vaguest of the definitions, definition g., "the
very beings which are intimately present to the mind". Accepting the
reference, to which Hume alludes in the text, and going back to an
earlier part of the Treatise, (namely to Part II. Sect. 5), we find the
word "idea" there commonly in use. That section starts to concern
itself with abstract ideas such as space in general, and the idea of
a vacuum, but it proceeds to wider interests. We find a repetition
of the conception of the relations of resemblance, con
tiguity and causation, as principles of union among

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 491—2.

129] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 427

ideas1), and the following curious notion, I shall .... observe,
that as the mind is endow'd with a power of exciting
any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits
into that region of the brain, in which the idea is
plac'd; these spirits always excite the idea when they
run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage
that cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their
motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little
to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal
spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present
other related ideas in lieu of that, which the mind
desir'd at first to survey. This change we are not
always sensible of....2).

This might stand as a physical and contingent parallel to Hume's
present notion of the "association of dispositions", and the mind being
placed in a "disposition" by its "ideas". But the conception becomes
almost identical with the present, as the context continues, under the
heading of resemblance: viz. Of the three relations above
mention'd that of resemblance is the most fertile
source of error; .... Resembling ideas are not only
related together, but the actions of the mind, which
we employ in considering them, are so little diffe
rent, that we are not able to distinguish them. This
last circumstance is of great consequence and we may
in general observe, that wherever the actions of the
mind in forming any two ideas are the same, or re
sembling, we are very apt to confound these ideas,
and take the one for the other. Of this we shall see
many instances in the progress of this treatise3). We
may remember what an important part the conception of the "idea"
plays in Hume's doctrine; how he inherited the notion from Locke,
and how he modified it and gave it the supremacy in his own philo
sophy. When Hume said, I content myself with knowing

perfectly the manner in which objects affect my
senses, and their connections with each other, as far
as experience informs me of them. This suffices for
the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my
philosophy, which pretends only to explain the
nature and causes of our perceptions, or impressions

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 364. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 365. 3) Gr. & Gr, I, p. 365.

428 C. V. Salmon, [130

and ideas1); he was really expressing his subjectivism in terms of
the Lockeian idea, although he there uses the three words, "per
ception", "impression" and "idea" indiscriminately, and as if they
were interchangeable with one another.

At last, in the present connection, we have an opportunity of
ascertaining Hume's most definite conception of the "idea". Hume
brings his principle of resemblance to bear on the question of
our perception of identity. He describes its operation in two
examples, the first being offered as an instance of the perception of
a comparatively 'genuine', and the second as an instance of the per
ception of a comparatively 'spurious', identity. In order to apply
this general maxim, he says, we must first examine the
disposition of the mind in viewing any object which
preserves a perfect identity, and then find some
other object, that is confounded with it, by causing
a similar disposition. When we fix our thought on any
object, and suppose it to continue the same for some
time; 'tis evident we suppose the change to lie only
in the time, and never exert ourselves to produce any
new image or idea of the object. The faculties of the
mind repose themselves in a manner, and take no
more exercise, than what is necessary to continue
that idea, of which we were formerly possest, and
which subsists without variation or interruption. The
passage from one moment to another is scarce felt,
and distinguishes not itself by a different perception
or idea, which may require a different direction of
the spirits in order to its conception2).

It is to be observed that Hume is now employing a three-fold
division of elements within the subjective perception, where we know
that there is room only for a two-fold division into noesis and noema.
Hume speaks I. of a "disposition of the mind", II. of an "idea or
image", and III. of an "object". There is only one set of theories
which makes use of such a tripartite division in consciousness. These
are the varieties of the representative theory of perception. We
are obliged to conclude that, in spite of his own most effective
criticism of representative theories in general, Hume is himself now
going to make use of one. The word "image" gives the whole matter
away. It is true that the representative theories which Hume re-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 367—8. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 492.

131] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 429

futed were such as bore a reference to the real, transcendent world,
in so far as the 'object' represented by these was a reality existing
in the transcendent world. But, nevertheless, a representative theory,
conceived of as operating within the subjective sphere, where the
object 'represented' is not a transcendent reality, but a perception-
reality, perception-houses, perception-trees, etc., is open to precisely
the same objection, as those relating to reality. This is the objection,
which Hume himself brought against those others, namely that we do
not perceive two sets, but only one set, of objects. Just as, when the
object perceived is taken to be a reality, what is perceived is not the
representation of a reality but the reality itself, so, when the object
perceived is taken to be a perception, what is perceived is not the
representation of a perception, but the perception itself. But Hume
talks as if our perceiving a perception was dependent upon our per
ceiving an "image" or "idea" of the perception. His three-fold divi
sion of the elements of perception is made to support an operation,
or effect, of each upon the other.

"The mind being in a certain 'disposition' surveys an 'idea'
which is an 'image' of the 'perception'." There can be no doubt that
a representative theory is here involved of the kind which Hume
himself has already refuted.

§ 37. Hume's "Philosopher" examined.

In making use of a representative theory within the subjective act
of perception, Hume was guilty of holding the opinion characteristic
of the Philosopher whom he professed to despise. This character we
will now examine. It is not improbable that some one may have
objected to our exposition of the views of the vulgar man, on the
ground that according to our interpretation he does not differ from
the philosopher. But in reality, although our version of the vulgar
man shared with Hume's philosopher a conception of the subjective
nature of consciousness, he differs from him in two important respects.
Hume's philosopher was a comparative subjectivist, while the vulgar
man was not: and the vulgar man would not hold a representative
theory of perception, as Hume now wishes him to do. The philo
sopher is introduced as belonging to a class of men differing from the
vulgar precisely in this, that they believe in a certain duplicity of
objectivity . . . . however philosophers may distinguish
betwixt the objects and perceptions of the senses;
which they suppose co-existent and resembling, Hume

430 c- v- Salmon' [132

writes, yet this is a distinction, which is not compre
hended by the generality of mankind, who as they per
ceive only one being, can never assent to the opinion
of a double existence and representation1). And Hume
says . . . . Philosophers . . . . distinguish . . . . betwixt
perceptions and objects, of which the former are
supposed to be interrupted and perishing, and
different at every different return; the latter to be
uninterrupted, and to preserve a continued existence
and identity2). And again, This hypothesis is the philo
sophical one of the double existence of perceptions
and objects; which pleases our reason, in allowing,
that our dependent perceptions are interrupted and
different; and at the same time is agreeable to the
imagination, in attributing a continued existence to
something else, which we call objects3). Now whatever
Hume may have read into the notions of the philosopher, it is
manifest, that, if he is to be true to his part, the philosopher must be
supposed to start all his arguments within the subjective sphere.
Unlike the vulgar man, the philosopher does not have to be weaned
from a natural reference to reality. He starts his theories from the
standpoint of the comparative subjectivist. He believes that there
is such a thing as reality, but he believes that we cannot know any
thing about this reality apart from our perceptions. We are always
confined, he believes, to the perception of images of realities, so that
we can never perceive the realities themselves. The philosopher lives
his life in the contemplation of reality, by means of the images of
it which he believes himself to perceive.

When the philosopher is asked to join in the discussion he is told,
that he must leave aside all reference to reality. But though he
resigns his ordinary indirect reference to reality through images, he
carries with him his representative theory, and this theory, being
translated into the new subjective terms, convinces him that he per
ceives his images of reality only by means of certain "ideas", which,
in their turn, represent those images. Let anyone who thinks that we
are doing the philosopher injustice, consider Hume's statement, that
the philosophical hypothesis has no primary recom
mendation, either to reason or the imagination4), but

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 491. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 499.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 502. 4) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 499.

133] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 431

acquires all its influence on the imagination from the
vulgar one1). Hume supposes that the philosophical hypothesis
owes its origin, as he falsely supposes the vulgar hypothesis also to
owe its, to the acceptance of a representative theory of perception.
In other words, Hume considers that the representative theory in
volved in the philosophical hypothesis is based upon, and depends
upon, the representative theory which he believes to be involved in
the vulgar hypothesis.

Hume stands in the whole matter, therefore, in this curious
situation, that all the arguments, which he brings against the philo
sophical hypothesis and its origin, can be, and should be, brought
also against his own account of the origin of the vulgar hypothesis,
which he professed to hold and which we attempted to rectify. In
criticising the philosopher, Hume was unwittingly criticising himself.

§ 38. Hume's Example of the comparatively 'Genuine' Identity.

We have now to examine the details of Hume's account of our
perception of the comparatively 'genuine' identity. Nothing is
more apt to make us mistake one idea for another -
Hume writes — than any relation betwixt them, which
associates them together in the imagination, and
makes it pass with facility from one to the other. Of
all relations, that of resemblance is in this respect
the most efficacious; and that because it not only
causes an association of ideas, but also of dispositions,
and makes us conceive the one idea by an act or opera
tion of the mind, similar to that by which we conceive
the other . . . . The mind- readily passes from one to
the other, and perceives not the change without a
strict attention, of which, generally speaking, 'tis
wholly incapable2).

We may suppose, then, that I am looking at an inkpot. I look at
it continuously for some minutes, without taking my eyes off it.
Under these conditions I perceive what we may agree to call an
identical inkpot. Being convinced that if the real inkpot were to be
identical, it would have to be continuously existent, and, as such,
existent independently of my perception of it, Hume passes, through
a misunderstanding of the nature of the dependence of the 'objective'

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 500. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, PP. 491-2.

432 C- V- Salmon, [134

upon the 'subjective', to the conclusion that I could not perceive any
such independent object. From thence, by a confusion of premise and
deduction, Hume passes further to the conclusion that no such inde
pendent object could exist, and arrives, by these most doubtful
means, at the sphere of the subjective. The inkpot, then, which I
perceive, and whose identity, together with the perception of whose
identity, is in question, is a "perception". The gist of Hume's descrip
tion is as follows.

In my perception of the identical inkpot a chain of 'events' is
taking place. I am suffering a sequence of uni-dimensional sensations,
or real perceptive experiences. These sensations resemble one
another. They are exactly alike in everything except their individual
singularity. Each of these sensations, or perceptive experiences, pro
duces in my mind an idea, that, perhaps, which is "intimately present
to the mind". This idea is an "image" of an "object". But the con
scious mind has a natural tendency towards laziness. When, therefore,
I notice how exactly resembling these individual singular experiences
or sensations are, I cease to allow each one to produce its own parti
cular idea, and make the "idea" produced by one of them, persist, or,
as Hume says, "subsist", and serve the turn of all the rest. But since
this "idea" is the "image" of an "object", when the "idea" persists,
the "object" which it represents, appears to persist. "The faculties
of the mind repose themselves in a manner, and take no more exercise
than what is necessary to continue that idea, of which we were
formerly possest, and which subsists without variation or inter
ruption."

Hume's description is ingenious, but it is based upon a variety of
distinctions which it is difficult to preserve. Although Hume's sceptical
conclusions should have the effect of altogether excluding the objective
world of reality from the discussion, much of the force of the descrip
tion rests on an assumption of the real discreteness of the inkpot
which we perceive. But the inkpot whose identity Hume ought to be
discussing is not a real inkpot. The inkpot with which his business
lies is a "perception". Nothing Hume has established up to this point
argues against the possibility of a perception being identical. On the
contrary, the fact that we perceive an identical inkpot, would, by
itself, seem to entail that the object in consciousness, the perception-
inkpot, was identical. Not being aware of the intentional structure of
consciousness, Hume persisted in making his account of the subjective
genesis of our perceptions an alternative, and, as it were, a second-best,
to accounting for them in terms of objective reality. He will let the

135] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 433

word 'perception' cover both the real object which is perceived, and
our perception of that object, with the object in consciousness on
which that perception rests. The need of offering a subjective account
of our perceptions only arises, Hume thinks, in the event of our
suspecting the reality with which they present us.

Hume's empirical prejudices affect his present position in two
ways. They affect his attitude, and his method. They spoil his atti
tude by engendering a false motive. Only because Hume believes
that there can be no such object in the real world as an identical
inkpot, does he consider himself bound to explain our perception of
it. They spoil his method by making him rest even our perception
of the identical inkpot upon a basis of reality. Hume's only reason
for denying the identity of the perception-inkpot is that he thinks
its identity is incompatible with the plurality and discreteness of the
real experiences in which we perceive it. He returns to his old
notion of the "fiction", and of the 'blind' imagination which has
created it. Even the perception-inkpot cannot be identical. The only
thing which is identical is our "image" of the perception-inkpot. The
mind is lazy and contents itself with one image, instead of enter
taining the number corresponding to the number of our real
experiences. And when the "image" subsists, the perception-inkpot,
which it represents, 'appears' to "subsists". There Hume makes use
of his paradoxical appearance theory, to distinguish between the
subjective appearance and the subjective 'reality' of a perception.
For this use of the distinction there is, of course, no ground. If an
inkpot, which is admitted to be a perception, appears to subsist, then
it must be supposed 'really' to subsist, for the nature of a perception
is to be perceived1). Hume's use of the real discreteness of our per
ceptive experiences, to deny the identity of the perception in those
experiences, is a case of the empirical hypostasis. The 'one' perceptive
experience of my looking at an inkpot for some minutes without
interruption, can no doubt be divided from the objective point of
view, into a number of different real experiences corresponding to the
number of real units of time which it occupies. But the number of

1) Hume's attempt to distinguish between the 'appearance' and the 'reality'
of a perception, must be contrasted with the proper division of the whole of the
subjective perception into noesis and noema. Hume's attempt is improper because
it rests on the notion of a division within the noema into appearance and reality,
which is foreign to it. The whole perception can be divided into noesis and noema,
perception of object, and object of perception; but neither of these will suffer any
further division of the kind which Hume attempts.

Husserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophic. X. 10

434 C. V. Salmon, [136

units contained in the real period of time, and the consequent number
of real perceptive experiences which I may be said to have enjoyed,
cannot influence the unity of the purely subjective experience with
which I am dealing when I am concerned with the perception-inkpot.
In the same way, the number of the several different perceptive-
experiences, which, as we shall see, are involved in Hume's example
of the comparatively 'false' identity, cannot affect the essential unity
or 'sameness' of the subjective perception, which ensues from the
identity of the subjective experiences. Hume's notion of the "fiction"
compels him to employ a representative theory, whose validity he
has himself already denied. The "fiction" rests on a real basis of
sensation. It cannot therefore 'be' identical. It can only 'appear to
be' identical. In other words, it can only he a 'representation' of
something which does not 'exist'. The nature of the representative
theory which Hume employs cannot be considered, until Hume's
second example of the perception of identity, his description of our
perception of a comparatively 'spurious' identity, has been considered.
To this we shall now turn. We shall find that Hume's blameworthiness
for using a representative theory is mitigated by the impossibility of
recognizing any difference separating the "idea" or "image" represen
tative, from the represented "object" or "perception".

§ 39. Hume's Example of the comparatively 'Spurious' Identity.

Now what other objects, Hume writes, besides iden
tical ones, are capable of placing the mind in the same
disposition, when it considers them, and of causing
the same uninterrupted passage of the imagination
from one idea to another? This question is of the last
importance. For if we can find any such objects, we
may certainly conclude, from the foregoing prin
ciple, that they are very naturally confounded with
identical ones, and are taken for them in most of our
reasonings. But, tho' this question be very important,
'tis not very difficult or doubtful. For I immediately
reply that a succession of related objects places the
mind in this disposition, and is considered with the
same smooth and uninterrupted progress of the ima
gination, as attends the view of the same invariable
objects. The very nature and essence of relation is
to connect our ideas with each other, and upon the

137] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 435

appearance of one, to facilitate the transition to
its correlative. The passage betwixt related ideas
is, therefore, so smooth and easy, that it produces
little alteration on the mind, and seems like the con
tinuation of the same action; and as the continuation
of the same action is an effect of the continued view
of the same object, 'tis for this very reason we attri
bute sameness to every succession of related objects.
The thought slides along the succession with equal
facility, as if it considered only one object; and there
fore confounds the succession with the identity1).

It is to be observed that, in the opening sentence of this passage,
Hume is guilty either of denying, or of disguising, what he has but
just established. "What other objects", Hume says, " beside iden
tical ones, are capable of placing the mind in the same disposition
etc.?" But the whole sense of the description which Hume gave of
our perception of identity lay in Hume's premise that the objects
perceived, the perception-inkpots namely, were not themselves iden
tical. We are supposing no such absurd view, as that Hume should,
by the word "objects", be referring now to objectivity itself. That
sphere is excluded from Hume's consideration, once and for all, by
the fact of its non-existence. Hume knew that no real identical
inkpot existed in a real external world. His business was to discover
whether there was such a thing as an identical perception. And only
on the ground of denying that there was an identical perception-
inkpot, was he impelled to a representative theory, and the suppo
sition of an identical "image" of a perception. Not the perception
itself, Hume asserted, but only the "idea" or "image" of a perception,
is identical. We might take his present admission of the identity of
the object in question, namely the "perception", as an argument to
add to our inability to distinguish between the "idea" or "image"
and the "object" supposed to be imaged, and our consequent inability
to deny the identity of the "perception" itself.

But Hume was impelled now by a fresh consideration to allow
the identity of the 'objects' which in the previous example he had
denied. In basing all our perception of identity upon a re
cognition, or perception, of resemblance, Hume had left himself
no means of accounting for any direct perception of resemblance.
For, according to his account, whenever the "mind" noted a re-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 492—3.

10*

436 C. V. Salmon, [138

semblance among the "images" or "ideas" before it, it contented
itself forthwith with one "image", which it allowed to stand for those
that came after it. But how, then, should we ever perceive objects
which we pronounce to be "resembling", and yet deny to be "iden
tical"? Our "mind", being lazy in its "disposition", will never allow
us to contemplate a series of resembling "objects" through a series
of resembling "images" to which it can so easily put a stop. It would
seem as though the "disposition" of our "mind" would effectually
prevent our ever perceiving a resemblance. For an answer to this
objection the reader must search Hume in vain. At one moment he
seems to wish to solve the difficulty by the simple process of denying
(as we have seen) the point on which his former explanation rested.
At another, he seems to recognize that he owes his reader some more
plausible account. This reasoning, it must be confest — he
observes - - in a footnote to this section — is somewhat ab
struse and difficult to be comprehended We

may observe, that there are two relations, and both
of them resemblances, which contribute to our mis
taking the succession of our interrupted perceptions
for an identical object. The first is the resemblance
of the perceptions; the second is the resemblance,
which the act of the mind in surveying a succession
of resembling objects bears to that in surveying an
identical object1). Hume's explanation of our perception of
the 'spurious' identity is to rest on the resemblance of a state of
mind, rather than on a recognition by the mind of the resemblance
of its images. The state of mind of coming to perceive a 'spurious'
identity resembles the state of mind of coming to perceive, or,
possibly, of perceiving, a 'genuine' identity; and the recognition by
the mind of this similarity of its two states induces it to accept one
image, instead of a sequence, with the perception of identity which
this acceptance produces. But here again Hume finds himself obliged
to admit the actual identity of the object as it is perceived. He
speaks of the state of the mind "in surveying an identical object".
Hume is hard pressed. Unless he can preserve some distinction
between his first and second examples, he has no ground left for
distinguishing between identity on the one hand and resemblance
on the other. He wants to deny the identity of the perception, and
to that end, is obliged to make that identity a "fiction", and to ex-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 493.

139] The Central Problem of David Hume'e Philosophy. 437

plain our perception of it in terms of a perception of resemblance.
But once this explanation is given, he becomes aware of having
endangered the very distinction between identity and resemblance
of which he supposes himself to have made use. He finds, in fact,
that either all perceived identity must be perceived resemblance,
or all perceived resemblance perceived identity. As quickly as
possible, then, Hume drops the means of his former account,
and proceeds to his second example, as if he had allowed, from
the beginning, that the first perception was an instance of an
identical perception.

But, even forgetting this inconsequence, Hume has not escaped
from his difficulty; he has only changed its orientation. If he suppose
himself to have accounted for our perception of identity, he cannot
suppose himself to have explained the nature of our perception of
resemblance. For if, in the first example, we perceived an identical
object, it was its perceived identity, and not its perceived resem
blance, which induced us to be satisfied with one "image" instead of
a series of "images". The resemblance of the so-called "images" can
have been produced by nothing except their "identity". It is obvious
that the explanation of our perception of resemblance would cause
Hume just as much trouble as, from the other stand-point, the ex
planation of our perception of identity, From the one point of view,
having perceived a resemblance, why should the mind go on to per
ceive an identity? From the other point of view, having perceived
an identity, why should the mind work backward to perceive a re
semblance? This latter problem Hume does not attempt to solve. He
could indeed have made no progress in that direction, until he had
examined introspectively the assertion of the "unity" of an object,
which he considered as a tautology. "An object is the same with itself".
This "unity" of the object in consciousness is the foundation of its
ability equally to be identical with, and to be resembling to, other
objects. This "unity" is no other than the perception or "idea"
when it is purged of its association with any "image", and is allowed
to be present itself to consciousness within the reflective perception.
That it is always identical with itself means that it can be present
to consciousness on more than one occasion; and, that it can resemble
other perceptions means that it can be retained in consciousness as
an identity by the memory.

As Hume's two examples do not differ from one other, as he
wishes it to be supposed, by being, the one a perception of a 'genuine',
and the other a perception of a 'spurious' identity, we can accept

438 C- V- Salmon, [140

them as being, what they are in fact, two versions of a perception
of a similar kind of identity. What really differentiates the examples
from one another is not the quality of the perceived identity, but
a difference in the circumstances from which the identity is perceived.
His first description, that of the processes involved in "viewing any
object which preserved a perfect identity", is applicable to a man
perceiving an identical object within the unity of one real perceptive
experience, as when he gazes uninterruptedly upon any object for
the space of some definite time. His second description, that of the
processes involved in "viewing a succession of related objects", is
applicable to a man perceiving an identical object through the variety
of several real perceptive experiences, as when he opens and shuts
his eyes successively upon one object. Concerning the circumstances
of his second instance Hume is explicit. We find by experience, —
he writes, — that there is such a constancy in almost all
the impressions of the senses, that their interruption
produces no alteration on them, and hinders them not
from returning the same in appearance and in situ
ation as at their first existence. I survey the furniture
of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open
them; and find the new perceptions to resemble per
fectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This
resemblance is obser v'd in a thousand instances, and
naturally connects together our ideas of these inter
rupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and
conveys the mind with an easy transition from one
to another. An easy transition or passage of the ima
gination, along the ideas of these different and inter
rupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of
mind with that in which we consider one constant and
uninterrupted perception1).

The different angle from which the two experiences are described,
might, perhaps, be made to account for the discrepancies between the
descriptions, of which there are not a few.

But we are not concerned with the details of these,
except in so far as they are pertinent to the exactness of
two conceptions, which reside in these examples, and are of capital
importance.

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 493.

141] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

439

§ 40. Hume's notions of the "disposition of the mind", and of
the "idea", set free from the results of his Empirical Prejudice.

The worst consequence of Hume's sceptical premise, that there
was in general no such thing as a transcendental world of reality, was
that it forced him to find a place for reality as it were 'within' the
subjective sphere, and eventually to identify consciousness with
reality through the means of sensation. Sensation appeared to him
to offer a means of crossing from things psychical to things physical,
and vice versa. But for this hypostasis, Hume's scepticism corrected,
as he allowed it to be, by a mere change from a philosophical to a
practical attitude towards life, might have been wholly commendable,
as having had the fortunate effect of driving his enquiries into the
realm of the subjective. As it is, Hume's empirical hypostasis is apt
to spoil his most intuitive observations of consciousness in 'action'
by originating some reference of them to reality. There is no
more valuable and suggestive notion to be found in the Treatise,
than Hume's present notion of the identical "idea", falsely called
"image", and of the "disposition" or "act of the mind in surveying
an identical object". When these two notions are purged from their
empirical associations, the "idea" which is the product of the "dis
position" can be converted into the "phenomenon", which is the
product of the purely conscious "act". The "disposition of the mind"
has to be rid of its connection with the "animal spirits" of which
Hume speaks, and of its connection with "causality".

The "idea" has to be dissociated from Hume's notion of the
"object", which always bears with it an empirical reference on the
one hand to that external world of reality which Hurne denies to
exist, and on the other hand to the act of sensation regarded in
physiological terms. Beyond this again, the "idea" has to be dis
sociated from Hume's present connection of it with an "image ,
which is to be the middle term of his representative theory. This
is not difficult to do. We have to cling fast to the "idea" as the
identical "perception", which is produced by the disposition and
processes of the "mind". The "idea" in the examples is the
identical inkpot-as-it-is-perceived by the perceiving subject. The
"idea" is that identical object which is left, the noema in noesis,
when the real inkpot-of-the-external-world has been excluded from
consideration.

Hume himself was not able to identify the "idea" with his re
presentative notion of the "image", except in most confused and

440 C. V. Salmon, [142

obscure terms. The words "idea", "image", "perception", and "ob
ject", are used so carelessly, and so freely interchanged with one
another, that after the most careful examination of Hume's two sets
of descriptions, it is quite impossible to be sure whether he supposes
the image to 'represent' the object-in-consciousness, or the object-in-
consciousness the image.

In the first of the two examples we are supposed to notice the
"resemblance" of the "objects" perceived, and so, being lazy, to con
tent ourselves with one "idea". The "idea" is here falsely connected
with the "image" of the "objects", instead of with the "object" itself.
"When we fix our thought on any object" — Hume wrote (Refer back
to p. 130) - "and suppose it to continue the same for some time;
'tis evident we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and never
exert ourselves to produce any new idea or image of the object."
This must imply that if not the "objects" themselves, then at least
our consciousness of those objects, has the power to produce an
"image" of them. But this involves a complete revolution of the
system of representation: for whoever heard of an object represen
ting an image, instead of an image an object?

As Hume explains his example, three processes seem to take
place. First, thanks to an image, we perceive an object, then, thanks
to perceiving the resemblance of a sequence of objects, we content
ourselves with one image which we allow to 'subsist', and thirdly,
thanks to this one subsisting image, we perceive one identical object.
But this is absurd. If it is only by means of an image that we per
ceive the object at all, we cannot contrive to alter the number or kind
of the images by means of a direct reference to the objects. If, there
fore, we perceived any resemblance before we perceived the identity,
it would necessarily be the resemblance of the images, and not the
resemblance of the objects, which we perceived. And, similarly, we
could not perceive the identity of an object, until we had first
perceived the identity of an image. But if we perceived the identity
of the image, we should not need to perceive the identity of the
object, for there would be no means of distinguishing the image from
the object. These would, in fact, be not only identical with themselves,
but also identical with each other.

What applies to the first example, applies equally to the second.
There is no room within Hume's explanation for the distinction
between image and object. His own criticism of representation in
general, that we do not perceive two sets, but only one set, of objects,
is applicable to the present instance. We do not perceive an identical

143] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy.

441

image and an identical object, but only an identical object. That,
therefore, in Hume's explanation, which is allowed to be identical,
namely, the "idea" or "image", becomes the identical "object" or
"perception", and, as such, must drop the alternative title of
"image"; for there is no sense in talking of an idea as an image
of itself. The idea is the perception, and the identical object in
consciousness.

Induced partly by his sceptical prejudices, and partly by an
original conception of the subjective sphere, Hume convinced himself,
in his attempt to account for our perception of identity, that the
"perception" which was identical was a subjective object in con
sciousness, the object namely, as the subject perceived it, which is
a phenomenon, or, as Hume called it, an "idea". Working from this
conviction, Hume may be said to have discovered phenomena by a
reflective observation of the processes involved in consciousness in
the act of perception. His actual descriptions of these processes are
inaccurate and often clumsy. The distinctions of which Hume makes
use, in his account of how a perception of resemblance leads to a
perception of identity, are difficult to preserve. His descriptions are
seldom free from a conception of 'activity' which is drawn from the
physical world of reality. His empirical hypostases tend to convert
the subjective "disposition of the mind" into something physiological
or psycho-physical, and to connect the phenomena or "ideas" which
this "disposition" produces, with the utterly useless and fallacious
notion of "images" employed in representative theories of perception.
The representative theory, to which Hume considers himself driven,
in spite of his previous condemnation of it, is itself the result of
his empiricism, which not only made him sceptical concerning the
existence of the external world, but left him no means of connecting
a subjective consciousness with the same. But, in his inability to relate
the subjective with the transcendental, Hume suffered from a lack
common to all philosophers until the time of Brentano, the lack
namely of the conception of intention, and the intentional character
of consciousness.

§ 41. Hume deserts the Phenomenal sphere. Identity is converted
into an Abstract Idea. Parts III and IV of Hume's "System".

The tripartite division of the subjective act of perception, to
which Hume was led in his attempt to explain how we are able to
perceive identity, carried with it this much at least in its favour, that

442 c- v- Salmon, [144

it could be translated, by the suppression of its middle term, into the
proper division of the conscious act into noesis and noema. But in
the Third and Fourth parts of his System, for the sake of giving some
account of our belief in the continued existence of objects, the per
ception of whose identity he has established, Hume sees fit to
hypostasise a modicum of the "disposition of the mind" into a real
psycho-physical experience. Thus it is that he turns a three-fold
division of perception, which was not beyond the reach of subjective
conversion into phenomenology, into a four-fold division which
carries him ever further and further from the phenomenological bias.
As he goes he abandons his representative theory. But along with
that he flings to the winds his notion of the "disposition" and the
"idea". We hear no more of these.

The change of attitude is made with astonishing rapidity. Even in
the summary he gives of his account of our perception of identity, which
precedes his consideration of continuous existence, he rejects all the
careful distinctions on which that account was based. The persons,
who entertain this opinion concerning the identity
of our resembling perceptions he writes are in

general all the unthinking and unphilosophical part
of mankind (that is, all of us at one time or other) . . . .
. . . . The very image, which is present to the senses,
is with us the real body, and 'tis to these interrupted
images we ascribe a perfect identity1). In this crude
language Hume merges all his terms. He actually speaks here of
"interrupted" "images" which are "present to the senses"! But Hume
is urged now by another need. Just as he founded his problem of
identity upon the seeming irreconcilability of the interruptedness of
our experiences with the identity of our perceptions — and for the
sake of keeping up their irreconcilability was willing to confuse the
differences of significance contained in the one word 'perception', and
to misrepresent the vulgar man — so now, in order to found the
problem of continued existence upon a seeming contradiction, he is
willing to forget his solution of the problem of identity, and having
but just reconciled interruption and identity, is willing to set them
once more by the heels.

The very image, he writes, which is present to the
senses, is with us the real body; and 'tis to these inter
rupted images we ascribe a perfect identity. But as

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 493.

145] The Central Problem of bavid Hume's Philosophy. 443

the interruption of the appearance seems contrary
to the identity, and naturally leads us to regard these
resembling perceptions as different from each other,
we here find ourselves at a loss how to reconcile such
opposite opinions. The smooth passage of the imagi
nation along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The inter
rupted manner of their appearance makes us consider
them as many resembling, but still distinct beings,
which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity
arising from this contradiction produces a properi-
sion to unite these broken appearances by the fiction
of a continu'd existence, which is the third part of
that hypothesis I proposed to explain1).

Nothing is more certain from experience, Hume
continues, than that any contradiction either to the sen
timents or passions gives a sensible uneasiness ....
.... Now there being here an opposition betwixt the
notion of the identity of resembling perceptions, and
the interruptions of their appearance, the mind must
be uneasy in that situation, and will naturally seek
relief from that uneasiness. Since the uneasiness
arises from the opposition of two contrary principles,
it must look for relief by sacrificing the one to the
other. But as the smooth passage of our thought along
our resembling perceptions, makes us ascribe to them
an identity, we can never without reluctance yield up
that opinion. We must, therefore, turn to the other
side, and suppose that our perceptions are no longer
interrupted, but preserve a continu'd as well as an
invariable existence, and are by that means entirely
the same2).

But the "opposition", betwixt the notion of the identity of
resembling perceptions and the interruption of their appearance,
was no more 'difficult' than the parallel notion of the 'opposition'
between the identity and the interrupted appearances of real objects
in the transcendent world. Hume's "smooth passage of our thought"
turned out to be not a transition of perception from resemblance to
resemblance, but simply the perception of an identity. In the case

1) Gr. & Gr. I, PP. 493-4. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 494.

444 c- v- Salmon, [146

of the perception of objects in the transcendental world, it has to be
granted that the identity which we perceive in them is inseparable
from the perception of their continued and invariable existence. The
perception of any 'object' whatsoever is inseparable from the per
ception of its identity. To say that our perception of the identity of
the objects in the transcendental world is dependent on our perception
of their continued existence is to put the cart before the horse. It
would be better to say that our perception of their continued and
invariable existence is dependent upon our perception of their
identity. For unless we perceive its identity (Hume's "unity") we
cannot perceive any object at all. Continuous existence happens to be
the mode in which a certain set of objects, namely, realities, in the
transcendental world, 'exist'.

When Hume turns to the other alternative, and instead of
supposing that our perceptions are interrupted and therefore not
identical, supposes that they are identical and therefore not inter
rupted — "our perceptions are no longer interrupted, but preserve a
continu'd as well as an invariable existence, and are by that means
entirely the same" - he is again at fault in presuming that our per
ceptions cannot be both at once, but must be either the one or the
other. It is obvious that an object cannot both appear and not appear
to the same subject at the same time. But that is not relevant to the
question whether an object is exhausted in its appearance, so that if
something 'like' the same object appear again later, the subject is
justified in believing that it cannot be the same. A distinction must
be drawn between noesis and noema, so that a man may say, the
identical perception is now before my consciousness, and is now no
longer before, it, and is now before it again, etc. Hume would appear
to realize, where the difficulty lies, when he says .... as the
appearance of a perception in the mind, and its
existence seem at first sight entirely the same, it may
be doubted, whether we can ever assent to so palpable
a contradiction, and suppose a perception to exist
without being present to the mind. In order to clear
up this matter, he proceeds, and learn how the inter
ruption in the appearance of a perception implies not
necessarily an interruption in its existence 'twill be
proper to touch upon some principles, whi c h we shall
have occasion to explainmore fully after wards. The
reference is to Part IV. Sect. 6., where we are left in no doubt,
that Hume misinterprets the material in his hands. In this latter

147] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 445

section identity is conceived as an abstract idea, a "fiction" in the
worst sense of the word. There is no such thing anywhere as identity,
nor can we ever anywhere perceive such a thing. But yet, Hume
supposes that we are able to believe in identity, owing to the
nature of our disposition. In order to satisfy its lazy desire to
convert a plurality of resembling entities into a single entity, the
mind treads from one contradiction to another, until it reaches
a stage of invention, where they seem to be resolved. This
interpretation of Hume's conception of identity as an abstract idea
may be confirmed by some further quotations from this section.
We have a distinct idea of an object, Hume writes, that
remains invariable and uninterrupted thro' a supposed
variation of time; and this idea we call that of iden
tity or sameness1). It is this idea by which we falsely qualify,
the objects which we perceive, whether these objects are supposed
to belong to the external world, or to our individual selves or ego's.
Hume treats these two sets of 'objects' separately, but in both cases
he speaks of the attribution of identity as a "mistake". He says,
Our propensity to this mistake is so great from the
resemblance above-mention' d, that we fall into it b e -
foreweareaware. . . .2). He even refers to it as an "absurdity".
In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often
feign some new and unintelligible principle that con
nects the objects together, and prevents their inter
ruption or variation3).

In one sentence we find the conception of the subjective faculty
of genesis in consciousness, which we have tried to guard so jealously,
abandoned in a now avowedly sceptical use of the "imagination",
we feign the continu'd existence of the per
ceptions of our senses, — Hume writes — and run into the
notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise

the variation we may farther observe, that

where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propen-
sion to confound identity with relation is so great that
we are apt to imagine something unkown and myste
rious, connecting the parts, beside their relation4).

Hume sums up the matter in a passage which leaves no further
room for doubt. Thus the controversy concerning iden-

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 535. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, pp. 535—6.

3) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 536. *) Gr. & Gr. I, P. 536.

446 C- V Salmon, [148

tity — he writes — is not merely a dispute of words. For
when we attribute identity, in an improper .sense, to
variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not
confin'd to the expression, but is commonly attended
with a fiction, either of something invariable or
uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inex
plicable, or at least with a propensity to such fic
tions1). It is to be presumed that Hume makes his reference to a
"proper sense" of the attribution of identity, not for the sake of
preserving any memory of his former virtues, but merely to keep for
himself the pretension, at least, to some means of distinguishing ob
jects which appear to be identical from those which appear to be
resembling only.

§ 42. A concluding Estimate of Hume's position.

It must always be regretted that Hume confined himself to the
perception, and did not seek to extend his problems to the other
activities of consciousness. He speaks of identity in general, as if the
whole problem were set within the faculty of perception, and as if the
only 'objects' about whose identity any question could be raised, were
the reality in the external world, and the psycho-physical ego. And,
having no proper notion of space, Hume was free to treat these two
upon the same level. The objections which he brought against the
identity of the former, he could bring equally against that of the
latter. Hume did not succeed in touching the true generality of the
problem. How is an identical object possible in consciousness? Hume
should have asked; or, What is identical in consciousness, when I
say that I perceive an identical object? The question which Hume
did ask, What is the difference between the "appearance" and the
s "existence" of the perceptions? should be converted into: How, within
the subjective sphere, can the object of which I am conscious be

'distinguished from the experience in which I am conscious of it?
Hume's "existence" should have become the identical 'object', the ob
ject of the intention of the consciousness, the "idea", falsely called
"image", whereto the "mind" can return innumerable times, and
always to an exact identity. Hume's "appearance" should have become
the experiential or pure 'psychological' 'experience', the 'conditions'
and 'moments' of the "mind's" consciousness of its object. The
problem might have been extended to cover all the fields, the logical,

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 536.

149] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 447

for instance, as well as the perceptive. Hume might have considered
the identity of a judgment. How can the proposition 2 + 2 = 4, be
separated from the 'moments' in which it is apprehended, and remain
the proposition 2 + 2 = 4, whose identity can be re-apprehended
innumerable times? Hume might have extended his problem to the
aesthetic. What constitutes the identity of a Beethoven Symphony,
he might have asked, that it is separable from all the scripts which
contain it, and all the representations of it by orchestras which I
can hear? The answer to these questions lies open to the intro
spective gaze, and may be expressed in a description of the processes
of consciousness which are there revealed.

Hume's 'sceptical' prejudices concerning the external world need
not — we have often asserted — have spoiled his subjective obser
vations of their value. Even had the philosophic doubt grown strong
enough to overcome the opposite assurance of everday, Hume's
impeachment, had it grown to such, of the authority of the con
scious intuition, need not have robbed his philosophy of its value.
In concluding that, when we practise our accustomed perception of
the external world, we are not receiving the fullest evidence of our
perceptions, since a little examination reveals their 'falsity', Hume
would by no means have escaped from the problem of identity. The
question, What is identical in consciousness? would have remained to
be solved, albeit in the terms of hallucination rather than perception.

We can find a parallel to Hume's suggested falsity of perception,
in other spheres. Suppose that the proposition 2 + 2 = 5, be present
to the mind. If the mind believes it, the proposition is a "fiction"
in Hume's sceptical sense. It represents something which cannot 'be'
as it appears. We must conclude that the intellectual apprehension
was not made with the fullest evidence, since a little examination
reveals its falsity. But, taken as a 'false' or 'imaginary' proposition,
it has an identity which may usefully be investigated and described.
The mind can return to the proposition 2 + 2 = 5 innumerable times.
The mind can 'mean' it, in its identity, as often as it will. A parallel
could be given of a memory which has been qualified and shown
to be inexact by some other person, The memory would have been
shown to be 'false', but it could be remembered itself, for all that,
and believed either to be true or false. From the philosophical
point of view Hume supposed perception to be deceptive and
illusory; but he needed still to examine the nature of that per
ception. He did examine it, and found it consistent with itself, within
itself, although it seemed to contradict the dictates of his reason. So

448 C. V. Salmon, [15Q

Hume could do no more than leave the attitudes of everyday and of
philosophy at loggerheads, and profess to be alternately credulous
and a sceptic. But he needed not to have made a battleground of his
faculties. Each faculty must be allowed to be autonomous with regard
to its own data. If the perception present us with a consistent world,
we must believe it, and practice in it as we can. Indeed, as Hume
simply said, we do believe it. The "studied principle" cannot prevail.
In the sphere of perception the reason has no rights. Let the per
ception be taken in full evidence, and, beyond the possibility of the
Cartesian doubt, I cannot question it. For, in fact, as Hume urged,
where the processes synthesize in consciousness, the belief naturally
follows. Belief, Hume realized, is nothing but the result of synthesis.
There is protention in consciousness. The "mind" expects and is
satisfied, and, where the satisfaction is perfect, it cannot doubt.

But now, instead of using his opportunities, Hume constrains
himself to contradict himself, and become empirical, and and profess
a comparative subjectivism and the novelty of 'scepticism'. Hume
interprets the "existence" of "perceptions" and their "appearance" in
a real sense. The world itself is made out of "perceptions" he says.
The world is an "idea". The individual is a "bundle of experiences".

But our business does not lie with Hume's conclusions. Although
they are usually taken as the epitome of Hume's contribution to
philosophy, they lie outside of, and are foreign to, his subjective
conception of the philosophical problem. The task of this essay is
already done. The second half of the Third Part of Hume's System,
concerned with the objectification of the perceptions, and the attemp
ted "proof" that a perception of being may be sometimes "present
to", and sometimes "absent from" a "mind", without implying a
necessary "interruption in its existence", has been quoted, (Refer
back to p. 125 et seq.).

The supposition of the continu'd existence of sen
sible objects or perceptions, Hume writes, implies not
necessarily an interruption in the existence. We may
easily indulge our inclination to that supposition.
When the exact resemblance of our perceptions makes
us ascribe to them an identity, we may remove the
seeming interruption by feigning a continu'd being,
which may fill those intervals, and preserve a perfect
and entire identity to our perceptions1). The price at

1) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 496.

151] The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. 449

which such a 'solution' is reached is the sacrifice of all the distinctions
which were involved in Hume's treatment of identity. When the per
ceptions were identical, they were subjective perceptions, perceptions
of a subject with an object in the perceptions; but now that they are
continuously existent, they are no longer perceptions in the sub
jective sense. It is no longer objects in perception, which are per
ceived to be either identical or continuously existent; but the per
ceptions themselves, as objects out of perception, are supposed to
be both the one and the other.

The belief, accompanying this very remarkable 'perceptive-ex
perience' is re-introduced as a mode of "vivacity". Hume says, 1 1
has been proved already, that belief in general con
sists in nothing, but the vivacity of an idea: and that
an idea may acquire this vivacity by its relation to
some present instance1).

But now, by confounding all his previous distinctions, by con
fusing "fictions" with "realities", "objects" with "perceptions", and
all of them with psycho-physical experiences, Hume succeeds in de
riving the vivacity of the belief in identity, in body, and continued
existence, from "some lively impressions of the memory". Our
memory — Hume writes — presents us with a vast number
of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling
each other, that return at different distances of
time, and after considerable interruptions. This re
semblance gives us a propension to consider these
interrupted perceptions as the same; and also a pro-
pension to connect them by a contin u'd existence, in-
order to justify this identity, and avoid the contra
diction, in which the interrupted appearance of these
perceptions seems necessarily to involve us2).

But it is time to forego the examination of these contradictory
'conclusions', in which Hume involves himself, and in so doing departs
ever further from the former virtues of his subjective idealism.

1) Gr. & Gr.I, p. 496. 2) Gr. & Gr. I, p. 496.

Husserl, Jahrbuch f. Philosophic. X. 11

\

I.

APR 2 4

to

N

Tl

cv

Os